An investigation of network enterprise risk management techniques to support military net-centric operations by Teply, John F.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2009-09
An investigation of network enterprise
risk management techniques to support
military net-centric operations
Teply, John F.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
AN INVESTIGATION OF NETWORK ENTERPRISE RISK 









 Thesis Advisor: Edouard Kujawski 
 Second Reader: Jean Johnson 





















REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
September 2009 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE An Investigation of Network Enterprise Risk 
Management Techniques to Support Military Net-Centric Operations 
6. AUTHOR(S) John F. Teply  
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER  




 AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
System security and information assurance requirements and specifications incorporated into the architectural design of a 
network enterprise must be driven by an adaptable and evolving network enterprise risk management plan. Network Risk 
Management must start at concept design and relate to the network’s Concept of Operations. The purpose of this thesis is to 
examine some of the essential elements necessary in a network enterprise risk management plan for a complex global networked 
system similar to the Global Information Grid (GIG). It compares the current Department of Defense (DoD) framework for risk 
management with other popular network risk management process models. An important but difficult part of the risk management 
process is determining the value of network assets. Another important, but overlooked element of risk management processes, is 
evaluating the network for resiliency; the ability to return to normal in time to prevent the compromise of a mission. The 
contention is that risk management planning must include planning for network survivability and resiliency. Selected elementary 
network architectures are analyzed for attributes of the architectures that promote information assurance qualities of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Finally, recommendations are made on applying important elements of network risk 
management into the conceptual architecture of a global network. 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
187 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Network Enterprise Risk Management, Network Survivability and 
Resiliency, Vulnerability, Threat, Impact, Global Information Grid 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
ii 






















Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
AN INVESTIGATION OF NETWORK ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 
TECHNIQUES TO SUPPORT MILITARY NET-CENTRIC OPERATIONS 
 
 
John F. Teply 
Contractor, Cubic Applications, Inc., San Diego, CA 
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1972 
M.S., Naval Postgraduate School, 1980 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 















Approved by:  Edouard Kujawski, PhD 









David Olwell, PhD 
Chairman, Department of Systems Engineering 
 
iv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
v 
ABSTRACT 
System security and information assurance requirements and specifications 
incorporated into the architectural design of a network enterprise must be driven by an 
adaptable and evolving network enterprise risk management plan. Network Risk 
Management must start at concept design and relate to the network’s Concept of 
Operations. The purpose of this thesis is to examine some of the essential elements 
necessary in a network enterprise risk management plan for a complex global networked 
system similar to the Global Information Grid (GIG). It compares the current Department 
of Defense (DoD) framework for risk management with other popular network risk 
management process models. An important but difficult part of the risk management 
process is determining the value of network assets. Another important, but overlooked, 
element of risk management processes, is evaluating the network for resiliency; the 
ability to return to normal in time to prevent the compromise of a mission. The contention 
is that risk management planning must include planning for network survivability and 
resiliency. Selected elementary network architectures are analyzed for attributes of the 
architectures that promote information assurance qualities of confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability. Finally, recommendations are made on applying important elements of 
network risk management into the conceptual architecture of a global network. 
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The Department of Defense and the military services have clearly articulated their 
vision of information operations and the use of networking as the future strategy for 
military operations based on knowledge superiority. Computers and the automated 
processing capability inherent in them used to be seen as one of the technology tools in a 
tool set to increase the effectiveness of major weapons platforms and maneuver warfare, 
including increasing capability in operations, training, logistics, and communications 
within the different warfare areas. Today, that vision has expanded to raise the 
precedence of information technology and networking power and put it in a warfare area 
of its own. Information and its collection, manipulation, distribution, use, and protection 
are considered vital to the future of warfare and are central to the defense strategy of the 
nation. Concomitant with the increase of importance of information superiority, and Net-
centric Operations, the reality is that the systems that make this vision a reality are 
continuously threatened by malicious entities that use viably ingenious ways to gain 
access to those information systems; disrupt and deny valid users access; and steal, 
fabricate or distort the programs and data resident in these systems. To make the Global 
Information Grid (GIG) a reality, DoD must follow rigorous discipline in systems 
engineering principles and a robust risk management process, translating desired 
capabilities into detailed requirements and specifications that drives the architecture of 
the global network.  This is no small task.  The complexity and expense of tying together 
legacy and developing systems into a global network that connect with diverse state-of-
the-art communications links is a huge endeavor.  The network is populated by 
tremendous amounts of data, which interface and interoperate with many systems of 
varying functionality.  The network is intended to provide the right information at all 
levels of command.  Security requirements drive the architecture of the GIG network as 
well.  
This thesis investigates possible solutions to concerns of the U.S. Navy leadership 
with regard to network enterprise operations and security protection procedures, focusing 
on the following network enterprise risk management issues. 
xx 
• The considerations in developing and improving network enterprise risk 
management planning implementation of the processes presently used by 
DoD and the military services for their information systems and networks 
on the global domain as Net-Centric Operations, Net-Centric Warfare, and 
Information Dominance. 
• The attributes of a robust network enterprise risk management program 
and how it should be implemented so that it supports the confidentiality, 
availability, integrity, reliability, and trustworthiness of the military’s 
critical information resources so they act as an enabler to mission success. 
• Some of the architectural implications in the design of hardware 
(topology) and software (network management and control) and the 
process imperatives in the operation of networked information systems 
that make a global network system survivable and resilient to attack from 
hostile forces. 
• Some of the popular risk management processes in the public domain and 
how their methodology might enhance DoD’s network enterprise risk 
management process to achieve a survivable and resilient enterprise 
network and make decisions on the cost/benefit or value of the choices in 
implementing network security measures, ensuring quality of service and 




Networks are architected in different arrangements to provide different 
capabilities while efficiently using available resources. The way a network is architected 
can introduce vulnerabilities through the make-up of the network components, by the 
way the components are connected, and by the methods employed and the layer of the 
network where they are employed to provide protection for network and information 
assets. No matter how elegant the architecture of a network, designed to provide a set of 
services, a network compromised by the enemy could affect operations from mission 
degradation to mission failure; from the top level of the chain of command to the tactical 
units in the field. As network vulnerabilities are discovered and an assessment of the risks 
associated with those vulnerabilities is conducted, it is important to determine what 
network quality of service attributes that U.S. protection services and countermeasures 
(technological, procedural, or managerial) seek to secure or enhance through the 
protection of data and program resources, and how these attributes can be secured 
through innovative system design and network architecting. It is important in the 
xxi 
development and operation of a network (as well as any system) to learn how 
vulnerabilities are created and how they are discovered. This information provides system 
developers with valuable experience to draw upon when developing follow-on systems 
The topological arrangement of a network is the hardware architecture, and 
different topologies introduce different vulnerabilities. Mesh network architecture offers 
the network superior resilience from attack, but these systems are costly and complex to 
set up. The software network management of a mesh network can be quite convoluted 
and it is hard to monitor the effectiveness of the management and security of the network. 
However, if the threat of attack against the value of the assets in this type of network is 
high, the cost and the complexity of design and installation may be worth it. The GIG is a 
combination of many architectural topology arrangements, riding on the backbone of the 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) intranet bus. For this reason, a 
comprehensive enterprise risk management program has to consider the GIG architecture 
from the top down in aggregation and from the bottom up as each type of topology used 
in interconnecting networks affects the enterprise vulnerability picture. The architectural 
framework of the GIG and of the Navy’s FORCENet follows the International 
Standardization Organization (ISO) layered approach but in three main layers. It is the 
Navy’s intent that information assurance, quality of service, and Human Systems 
Integration activities penetrate all three layers of the reference model.  A plan to evaluate 
and mitigate risks to network enterprises must consider the network’s layer abstractions.  
For the network’s security software logic and mechanisms to operate correctly, it is 
important to know in which network layer abstraction a risk mitigating strategy will be  
defined and implemented. 
 
NETWORK ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
That adversaries are preparing to deny U.S. and allied forces free access to 
information supporting superiority in military operations is sound judgment supported by 
much evidence.  Along with possible organized (on a national or sovereign scale) efforts 
to deny the U.S. military access to their information, many independent actors exist with 
an agenda and motivations not necessarily aligned with any cause who relish the 
xxii 
challenge of breaking into networks containing high value information; not the least of 
these is the U.S. military’s network systems. For this reason, DoD has mandated that a 
major part of the development and operation of information system networks is the 
requirement for a robust information security program, primarily centered on Information 
Assurance (IA). IA is chartered to develop, test and implement measures to protect 
networks and information systems’ assets while at the same time meeting the sometimes-
conflicting objective of maintaining maximum network accessibility to the war fighter 
who needs it; many times under hostile conditions or harsh environments. 
As the expertise of the threat in being able to “hack” into networks continues to 
grow at an ever increasing pace, the costs of countering that threat can skyrocket as well. 
The complexity of the software programs and architecture designed to mitigate the risks 
of today and to anticipate the risks of tomorrow brings with it higher costs in technology 
acquisition, costs of training operators in its installation and operation, the engineering 
costs of design and testing to ensure the right countermeasures have been acquired and 
applied, and the costs of vigilance in monitoring the network for intrusion. As Bruce 
Schneider said in CIO magazine concerning network security: “I’m here to tell you it’s 
not about the technology” (Schneider, 2001). Since it is increasingly difficult for 
countermeasure technology to keep up, he advocates a program of continuous monitoring 
of the network’s operation. With the responsibilities of normal watch standing duties, the 
added monitoring of network operations places added burden on manpower costs, both 
real and opportunity.  
To be able to mitigate risk to the operations of a local network or an enterprise 
system of systems and achieve operational or strategic goals, identified risks need to be 
assessed to make the decision whether it is worth the cost in funding or opportunity to 
plan and implement a mitigation strategy for that risk. The answer to the question “What 
is this mitigation strategy protecting?” has a direct effect on the mitigation strategy 
employed. For risks of little or no impact no matter the likelihood of occurrence, the 
mitigation strategy may be one of accepting the risk as is. Implementation of security 
requirements that restrict functionality of a network incurs monetary as well as 
opportunity costs, life cycle costs, and some hidden or latent costs (such as stakeholder 
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costs in the future). If the system and its information that is protected have little impact 
on the success of achieving the desired effect, it might be prudent to reallocate that 
funding and technical solution elsewhere. 
Network enterprise risk analysis is an important part of the implementation of a 
network’s security posture as it overlaps with the IA program. Network enterprise risk 
management should be implemented at the beginning of a network system’s lifecycle. 
The risk analysis and management process follows the steps of general risk management 
processes for safety, program, operational, and enterprise risks in organizations. Unique 
to network risk management is the concentration on an unpredictable threat who is 
motivated to exploit network vulnerabilities that the threat discovers for an ultimate goal 
of gaining something of value. 
Drawing at once on the concepts of game theory and fault trees used in reliability 
analysis, attack trees can be useful in identifying and analyzing network vulnerabilities 
and the paths that can be exploited to gain access to the assets of the network. At the 
same time, they are useful in gaming the attributes of a threat that would make the threat 
more or less likely to make an attack on the network. 
The risk management plan must take into account not only the threats, system 
vulnerabilities, impacts and mitigation implementation plans; but it must go one step 
beyond to determine how to architect the system for survivability and system 
recoverability. The network must be designed from well-considered requirements to 
resist, recognize and recover from an attack. The risk management plan must be mission-
oriented. It must also be balanced, considering the costs of various risk mitigation and 
survivability design choices in terms of acquisition resources and in the effects of those 
choices on end-user functionality. The decisions made as a result of the risk mitigation 
and survivability planning and implementation drive the network architecture and design, 
and properly executed, result in an interoperable and networked system of systems and 
family of systems providing the war fighter with the right information at the right time, 
and easily operated programs and application to put ordnance on target and to keep the 
enemies’ ordnance off us. 
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NETWORK SURVIVABILITY AND RESILIENCY 
 
While risk analysis and management are designed to find and fix vulnerabilities 
that put the network at risk by the threat that exploits them with the intent to gain access 
to valuable information system assets, survivability is the attribute of a system that 
defines how it deals with an actual exploitation of network vulnerabilities that have 
remained after mitigation implementation. It is the architecting of a system before attack 
to respond to attack after other risk mitigation implemented plans have been activated to 
resist attack by mitigation plans that have reduced network vulnerability. In other words, 
survivability and resiliency are defense in depth for a network by designing the capability 
to continue action to resist and recover after an attack scenario. While it is vitally 
important to manage the risk to a network before attack and to make every effort to keep 
it from happening, a further defense mechanism and process needs to be in place in the 
event of an attack. 
Survivability is scenario-driven, and defining survivability requirements with 
which to build a survivable network system is challenging. For this reason, the architect 
must look at the network’s boundaries, the interface to other networks, and define where 
the line is drawn to resist attacks from threats that come in various ways with an array of 
capabilities. Once an attacker has penetrated a network, the architect must look at the 
capability of the system to adapt and recover while stopping the attacker’s progression. 
Adaptability has to be built into a system on initial design. Unlike manned systems that 
can adapt with human intervention, network systems require adaptation in fractions of 




This thesis, (1) examines a network’s architecture from the hardware aspect 
(topology) and software (layers and Service Oriented Architecture (SOA)) and how 




and (2) develops a risk management process to enhance DoD Net-centric operations and 
the GIG architectural framework. The result is a comprehensive network enterprise risk 
management plan with the flexibility to adapt to a changing environment.  
The second contention of the thesis is that the network enterprise needs to be 
architected with survivability and resiliency. A solid network risk management plan can 
inform the architects and engineers where a network’s vulnerabilities exist so that 
survivability and resilience can be built into a network system designed to provide critical 
services in the face of an attack on the network. 
There are risks associated with every endeavor. In the quest to develop an 
interoperable, interactive, and collaborative network enterprise across DoD that achieves 
DoD’s strategic goal of information dominance against the adversary, a key ingredient in 
the success of that goal is to identify the risks to the network and develop a plan through 
knowledgeable assessment to mitigate the risks to an acceptable level. Doing this 
contributes greatly in allowing the network to provide the war fighters the information 
and capability they require to gain the edge in situational awareness, no matter the size or 
characterization of the mission. To shy away from the possibility of network attack by 
initiating uninformed security measures which unduly inhibit the network enterprise 
functionality, or to ignore the risk in an effort to meet budget targets, assures a less than 
satisfactory capability and acts as an impediment to reaching the ultimate goal of 
information dominance. Risk to the network enterprise must be dealt with up front by 
first designing the network for resiliency, second by constant vigilance to the changing 
environment at the boundaries/interfaces of the network, and third by building in an 
adaptability that learns from the attempted attacks as well as the successful ones, 
strengthening the network in every iteration. Proper employment of a rigorous network 
enterprise risk management plan supported by leadership delivers a network enterprise 
system that can deliver the goods of accurate, uncompromised, and available information 
when it is most needed. 
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John G. Grimes, the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer states:  
The security challenges of the 21st century are characterized by change 
and uncertainty. Operations vary widely and partners cannot be 
anticipated. However, we are confronting that uncertainty by becoming 
more agile. Greater levels of agility rest upon leveraging the power of 
information–the centerpiece of today’s Defense transformation to net-
centric operations. (NCO). (DoD CIO, 2007, p. 1) 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Information Technology Evolution 
The information age brings new capability to the military by introducing software 
into the design of systems to run computers that provided control, automation and data 
manipulation, making these systems more capable. It is estimated that the contribution of 
software into the engineering effort of system design over the last decade has increased 
30 to 70 percent (Maier & Rectin, 2002). Communications technologies benefit from the 
use of software by allowing the transmission of information in new forms; increasing the 
speed of delivery and the quantity of the data transmitted. Systems are tied together into 
networks so that data and programs can be shared between similar systems and across 
geographical boundaries to enhance the capability of the system and the war fighters who 
use those systems. However, this technology is applied in eclectic fashion to new systems 
development, so that when the systems are brought into production, they are equipped 
with the software available at the time they are developed. Out of this, systems and 
systems of systems are developed with differing characteristics (network architecture of 
hardware, software, and firmware, operating systems, applications, connectivity 
protocols, and use of the electro-magnetic spectrum) so that presently there are thousands 
of different programs running on different networks satisfying the requirements of a 
particularly stove-piped war fighting capability. In addition, the technology of 
computational power and networking is applied to the military’s business enterprise and 
to the collection and dissemination of intelligence data. 
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2. Information Technology Today 
As information systems in the military grow in importance and capability, the 
services and DoD attempt to control the characterization of the systems’ software and 
how systems operate through limited configuration control using standards like the 
Defense Information Infrastructure Common Operating Environment (DII/COE). This 
standard is designed to achieve a commonality between software components designed 
into systems to allow some form of configuration control and to allow interoperability 
between systems (Stewart 2006). However, the present information systems architecture 
in the Navy, and in DoD in general, is comprised of multiple networks serving stove-
piped applications, which are further partitioned by functional category (business 
enterprise, combat systems, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, & 
Intelligence (C4I), logistics/supply and specialized intelligence gathering to name a few). 
The military recognizes now that information and easy access to that information is a key 
element in gaining an advantage over the enemy, and that the next frontier in warfare is 
the ability to leverage information system interoperability and to quickly turn data and 
information into knowledge superiority that results in the advantage over an adversary. 
Superior firepower is one thing, but the knowledge of when and where to apply it is 
another. To accomplish this mission and to achieve the capability of knowledge 
superiority, the military needs architecture for an integrated and interoperable 
information system of systems.  
3. Future Vision of Information Technology 
As the quote at the beginning of this section states, the leaders of DoD and the 
military services have clearly articulated their vision of information operations and the 
future strategy for military operations based on knowledge superiority. Computers and 
the automated processing capability inherent in them used to be seen as one of the 
technology tools in a tool set to increase the effectiveness of major weapons platforms 
and to increase capability in other aspects of operating, training, equipping, and 
communicating in the different warfare areas (NSA/CSS/GIG, 2008). Today, that vision 
has expanded to include information technology, processing and networking power into a 
3 
warfare area of its own, Cyber-warfare. Information and its collection, manipulation, 
distribution, use, and protection are considered vital to the future of warfare and are 
central to the defense strategy of the nation. Information systems are no longer 
considered to be stand-alone. They must be networked and interoperable; capable of 
sharing information with all authorized personnel and entities. Warfare and any military 
operation are now mandated to be net-centric.  
To comply with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and 
the service Chiefs’ vision, the DoD’s Chief Information Officer formulated an 
architecture for the GIG and a pathway to take the military from the present day GIG to 
what he calls the Target GIG; a system of information capabilities gained through 
procedure and technology including doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership 
and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) that provides an agile, dynamic, 
interoperable, and responsive system. Today’s grid is sporadically networked along 
stove-piped structures of services, warfare areas, special capabilities, and partitioned 
organizations. While the networks are not an exact reflection of the chain of command 
under which they are governed, they do have somewhat of a hierarchical architecture to 
them. Each networked system uses its own technology base and is run in accordance with 
local procedures for the most part. There are over-arching rules and procedures 
emanating from organizations such as the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), 
National Security Agency (NSA), and individual service controllers as with Naval 
Network Warfare Command (NAVNETWARCOM). 
4. Architectural Vision for Networked Information Systems 
The target GIG architecture is designed to allow the users “to find and share the 
information they need, when they need it, in a form they can understand, use, and act on 
with confidence; and protects information from those who should not have it” (DoD CIO, 
2007, p .7). The GIG technology is based on a SOA of loosely coupled repositories of 
services accessible to any node on the network that has access rights (what the CIO calls 
need to share). The technology draws from commercial technologies already developed 
to architect a system using Open Architecture, allowing a cost-effective way to design 
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and operate the systems throughout their life cycle and capitalizing on the reuse of 
software and firmware components. This architecture is the key enabler of Net-Centric 




The GIG Federated Architectural Framework is the structure that 
ties the disparate architectures of the services together as they 
exist today. 
Figure 1.   GIG Federated Architecture (From: DoD CIO, 2007) 
The ultimate goal of the GIG architecture is to move from a federated to 
enterprise architecture. To be federated means that individual programs are networked 
together through a tightly coupled framework. Enterprise, through the application of  
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SOA, means the systems are loosely coupled services networked on an architecture, 
which is agile and employs collaboration as its main ingredient of communication (DoD 
CIO, 2007). 
To achieve the vision of the DoD’s target GIG, each service has an information 
technology initiative that falls in line with the architectural framework of the GIG, 
employing the principles of a distributed system built on a SOA. Standards are based on 
commercial standards boards as in Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 
(IEEE), Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), International Standardization 
Organization (ISO), American National Standards Institute (ANSI). Additional standards 
stem from service-specific initiatives including FORCENet for the Navy and Marine 
Corps, the Air Force Challenger program, LandWarNet as part of the Future Combat 
Systems for the Army, and Deep Water for the Coast Guard. 
5. Challenges 
a. Architecture 
Many challenges face the achievement of a net-centric system of systems 
throughout DoD built on the target GIG architectural framework. The sheer size of the 
GIG technologically, financially, and procedurally is daunting (NSA/CSS/GIG 2008). 
Due to its sheer size and number of disparate networks linked together, security planning, 
implementation and coordination of effort across the services are difficult. Another 
obvious challenge is the coordination between the services as the development of a 
unified network architected in the GIG framework evolves. The service components may 
not be ready and willing to connect their individual network systems in synchronization 
with the target GIG objectives. Each service has individual goals they are trying to 
achieve, but for the GIG to be truly interoperable, there must be a consolidated set of 
objectives and a common approach to development controlled and monitored by the DoD 
agencies responsible for overseeing the development of the GIG. As can be seen in 
Figure 2, the set of services that reside in the GIG architecture are meant to be all-
inclusive from all service components, tied together by SOA The interoperability of the 
core services meets the CIO’s goal of information sharing. Choosing a SOA is considered 
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to be a way of mitigating the risks associated with the interconnectivity of the complete 
set of services. However, the loose coupling of services through SOA allows connectivity 
and collaboration while keeping individual network interfaces less exposed to the 
vulnerabilities of those networks to which they are connected. Some disadvantages to this 




SOA is a framework for achieving the CIO goal of information sharing 
between core services with an interconnectivity that promotes security. 
Figure 2.   GIG core Services and Underlying SOA Infrastructure (From: DoD CIO, 
2007) 
b. GAO Concerns 
In a 2004 report, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
examined the process of GIG development and uncovered areas of concern (USGAO, 
2004). GAO found the following. 
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• Identification and prioritization of technology investments was not yet 
articulated. With a system this large and complex, the financial decisions 
and the acquisition strategy have huge ramifications to the end product’s 
ability to perform as desired. In addition, it is not clear how GIG 
technology investments impact other programs resources for development. 
• There was not a clear understanding of how or who would enforce 
standards during development. 
• Planning was lacking on how to deal with advancements in technology 
and how they would be incorporated (or not). Especially important here is 
what technology path to pursue as parallel technologies in hardware, 
software, protocols, applications and methods are developed. Which one 
would DoD choose to apply to the GIG? Since the GIG is based on open 
architecture, commercial products are an integral part of the system, and 
choosing the technology that prevails is important to the lifecycle costs 
and the development of other functionalities that depend on that product 
choice. Recall the DoD’s choice of the Sony Betamax as the video cassette 
recorder for shipboard entertainment systems. 
• A system this large makes it is difficult to evaluate the degree of 
enhancement to war fighting capability the GIG offers. In addition, the 
development of this capability takes some time, and as the national 
strategy and the environment change over time, a question of the ability to 
evaluate the new capabilities in light of new threats has not been 
articulated in the architectural framework. 
• Network bandwidth has been a challenge to individual networks, and even 
with consolidation of some commercial services operating bands, it is 
going to continue to be a challenge as the size and the requirements for 
connectivity grow in the GIG. Through the GIG-BE (bandwidth 
expansion) program, the vision of the GIG is that it is agile to allocating 
bandwidth to the right entity that needs it in a temporal sense. However, 
the unknown is how much bandwidth the entire system requires and how it 
is obtained given the competing interests of national and international 
commercial enterprises and other Government organizations (such as the 
Department of Homeland Security). 
• Protection of data within the current systems as well as the data generated 
during the development of the GIG has not been given the attention 
required. For instance, in the Core Enterprise Services layer of the GIG, 
“…Parts of the computing infrastructure are operated and maintained by 
commercial or government computing service providers (CSP) that 
provide managed services for hosting and maintaining enterprise services 
and applications…” (DoD CIO, 2007, p. 21). The GAO asked how the 
GIG developers assure current system owners (legacy and component 
owners) that their data are secure and remain so given the objective of the  
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GIG to broaden the sharing of information even with coalition partners 
who are not yet identified. Protection not only goes to the IA technology, 
but also to the procedures for safeguarding data, including the following. 
• Who owns the data? 
• Who has authority to release data? 
• What is the plan if data is inadvertently or maliciously released to 
organizations or countries DoD to which it does not want it 
released? 
• What is the impact on mission accomplishment? 
• How is the impact determined? 
• How to recover from that data being in the wrong hands. 
c. Space and Naval Warfare Command Concerns 
Other concerns and challenges in the development of a Net-Centric 
Warfare capability with a robust, agile and interoperable network have been expressed by 
service organizations, such as the Space and Naval Warfare (SPAWAR) Command and 
their systems centers responsible for the acquisition and development of Command, 
Control, Computer, and Communications, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance systems (C4ISR) (Davis 2008; Anderson, Davis, & Green, 2008). Some 
of their concerns are the following. 
• The data protection policy and a security architecture to protect data–a 
scheme for the prioritization of protection levels for data and how that 
affects the Multi-level security and cross domain solutions to the sharing 
of data. One plan for the protection of data is what SPAWAR calls a Data-
centric Security Approach–prioritizing, partitioning, temporal value 
determination, data ownership, levels and need to access, storage and 
back-up requirement–are just a few of the elements of this plan. 
• Establishing protections and procedures for the supply chain 
management of computer network components. This is especially 
important in the future development of Net-centric Operations, which are 
built on the concept of Open Architecture and the procurement of 
commercially developed and manufactured items. There needs to be a plan 
for how to ensure the level of quality of the procurement. 
• Configuration management is important to the security of the networked 
systems to know what is running in each level of the architecture, and the 
plans for protection and recovery are valid for the known configuration. 
One of the challenges with service oriented architecture is the loose 
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coupling of the various services. Service providers have to have some 
standards of configuration control to assure the data users of the integrity 
of the service being queried by a user.  
• The GIG Information Assurance (IA) infrastructure is built on five key 
elements listed below; however, net-centric operations and warfare need 
an information assurance policy and procedures for balancing the needs of 
the users with the levels of protection to meet user needs. In other words, 
maintaining a level of protection, which is affordable, enforceable, non-
intrusive enough for mission accomplishment but strong enough to ensure 
mission accomplishment does not compromise degradation of the loss of 
the network or some of its components. Currently, the GIG IA 
infrastructure is defined by the following.  
• Transactional information protection 
• Distributed and automated digital policy enforcement 
• Defense against internal adversaries 
• Integrated security management, and 
• Embedded IA within enterprise components for a net-centric trust 
model 
• For the current state of networked systems, whether interoperable, 
federated or stand alone, and for the target GIG and its components, the 
DoD network enterprise risk management plan should be robust, 
holistic, and structured, but should also be understandable and able to be 
applied at every aggregation and layer of the network system. 
6. Service Networks Integration into the GIG 
FORCENet is an example of how the services’ architecture leads to the 
development of the target GIG when incorporated into the GIG system. Aligned with the 
architectural principles of the GIG, the Navy sees its FORCENet system as the 
integration of networks and communication with capabilities that are distributed and 
agile, able to make changes to configuration “on the fly.” Network configuration 
adaptability allows a tailored network structure to be composed as needs are realized to 
meet the mission requirements in a distributed environment. The security mechanisms 
and Information Assurance program of FORCENet are envisioned to deliver information 
to the warrior that assures confidentiality, trust, integrity, availability, authentication and 
non-repudiation (inability to deny that correct information was received) (Stewart, 2006).  
FORCENet uses commercial standards in an open architecture philosophy, and uses the 
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same development principles as the GIG through the spiral model. This methodology is 
designed to be warrior-focused. Commercial standards and open architecture are used in 
the development of FORCENet to bring commonality to the systems, which comprise 
FORCENet and to use standards already in place that are working on commercial 
systems, avoiding the necessity to generate new standards through the development of 
proprietary software that is FORCENet specific. The purpose of designing FORCENet in 
a spiral development model is to transition stove-piped networks and programs from their 
programs of record to a net-centric configuration. The objective of the warrior-focused 
approach is to ensure the paradigm of “sensor to shooter;” the ability to get the complete 
picture prior to making a decision to engage (Hight, 2004).  
Communication between services is based on the system presently built into the 
World Wide Web, the use of Extensible Markup Language (XML) and the Extensible 
Tactical C4I Framework (XTCF). Figure 3 shows a pictorial representation of the 
communications infrastructure as envisioned in the GIG.  
 
 
The GIG communications architecture is based more on wireless 
connectivity than the Internet due to the military’s inherent mobility 
Figure 3.   Communications Infrastructure of the GIG (From: DoD CIO, 2007) 
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Communications technology from a physical reference entails several different 
modes, but the infrastructure is principally connected by fiber-optic cable and wireless 
technologies utilizing airborne and satellite relays. This setup of the infrastructure is not 
new for the military, but what is new is the architecture to combine these 
communications means into a cohesive network, which delivers accurate, timely, and 
sufficient information to meet the ultimate objectives of military strategy. 
B. PURPOSE  
1. After the Fact Risk Management Diminishes Network Capability  
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate all aspects of a suitable network 
enterprise risk management plan in a GIG-like environment. Specifically, it provides the 
following. 
• An examination of various network architectures and the advantages and 
disadvantages of different arrangements with regard to their ability to 
resist and recover from network intrusion with loss of confidentiality, 
integrity or availability of data, and functionality 
• Risk and the risk management process; in particular, how operational and 
strategic risk management can be applied to operational and strategic 
global networked systems including the GIG and the services’ network 
operations and to the mission success of a large organization such as the 
U.S. military. 
• Specific risk management process models in use today with varying 
degrees of success by business and governmental organizations and how 
they can be applied to a risk management plan for NCO/NCW 
• The definition of a survivable/resilient system and the necessity to include 
the attributes of survivability and resiliency into network designs and in 
the development of a risk management process/program. 
• Network attributes that promote the protection of critical network 
resources from the disruption of network operations or the compromise of 
critical data. These attributes include defense in depth, fault tolerance, 
diversity and distribution, and redundancy and replication. As the Chief of 
Naval Operations has designated all his networks as critical, finding the 






• Bridge the gap between network risk management and architecting a 
network to meet the duel objectives of capability and security, with the 
ultimate goal of a global network of Joint military capabilities that can 
recover quickly in any environment or theater of operations and meet the 
war fighters’ needs. 
Why is the study and analysis of a network enterprise risk management plan 
vitally important? The complexity of the GIG and the services networks–FORCENet for 
one–make them vulnerable to attack on a number of fronts. If the networks provide the 
war fighter the information needed to win the battle, it is important to know where these 
vulnerabilities are and how to mitigate them so the vital information keeps flowing to the 
right places and individuals. It is postulated here that this risk management is best 
developed from the top down through the network enterprise operations to the nodes on 
that network and the services they provide and the users so that the plan is effectual end-
to-end. 
Risk can be dealt with in a number of different ways. Generally, risk can be 
eliminated, mitigated, transferred or avoided. While the IA engineers from NSA, DISA, 
and the services’ systems commands have implemented many technical and process-
oriented protections to the military’s vast array of stove-piped and legacy networks, it is a 
common practice as prescribed by network operating procedure to avoid risk by isolating 
and terminating network operations that have been attacked, no matter what the level of 
the attack, the level of interruption to services, or amount of destruction to network data 
or programs. Risk management of the military’s networks today is to a great extent 
comprised of information assurance efforts to examine and implement the best IA and 
protection technology tools, procedures and controls (countermeasures) to limit the 
possibility of intrusion from without and within that would cause degradation to the 
network or one of its nodes. Risk management planning appears to be somewhat 
reactionary, trying to plug the holes of vulnerability with technology or operational 
restrictions, or reorganization of resources and controls against known threats, and 
hoping that the technology guards against the unknown threat. Not much evidence exists 
that an examination of how the network countermeasures to resist attack are analyzed for 
their effects on network operations and the ability to bring information to the war fighter. 
In fact, the standard operating procedure appears to be a form of risk avoidance when an 
13 
intrusion is detected or a fault or failure is realized. The procedure is usually to “turn it 
off” as soon as a problem, real or imagined, is found. Growing concern exists among the 
war fighters about what might happen in the middle of a critical operation where the 
advantage in the fight is information and knowledge superiority, and that when a fault is 
detected in the network system, network system administrators and network management 
disable the network and deny the advantages of connectivity and information 
accessibility to the war fighter until the fault is located and fixed. 
2. Summary of Purpose 
This thesis investigates network enterprise risk management and determines what 
some of the likely risks are in operating a network as complex as the GIG and identify 
architectural tradeoffs available to improve network connectivity, functionality and 
security. DoD and services’ risk management plans in place today can be improved 
through the adoption of processes examining architecting a network for the following. 
• Optimizing the often competing objectives of functionality and 
information protection 
• Designed for survivability and resiliency to allow continued network 
connectivity even if limited 
Principally, the network enterprise risk management plan can be enhanced to 
guide the management of network services and the formulation of policies and 
procedures that supports the war fighters in accomplishing their mission. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis attempts to answer or provide some evidence to respond to the 
following questions concerning network enterprise risk management of the U.S. 
military’s network systems. The term networks means the “global domain within the 
information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information 
technology infrastructures, including the internet, telecommunications networks, 
computer systems, imbedded processors and controllers” (Davis, 2008, p. 3). 
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• What considerations are important in developing and improving risk 
management planning and processes presently used by DoD and the 
military services for their information systems and networks on the global 
domain as Net-Centric Operations, Net-Centric Warfare, and Information 
Dominance now in the center of the nation’s defense strategy? 
• When and how should a robust network enterprise risk management 
program be implemented that supports the confidentiality, availability, 
integrity, reliability, and trustworthiness of the military’s critical 
information resources and also acts as an enabler of mission success in the 
operational, strategic, and business processes domains? 
• What are some of the architectural implications in the design and the 
process imperatives in the operation of networked information systems 
that make a global network system survivable and resilient to attack from 
hostile forces? 
• Are there network risk management processes already in existence in the 
public domain supporting DoD’s network enterprise risk management 
process to achieve a survivable and resilient enterprise network and 
support DoD in making risk assessments and decisions on the cost/benefit 
or value of the choices in implementing network security measures that 
ensure quality of service, information assurance, and meet the needs of the 
end user?  
D. BENEFITS OF THIS STUDY 
This study is intended to support improvements to DoD’s and service 
component’s Computer Network Operations/Computer Network Defense risk 
management process and support for the military’s network management team as they 
examine risks to the present system of networks, which provide information to the 
warriors and to the network systems under development comprising the target GIG. This 
work encourages the incorporation of a network enterprise risk management approach 
when making decisions about acquisition, design, development, and operation of military 
networked systems. 
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The scope of the thesis is on the investigation of network risk management plans 
by other organizations and the applicability of some of the plans’ elements to a generic 
network enterprise risk management for DoD, Joint, and Navy use. As part of the 
development of the above elements, the thesis investigates current models used in risk 
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assessments (CORAS, CRAMM, OCTAVE to name a few) and the possibility of 
adapting or developing a model for use as a decision tool in the military’s network 
enterprise risk management process. The methodology entails the following. 
• Research in literature and by selected interviews into present risk 
management processes in the military and in other organizations with 
complex networked systems (preferably architected using SOA) 
• An evaluation of current risk management plans and models and an 
analysis of the models’ application to the military network system 
• An investigation of some architectural frameworks that might serve to 
improve the risk of operating network systems or serves to inform network 
designers of limitations, constraints, and assumptions arising in the design 
of networks when a proper assessment of network risk is conducted, 
looking at vulnerabilities and threats, the impact due to network 
degradation or loss, and the value of procedures to maximize network 
availability in a degraded state on mission accomplishment 
16 
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II. APPLICATION OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES 
TO NETWORK ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the architecture of a network from the hardware 
perspective of network topology and from the software perspective of open architecture 
and SOA. It examines the implications of managing the risks associated with network 
operation and how risk management is affected by the software architectural design and 
the arrangement of network components. The chapter’s brief discussion of the different 
layers of a network system and their interaction with respect to network security and 
managing risks is covered more fully in Appendix A. Subsequent chapters examine the 
risks inherent in conducting computer network operations; how an organization might 
analyze the risks to network operations by identifying, assessing and managing risk both 
from a systems view of the network enterprise and the lower level view down to the 
client workstation level; and how process models that employ both qualitative and 
quantitative methods are useful in informing network designers and operators how to 
mitigate the risk of attack and protect the valuable assets of the network and the 
information in it. Commensurate with risk analysis is the study of how the survivability 
attributes, such as fault tolerance, of the network support the management of risk. 
The architecture of a network is comprised of a number of elements. These 
include the topology of the network (arrangement of nodes and connections), the 
abstraction of information as it travels through a network, the standards used to assemble 
a network and the standards for packaging the information transiting a network, the type 
of components used for network node construction (switches, routers) and for transit 
paths (arcs) through the network (fiber-optic, twisted pair, wireless, satellite), how and 
where network components are acquired, the construction and control of the interfaces, 
the location of the network’s information assets (data, programs), how and where the 
network connects to other networks or the Internet (gateways) as in a SOA, and the 
physical location of various components interacting with the physical environment 
(shipboard, desert,…). 
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Networks are architected in different arrangements to provide different 
capabilities while efficiently using available resources. The way a network is architected 
can introduce vulnerabilities through the make-up of the network components, by the 
way the components are connected, and by the methods employed, and the layer of the 
network where they are employed to provide protection for network and information 
assets. As network vulnerabilities are discovered and an assessment of the risks 
associated with those vulnerabilities is conducted, it is important to determine what 
network quality of service attributes the protection services and countermeasures 
(technological, procedural, or managerial) seek to secure or enhance through the 
protection of data and program resources, and how these attributes can be secured 
through innovative system design and network architecting. It is important in the 
development and operation of a network (as well as any system) to learn how 
vulnerabilities are created and how they are discovered. This information provides system 
developers with valuable experience to draw upon when developing follow-on systems. 
First, a brief discussion follows about the timing of commencing a risk analysis on a 
network and the importance of making risk analysis a continual process to take advantage 
of the feedback afforded by monitoring the success of mitigation efforts and by keeping 
the analysis current as the organizations objectives, technology and threats change over 
time. 
It is the contention of this thesis that the identification, assessment, and 
management of network risks need to be done early in the system engineering cycle, in 
tandem with system concept definition. It is at this point when the Concept of Operations 
is the guide for determining the system’s functions and for defining the system’s 
requirements to meet the intended mission. Whether it is form from function or form 
driving function, the architectural foundation of the system must include an assessment of 
the systems’ risk level from threats, and how the systems are architected to mitigate those 
risks or recover from an attack. The same is true for developing networks. All too often, a 




connected together for functionality, and only after the network has been intruded, are 
security measures integrated into the network system by means of software patches, 
which are put in place to mitigate another attack of the same or similar characteristics. 
Before information systems became a ubiquitous commodity, system design built 
in safety as one of the design requirements, and system safety was required to meet strict 
specifications in critical control and operating systems where human and valuable 
property were at risk. With the advent of the revolution in information technology, and 
probably because of its rapid pace, system capability and the tremendous amount of 
applications that the new technology brought were given priority over safety and security 
considerations. Often, security was not just second on the priority list; it was almost 
ignored. Thus, with the systems already in place today, security tends to be more 
reactive; vulnerabilities are treated with patching to seal up the place in the program that 
has already been exploited (Davis, 2008). The same philosophy holds for the way many 
major commercial software products on the market are developed today. Security is 
covered by a library of software corrections to fix the vulnerabilities discovered by 
attackers. Vulnerability libraries keep expanding as new methods of malicious behavior 
from threat agents are discovered; usually, through a new attack on a legitimate system. 
At least the U.S. Government is trying to stay one step ahead though the Comprehensive 
National Cyber security Initiative (CNCI) (Germain, 2008). CNCI initiatives are an 
attempt to be proactive (in the true sense of the word, meaning action before 
consequences) by looking at establishing a front line of defense, developing cyber-
counterintelligence plans, and shaping the future through cyber-supply chain 
management, deterrence, and defining cyber-security for critical infrastructures (Davis, 
2008). 
Networks are often crated by connecting pre-existing stand-alone information 
systems together, often on an ad-hoc basis. With so many individual systems in the U.S. 
military inventory, the DoD has decided that the best architectural standard for 
connecting legacy systems together is through the method of SOA. One of the advantages 
of SOA is software reuse. Legacy systems in use today that were not developed to 
withstand the threat environment as it is today are networked in the new architecture to 
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avoid redeveloping the functionality these systems already provide. In addition to putting 
risk management in the systems engineering process from the beginning, the urge to 
ignore the security faults that legacy systems contribute to the network must be resisted. 
It is tempting to let resource constraints (as well as human nature’s resistance to change) 
drive the decisions whether to take the additional step in architecting a system to resist 
and recover from attacks as well as architect the system to meet capability requirements. 
Additionally, while it may be at present, legacy systems’ functionality will not be stand-
alone in the future under the vision of SOA. The SOA, how it works and its advantages 
and disadvantages, is discussed later in this section. It is envisioned under SOA that 
legacy systems fit into the network architecture to connect their services (functionality) to 
the information grid. Being in an operational status in their life cycle, it is critical that a 
thorough risk analysis be done at the interfaces connecting these systems to the larger 
network. It is at these interfaces where a threat agent is most likely sought to penetrate 
and harm a legacy system’s functionality. Through intelligent software architecture of the 
interfaces to legacy systems and the other Net-Centric Enterprise Services and 
applications, risk mitigation strategies can be implemented to provide protection to these 
assets and to the information and control required of them.  
B. NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS  
1. Attributes of a Network 
There are as many ways to design and connect the components of a network as 
there are networks. No two are exactly alike. Networks can be characterized by the 
following. 
• How they are physically or virtually (through software) hooked together 
called the topology. 
• The basic function of the network (e.g., data storage and retrieval, 
command and control, business services, collaboration, supervisory 
control and data acquisition). 
• The layer of abstraction of the communications between nodes in a 
network (data layer, network layer, session layer, presentation layer) 
• The specifications of a network in memory capacity, processing power, 
signal latency, and bandwidth. 
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• The number and types of components comprising the network (switches or 
routers, central processors or embedded controllers) and the connecting 
devices used (Ethernet, synchronous optical network (SONET), optical 
fiber). 
• The degree of accessibility or classification level of the network. 
• The size of the network (Local Area Network, Wide Area network, 
Metropolitan Area Network) and its diameter (how many interconnections 
between end-to-end users). 
The architecture of a network depends on the design and function of the 
individual components (nodes) and the way they are connected together (arcs of a 
network) to achieve an enhanced capability through their connectivity. Network node 
basic functional characteristics can be described with the following parameters when 
relaying packets or frames (wireless). 
• Memory (buffer) capacity 
• Processing speed (switching/relaying) 
• The communications connection (arc in a nominal network) has the 
following performance parameter: 
• Bandwidth (throughput rate) 
• Interface processing speed (from Ethernet to fiber optic signals) 
The goal in a network path is to get the signal, undistorted, through the network 
the quickest way under high bandwidth and low latency conditions. The parameters are 
constrained by signal latency, which is the time it takes for the signal to get from the 
source to the destination. This is determined by the number of nodes (switches), the 
switching time for each switch it has to transit, and the time it takes for the signal to 
travel through the communications cable. The bandwidth determines the amount of 
information that can be sent at once. Each time a signal passes through a node on the path 
between source and destination, it is called a “hop” in network terms. Since the travel 
time of light through the cable is a small fraction of the time for a switch to relay the 
signal between communication paths, the biggest contributor to latency is the number of 
hops the signal makes before it reaches its destination (Sterbenz, 2006). 
A network diameter is the topographically farthest distance that a signal can go 
from source to destination. The “edge” of a computer network is comprised of those 
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nodes that do not act as relays for other signals. The number of hops a signal must take to 
get from edge to edge is a measure of the network’s diameter. Thus, a network is 
bounded by its diameter. The Internet is described as unbounded because it is so large 
and it does not appear to have an edge (Sterbenz, 2006). 
Aggregation in a network means connecting nodes to a central point. For a given 
number of nodes in a network, higher aggregation of the network means smaller 
diameter. More of the nodes are connected in a star pattern to a central routing 





Knowing the “shape” and number of connections in a network points the architect to 
vulnerabilities that can be corrected by changing the “shape” without sacrificing 
functionality. 
Figure 4.   Relationship between Diameter and Aggregation in a Network 
Networks can be aggregated into three basic types: client-server, peer-to-peer, and 
a hybrid of these types. In the client-server arrangement, a component called the server 
controls the network communication between several “client computers” connected to the 
server, usually connected in a star topology. Peer-to-peer has no one component 
controlling communication, and the traffic management is done through the collaboration 
Low Aggregation; High Diameter High Aggregation; Low Diameter 
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of the “peers,” or active computers in the network, that are communicating. Client-server 
has an advantage of being able to more efficiently get signals through the network in an 
ordered pattern, depending on the network management program in the server, but the 
disadvantage in an intrusion scenario is that penetration and disruption of the server 
affects all the clients attached to that server. In wireless networks, transmission range and 
directional coverage are used to aggregate and control density. In high transmission 
wireless, everybody is connected to everybody. In low power wireless, nodes and 
overlays are used to control density and network diameter. Wireless network attributes 
take on a significant importance because of the GIG’s expanded use of wireless as 
opposed to the heavy land-line use in the Internet. DoD recognizes that with mobile 
forces, a significant amount of network connectivity is wireless-based (Sterbenz, 2006). 
The scale of a network is the number of nodes and connections between nodes in 
a network. A network’s scale can be controlled by architecting the network into a 
hierarchy or by clustering segments of the network. In addition, the clustering controls 
system state as each cluster in the network can retain its own state separate from the other 
clusters. Clustering in a hierarchy can also control the amount of aggregation, thus 
limiting the effect of failure in a central node and not allowing it to affect the entire 
network or large portions of it. Clustering also supports the management of bandwidth 
allocation within the hierarchy’s sub-networks so that bandwidth through the larger 
network is managed when bandwidth is a controlled commodity of the network. Mesh 
networks (a topological arrangement discussed below that has the network nodes 
connected to every other network node I through its own arc) form natural clusters and 
can scale better than bus networks, allowing more versatility and adaptability in the 
network architecture. This also improves the network’s resiliency and recoverability after 
attack and network fault or failure (Sterbenz, 2006). 
2. Network Quality of Service Attributes 
The quality of service (QoS) attributes that need protection from malicious actors 
who would seek to disrupt operations are confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
(Davis, 2008). It is the goal of the network’s owners to ensure that the data, services, and 
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the control of critical operations are (1) available when and where they need them, (2) be 
unavailable to those that should not have them, and (3) be uncorrupted by those that 
should not have access to them so that the desired tactical, operational and strategic 
effects happen, and safety of personnel and systems is not compromised. Conducting a 
risk analysis of the network is vital to understanding how at risk these three attributes are, 
and whether or when they may be compromised because of system unreliability, 
accidental faulty operation, intentional intrusion, manipulation, or denial of network 
operations. The definitions of the three main QoS attributes are as follows.  
• Confidentiality is the quality attribute that information is seen or given 
only to those authorized to see it. If someone unauthorized unintentionally 
or intentionally can gain access to the information, then confidentiality is 
compromised or lost. 
• Integrity is the assurance that information received is the same information 
that was sent; nothing added, subtracted or altered. If data integrity is lost, 
information at the reception end sometimes seems ambiguous; however, 
ambiguity is often created by the sender and should not necessarily be 
attributed completely to a loss of network integrity. Information whose 
integrity has been compromised is difficult to detect unless there is a way 
to back up or compare the quality of the information received by 
information from another source, or by attaching a quality code (check 
sum) to the information sent.  
• Availability is quantitatively defined as the percentage of time that the 
network system is operating as intended to produce the effects desired by 
the network owners and users (Hernandez, 2001). 
In addition to these three attributes, non-repudiation (neither sender nor receiver 
can deny sending nor receiving what was sent or received) and authentication 
(verification of the identification of people and information) are important attributes to 
protect on networked systems. 
C. NETWORK HARDWARE ARCHITECTING 
The topology of a network is the arrangement of how a network’s components are 
connected, physically and logically through software. There are many considerations and 
motivations for choosing a particular topology for a network; cost and capability are 
probably among the preeminent. A network can take on a topological arrangement from 
its design and over time may take on another shape as the network evolves by added 
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technology, changing requirements, and not the least, by its addition and connection to 
other networks. Among the motivations for choosing a particular network topology, 
architecting it to protect its purpose and its contents and to contribute to the protection of 
the networks with which it is interoperable or loosely connected should be of the same 
importance as the capability it provides. No matter how capable the network and its 
component functions are or what contribution it makes to the larger network enterprise, if 
it is architected with vulnerabilities that can easily be exploited, any contribution to 
meeting the organization’s objectives is most likely to become detrimental. A majority of 
the time, a compromised network can aid an attacker unknown to the network’s owners 
until it is too late. 
There are five basic types of network topologies; bus, star, ring, tree and mesh 
(Kioskea, 2009). While the pictorial representations of these arrangements look like their 
descriptions, the actual physical arrangement is created in the hardware used to make the 
connection and in the software program used in the component used to connect them 
together. While the basic topology of a network is the connection of components (as in a 
Local Area Network), the nodes of the network could be other networks, which are 
attached in the prescribed arrangement. These topologies are discussed below (images 
obtained from Google Pictures). 
1. Bus Topology  
In the bus topology, the components or nodes of the network are connected to a 
common bus known as the “backbone.” It is the simplest organization of a network; each 
component connected by communications line and 
their hardware adapters to the common bus. It is also 
vulnerable to degradation or failure should one of the 
components fail; in particular, a component that is 
attached to manage the traffic across the bus. While 
the advantage of a bus is that it is easy to add components to the network, this makes it 
easy for an unwanted component to add itself to the bus and gain access to the authorized 
components. 
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2. Ring Topology 
The computers in this topology are not necessarily arranged in a physical ring; 
however, they are connected by software that handles transactions between components 
in a ring pattern, by handling component “broadcasts” or requests for 
service in order of where the component is located on the ring 
abstract. Information flows within this connection in one direction 
and each component has a turn to transmit or receive data in their 
order in the ring. The traffic management is usually handled by a 
program called “Token Ring” or fiber distributer data interface (FDDI). The FDDI 
architecture can provide a dual ring for added stability and network recovery. If one ring 
fails, the second ring picks up the communications management task. Under a dual ring 
technology with a concentrator (multiplexor to combine many signals into one), the 
individual components’ failures have less effect on the network performance than under a 
single or dual ring topology. Unlike a bus, the ring topology contains components in a 
tighter arrangement with more resistance to outside intrusion; however, the basic ring is 
vulnerable as failure of a component or one communication line to the ring causes the 
entire network to fail and cease communication. As mentioned, the dual ring arrangement 
offers recoverability capability. The time to establish the second ring would be an 
important specification depending on the service or data requirements of the network. 
3. Star Topology 
Star topology connects the components of network together by communications 
line to one central location called a hub. Traffic management and communications order 
is maintained in the hub to send the communication from a source to a 
destination without involving the other members of the network who 
were not intended to receive the communication from the source. An 
increase in the sophistication of the hub device allows for more 
capability in traffic management and detection of stray or unwanted traffic. The hub 
could be merely a central collection and distribution point or a switch to control timing 
and priority of message delivery. A router, as the central point of the network, can 
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provide additional capability in the connection to other networks and as a firewall for 
incoming traffic. A router is a network hub with special capabilities to bridge to other 
networks. One advantage of the star topology is that the failure of one component or its 
communication link does not affect the rest of the network, unless, of course, the 
component that fails is the hub. Star topology also offers the shortest latency between 
nodes on the star; the latency time dependent mainly on switching speeds of the central 
hub. However, the importance of the hub in the network can make this component a 
single-point failure and therefore susceptible to attack.  
4. Tree Topology 
Tree topology is a collection of star or ring topologies or individual components, 
which attach to a central bus via a concentrator component, with the 
concentrator/multiport hub that acts as a root for that branch. The 
concentrators can be connected in a hierarchical fashion with the 
root concentrator managing messages for an upstream concentrator 
as well as other individual components. This arrangement offers the 
advantages of the simplicity of a bus for the aggregation of the 
individual network arrangements and the protection of the star or a 
dual ring topology for each individual sub-network attached to the “tree.” There are 
multiple points on the tree that can be used to provide distinct levels of protection 
according to the level needed within the sub-network. Virtual Private Networks (VPN) or 
layer networks can be established within the tree, and the hierarchical arrangement of the 
concentrators can provide some defense in depth to critical components. Recovery 
techniques can be applied to the entire network or to the individual branches. It is 
vulnerable on the bus backbone to other networks attaching to the bus causing 
degradation to the rest of the network when one branch has a fault. It provides some fault 
tolerance when the fault is located inside a branch. 
5. Mesh Topology 
A mesh network connects each component to more than one other component via 
a dedicated communications channel. In a true mesh arrangement, all components are 
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connected to each other through a dedicated 
communications channel, so that no one 
component is controlling the communications of 
any other network component. As a network 
expands, if a true mesh topology were used, each 
component would need an increasing number of ports to connect to every other network 
node. In reality, the connections in a mesh are numerous but not total, and some 
components must have more connectivity than others to provide some type of traffic 
management or translation of information if some nodes process information differently 
than others. From the standpoint of vulnerability to intrusion, the mesh topology offers an 
architectural design with very good resilience in that a disconnection in one 
communication channel can be overcome by rerouting through a different path since all 
nodes are connected multiple ways. A mesh network can be complex to design and 
fabricate, as well as expensive with all the porting and channels. Deciding on the best 
mesh to maximize flexibility and resiliency and to maximize total network performance 
specifications of signal latency, bandwidth and computational power can turn into a 
multi-objective problem very quickly. As the diameter (number of nodes between end-to-
end applications) of the mesh network increases, the shortest path between nodes quickly 
becomes constrained by individual bandwidth capabilities, switching delays, and 
communications link distances.  
D. NETWORK SOFTWARE ARCHITECTING 
To acquire a flexible, adaptable, and resilient global network, DoD had to make 
several system-of-systems (SoS) level architectural design decisions as it moved toward a 
net-centric philosophy of warfare. Two of the major decisions were to design networks 
under an open architecture computing environment and to build the global network to 
distribute, store, and operate on information in a SOA. This decision required the 
acquisition and incorporation of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology into 
information systems and networks and was driven by the fact that to develop this 
technology in house would be too costly and untimely. Chapter V discusses survivability 
of a network. However, it is important to note, that unlike survivability as defined for 
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weapons platforms in battle situations, survivability of networks is protocol-based, not 
topology-based. Thus, it is the interaction between nodes that defines how the network 
interfaces are designed through software logic. 
1. Open Architecture 
a. Open Architecture Computing Environment (OACE) 
The use of Open Architecture standards in developing information 
systems and networking them has been required by DoD and the Navy since 2004 (Naval 
Surface Warfare Center, 2004). The idea of open architecture is to use COTS products 
that meet common industry standards and to incorporate them into new and existing 
systems in a modular design. The Open Architecture Computing Environment (OACE) 
defines the key systems interfaces with commercial standards by industrial standards 
organizations. 
The OACE sets the standards of COTS hardware and software 
components and systems that can be used in the architecting information systems and 
networks. The standards, drawn from the DoD Joint Technical Architecture, promote user 
portability, or the ability to develop applications that interoperate with other applications 
and with a wide range of suppliers because they are engineered on the open standards for 
the following: 
• Communications 
• Abstraction of services 
• Application Programmer Interfaces  
The OACE is based on a reference architecture using a layered approach 
so that specific war fighting applications can ride on the layers and can interoperate and 
communicate with other mission-critical applications in a distributed environment. The 
standards in each layer are as follows and are shown in Figure 5. 
• Applications: Java Programming, Java Community Process 
• Language: American National Standards Institute (ANSI) programming 
C++ 
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• Middleware: Object Management Group (OMG); Common Object 
Request Broker Architecture (CORBA), and Data Distribution Service 
(DDS) 
• Network Operating System: POSIX Operating System 
• Networks: Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) for networks and 
protocols 




Network layer abstractions allow the architect to focus on the form of the signal as it 
exists in that layer, enabling better architecting decisions.  
Figure 5.   OA Layered Approach (From: Naval Surface Warfare Center, 2004) 
The range of functional applications built for the OACE are either 
integrated or federated.  Integrated means commonality system-wide: resource sharing, 
enhanced recovery through redundancy.  “The integrated approach enables mission 
flexibility and enhanced failure recovery through a high degree of redundancy delivered 
via operational resource sharing.” (NSWC, 2004, p. 12)  Federated means unrestricted 
choice: maximum flexibility to meet unique requirements. 
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TheOACE runs on the following layers, which mimic and are based on the 
four of the ISO layers. 
• Physical layer: fiber optics carrying multi-mode messages has a 
wavelength and aperture. Physical security includes enclosures to provide 
shock, vibration, and other protections from environmental conditions. 
• Network layer: connectivity, transfer, and support protocols. Connectivity 
is the data link layer providing logical connectivity (IEEE 802 and 
Ethernet). Transfer is the network layer (IP and routing instructions and 
QoS). Support protocols are the many session, presentation and 
application protocols for communication, file transfer, and e-mail. 
• Transport and sessions layer: The network operating systems in this layer 
provide structure, priority, timing to comply with real-time operating 
systems to provide predictability. However, since the network’s 
predictability is only as good as the most unpredictable component, the 
thrust of the operating system standards is based on the portability 
concept, a network operating system that can interface with other 
networks to which it is connected. 
Two types of middleware are resident in this layer, adaptive and 
distribution middleware. Adaptive middleware isolates the application from the network 
hardware and the operating system. A Resource Manager supports computing capability 
(management to provide fault detection, tolerance, recovery) for computers that are 
input/output intensive, computing intensive, or memory intensive.  
Four types of distribution middleware are included in the OACE: 
Distributed Objects protocol, Distributed Services protocol, Group-ordered 
Communications protocol, and Message-passing Interface for data parallel applications.  
• Distributed Objects protocol supports data exchange by invoking methods 
on program application or data objects that can be remote. The distributed 
object protocols allowed by OACE are: 
• Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) for non-real time 
business enterprise applications. 
• Java/Remote Method Invocation (RMI) soft real time for decision 
aids 
• Object Management Group’s (OMG) CORBA–for soft real time 





• Data Distribution Services (DDS) from OMG uses data-centric, 
publish/subscribe communications control for Command and Control and 
sensor/weapons control. Publish/subscribe distributes data to an 
application that declares itself a member. Data is distributed from 
anonymous servers to anonymous clients, as the information is not 
addressed for specific routing end-to-end. 
• Group-ordered Communication protocol provides higher level of delivery 
guarantees; ordering messages to maintain consistency of state between 
replicated applications; detecting and recovering communications failures. 
The application can tell what communication was transferred before 
failure and what communication replication started after failure. Fault 
tolerance by application replication. 
• Message Passing Interface (MPI) can be used for low/no-latency sensor 
control where real time control of data is important. Using data parallel 
techniques, this protocol is designed to handle parallel processing 
applications such as signal processing and for communication across a 
back plane of a massive parallel processor. 
b. Vulnerability of Open Architecture 
Open Architecture has the advantage of reducing development costs for 
new system software. The network architecture is composed in modular form from COTS 
products, which have the advantage of being already tested to a limited degree for 
reliability. However, the use of COTS introduces vulnerabilities that need to be examined 
for the potential of their exploitation by threats. In particular, commercial hardware and 
software has limited or no test and verification pedigree, and limited documentation 
inhibits optimum architectural design and the ability to determine exact reliability or 
develop certified and tested recovery procedures (Anderson & Hundley, 1998). 
2. Overlay Networks 
Overlay networks use software programs to draw on the topology of the lower 
physical layers and are defined by special procedures for linking certain nodes in a 
network together for special purposes. A VPN is an overlay of an existing topology in a 
physical network to provide security and privacy to certain nodes. The overlay or VPN 
can be scaled by physical characteristics of the communication signal or by authorization 
and authentication of new nodes requesting to become part of the VPN. An overlay VPN 
can also be controlled through the use of “Hash Tables,” which are a form of intrusion 
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tolerant multicast protocol. Hashing assigns a non-descriptive header on data transmitted 
over a network, so that intercepted data cannot be reconfigured to its original meaning. 
This form of addressing and describing data that flows through the network is mainly a 
device for database access when it is critical to have a high quality of service in 
confidentiality (Walker, 2008). 
 
 
Overlay networks are an architecting 
technique that uses existing topology to 
provide the attributes of flexibility and 
adaptability. A virtual Private Network is 
and example of a network overlay. 
Figure 6.   Example of Network Overlay (From: Google Network Pictures, 2009) 
3. Service Oriented Architecture 
a. Service Oriented Architecture Direction for the Military 
DoD and the military services have several thousand applications residing 
on thousands of networks.  Many of the applications are redundant, but they are accessed 
and executed by different means and in different languages. Rather than discarding all 
these capabilities from numerous programs that serve various functions and starting over 
to build functionality from scratch, DoD and the services are migrating their future 
network software architecture to a SOA (DoD GIG, 2007). 
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b. Service Oriented Architecture Definitions 
Vijay Gehlot (Slide 6, 2009) paraphrases Thomas Erl’s definition of 
service oriented architecture as a model in which functionality is decomposed into 
distinct units (services), which can be distributed over a network and can be combined 
together and reused to create business applications. These services communicate with 
each other by passing data from one service to another, or by coordinating an activity 
between two or more services. SOA draws on its predecessor concepts of distributed 
computing and modular programming. Technically, the communication between services 
is defined using a description language. The services have callable interfaces that are 
called upon to perform business processes. Each interaction is independent of each and 
every other interaction and the Internet protocols of the communicating devices. Since 
interfaces are platform independent, a client can use the service from any device using an 
operating system in any language (Gehlot, 2009). The communication independence 
between client and service is what produces a loose coupling between the interfaces of 
the network architecture. SOA is similar to the present architecture of Web-service, both 
of which use a service registry to allow a consumer of a service to discover available 
services through the Web Services Descriptive language (WSDL), and to access the 
service through an XML-base protocol called Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP). In 
SOA, the service directory and service description are contained in one location and 
communicate under the Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) 





SOA discovers available services through a service 
registry, which decouples the service from the 
underlying operating system of the consumer, 
protecting that service from consumer malfunctions. 
Figure 7.   Service Oriented Architecture Arrangement (From: Geholt, 2009) 
c. Distributing Services under Service Oriented Architecture  
SOA is desired because of the savings on time and money by the reuse of 
existing software and services available through various programs. By structuring the 
enterprise network so that these services are accessible to any authorized user without the 
user having the program reside in the user’s memory and rewritten in the user’s language, 
these services can be distributed and used by anyone on any system platform and with 
any computer software language. When a service is needed to perform some operation, 
the architecture of the network is such that the user can discover the service desired, the 
service residing in some distributed location, and can call on the functionality of the 
service even though the service application may not be in the same software language as 
the user. The product that the user receives is in the presentation and display format of 
the user’s workstation. The service does not need to know what program the user is 
running to provide the service requested. Through the technology of building an interface 
(SOA interfaces are ubiquitous) that can translate the language of the user’s application 
with the language of the service’s application or information resource of one kind or 
another, the user is able to access that service (if authorized and authenticated). Before it 
enters the network, requests for service or products from the service are wrapped in the 
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extensible markup language to describe what the information is so that when it arrives at 
the destination, the application can translate the data into a form it can use. The markup is 
usually done at the network enterprise services layer of the network (transport and 
sessions layer of the ISO model) where the middleware adds onto the information packets 
one of the middleware protocols discussed in the Open Architecture section above (e.g., 
distributed objects, distributed data services, group ordered communication, or data-
parallel protocols for data-centric handling). Messages between nodes on a network are 
descriptive rather than instructive (loose coupling), and the messages must be extensible 
(changeable). Figure 8 is a graphical description of the way SOA is architected in the 
GIG, allowing the interconnectivity between units and services so that all can share in a 
common set of services. 
 
 
SOA is envisioned to provide the connectivity between different warfare areas 
to promote “Jointness” and information sharing.  




d. Advantages of SOA 
• Software reuse: transparent; neither knows what application the other is 
running. In this way, the network can be architected under software reuse. 
No new software programs need to be developed for the exchange of 
services except for the software in the middleware program that translates 
the service/data. 
• Loose coupling between client and service. Coupling in simple terms is 
the reaction of one component given an action by another.  Loose coupling 
between the client and the service or between two services means the 
actions taken by one program may be felt by the other program to which it 
is loosely coupled, which may or may not elicit a reaction. In tight 
coupling the reaction mimics the action.  No coupling mean there is no 
reaction to the action from the originator.  
Note:  During the beginnings of software development, instructions to 
perform certain tasks called on subroutines to perform a service. The 
subroutine was part of the software program and was tightly coupled to the 
main programming. As program instructions continued to grow and as all 
services could not reside on one Central Processing Unit (CPU), a local 
network was established to put one application on a server that many 
clients could access and use. This was followed by object oriented 
programming, where the services were called upon by the network as 
objects (programs of a unique type that could be used and delivered as an 
entity) (Mahmoud, 2005).  Object-oriented architecting of software 
contained strong links between service provider and user, and a change in 
user requirements usually meant a change in the object’s programming to 
continue to be used by the new client. Under SOA, the trick is the design 
of the interface between service and user to loosely couple the two through 
software programming of the middleware interface to the network, 
allowing for changes in one end user or service not to affect the other end 
user or service. The language translation through the use of eXtensible 
Markup Language (XML) and later more sophisticated versions. Loose 
coupling allows for the rearrangement of the different services without 
affecting the users. This allows for flexibility and resiliency in networks 
(NSA/IAD, 2008).      
• Testing new software applications can be done on the application itself, 
and not depend on the interface method except for the interface on the new 
program’s end. This lessens the interruption of normal operations at other 
client sites and at the service site.  
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e. Challenges of Service Oriented Architecture 
• Security across the architecture: While the loose coupling of the network 
connections between service requester and service provider gives the 
global architecture resilience in recovery from intrusion, it also means that 
the system, much the same as the Internet, is virtually unbounded and the 
number of users accessing services is unknown. Unnecessary requests for 
service or unauthorized service requests could go undetected using up 
valuable bandwidth and possibly compromising the confidentiality of 
information without the networks’ owners discovering the loss until it is 
too late to recover. 
• Testing in the SOA environment is complex because of the size of the 
global network and because of the complications of testing COTS 
products. Commercial documentation of software testing may be 
insufficient to uncover the faults or hidden programs of the code when 
applied to a military application. In addition, the loose coupling at the 
network’s interfaces makes it difficult to discover a root cause for 
problems that span an interface. Software, whether commercial or 
proprietary to the organization, needs to have a formal process of quality 
control during testing to handle the unique aspects of software coding, and 
architecture to limit the existence of malfunctions and paths for intrusion. 
One such process that offers quality control in software design is 
Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI). Its use, while explicitly 
addressing quality control issues, puts the development of software one 
step ahead in limiting vulnerabilities in the software code and architecture. 
Vulnerability in software development and acquisition of COTS is a 
manifestation of its states, and controlling the states supports the control of 
vulnerabilities in the software (Chittister & Haimes, 2006). Software 
testing is designed to evaluate the ability to control system states, but the 
complexity of software testing makes it virtually impossible to determine 
the ability to control all the states of the system.  
• Managing metadata: networked, distributed services allow interception of 
information in packets while being routed without knowledge of either end 
user. 
• The global aspects of SOA on the GIG means there are multiple 
connections of multiple types and it is difficult to manage the security 
across all those connections. As an unbounded network, there is limited 
governance from a global perspective. Governance is from multiple 
sources but do not translate easily across the loose coupling of the 
individual network’s interfaces at routers and other gateways. It is difficult 
to monitor remote sites, especially if they are mobile and in a hostile 
theater. The diversity of multiple physical data transport devices and 
communication links (optical, wireless, satellite) while assisting in 
survivability through redundancy and diversity, causes problems with state 
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awareness in connecting networks. Interface connections, while loose, 
may have threat agents resident on the connected network that are 
unknown to the service requester. In addition, configuration control may 
be an insuperable task on a global scale, and configuration control loses 
some of its meaning when the point of SOA is to connect divergent 
applications across a transparent interface. 
E. NETWORK ARCHITECTURAL VULNERABILITIES WITHIN 
NETWORK LAYERS 
1. ISO Model 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, a network is a complex organization 
of physical components and connecting devices arranged in a certain topology, signal 
paths, software logic controlling the signals, protocols which define how information is 
packaged, logic programs controlling the routing of the packets of information, packet 
addressing schemes to get the information from source to destination, software programs 
for determining who gets what information, mechanisms to keep packets from interfering 
with one another, the data and functionality contained in packets sent through the 
network, and a variety of other schemes for making the network operate correctly and 
perform the functions desired. The ISO has decomposed the operation of networks into 
seven layers in its OSI model. A plan to evaluate and mitigate risks to network 
enterprises must consider each abstraction layer. The seven layers are as follows. 
1. Physical 




6. Presentation  
7. Application 
Figure 9 is a graphical rendition created by the author of the ISO seven layer 
abstraction to focus on the interconnectivity of each layer and what function each layer is 








Physical Layer - The hardware for the electrical signal to flow through
Creating the signal that 
will carry information
Creating the paths that the 
signal can travel
Selecting the best path 
from source to destination 
Source and destination 
make a connection to pass 
information
The information from source 
gets mark-up to be usable at 
the destination
Where information is 
generated or used
 
An understanding of the form a signal or packet in each network layer 
abstraction supports architecting a resilient network at each layer. 
Figure 9.   Graphical Interpretation of Network Layer Abstractions 
2. Vulnerabilities and Mitigating Strategies within the ISO Layers 
Table 1 is a synopsis of an analysis of vulnerabilities in network architecture as 
seen through the information abstraction of the ISO’s network layer definition. Appendix 









International Standardization Organization (ISO) Seven Layer Reference Model 




Network abstraction Attribute Information 
Assurance is trying to 
protect 
What could go wrong What can be done about it 
Application 
Services (e-mail, video 
stream, computation, 
collaboration) 
Confidentiality, integrity Fabrication, interception, 
and modification, of 
information inside 
firewalls and security 
management 
Data replication, diversity, 
distribution and multiple 
sources of like services, 




Integrity Information markup in 
XML corrupted to 
intercept data, or incoming 
markup corrupted to 
deliver malicious program  
Authentication, encryption, 
PKI, OS protection and 
virus data base updates, 
access control, distribution, 
Session 
Setup and management of 
session 
Integrity, non-repudiation Session interrupted, or 
joined by unauthorized 
node capable of hijacking 
or eavesdropping on 
session  
Authentication, access 
control, multicast, process 





Complete messages and 
e2e recovery 
TCP 
Availability Intruder penetrates hole in 
VPN or layered network, 
or sets up unauthorized 
receipt permission at 
unauthorized node or 
hijacks intermediary node 
for DDoS  





management, secure socket 
layers, VPN 
Network 
Packet flow to establish 
connectivity between many 




Availability, integrity Network path management 
reconfigured for worst case 
routing or interception of 
packets on transparent 
internet  
Intrusion detection, 
layered and mesh 
networks, , router access 






Packets on one link 
Availability, 
Confidentiality 
Packets on open net are 
intercepted and modified 
or dropped 
Packet verification and 
checking, redundancy 
Physical  
Hardware and bit stream; 
cabling 
Availability Processor or memory chips 
from commercial source 
with secret code to reroute 
network traffic or intercept 
security management 
procedures. Electro-
magnetic interference in 
unshielded systems at 
remote locations in foreign 
theater. 
Redundancy, diversity, 
separation, physical access 
control, secure backplane 
 
Each layer has its own contribution to providing a certain level of quality of service to the 
information flowing through the network. 
Table 1.   Network Vulnerability and Mitigating Strategies within Network Layers 
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F.  SUMMARY: NETWORK ARCHITECTURAL CONSIDERATIONS IN 
MANAGING NETWORK RISK 
A network can be characterized by its physical and its logical attributes. The 
hardware and software architecture of a network is a key factor in the vulnerabilities 
introduced into the design of a network system. When assessing the risk to a network, 
knowing the vulnerabilities that come from the architecture allows decisions to be made 
when considering alternative architectures to minimize the vulnerabilities to the assets of 
the network. 
The topological arrangement of a network is the hardware architecture, and 
different topologies introduce different vulnerabilities. Mesh network architecture has the 
attribute that it offers the network superior resilience from attack, but these systems are 
costly and complex to set up. The software network management of a mesh network can 
be quite convoluted and hard to monitor the effectiveness of the management and 
security of the network. However, if the threat of attack against the value of the assets in 
this type of network is high, the cost and the complexity of design and installation may be 
worth it. 
The GIG is a combination of many architectural topology arrangements, riding on 
the backbone of the DISA intranet bus. For this reason, a comprehensive enterprise risk 
management program has to consider the GIG architecture from the top down in 
aggregation and from the bottom up as each type of topology used in interconnecting 
networks affects the enterprise vulnerability picture. 
In the risk assessment of the GIG’s software architecture, the decision to use open 
architecture and to take advantage of the attributes of a SOA carries with it several area 
that can introduce vulnerabilities. Chief among these is the fact that Open Architecture 
and SOA is built from commercial products (COTS) that may be questionable as to the 
testing conducted before use in the military’s network systems or whether there are 
hidden software programs or logic that can introduce unknown vulnerabilities that appear 
during network operation. Testing software, especially commercial, is problematic in that 
not all paths and software states can be tested within a reasonable amount of time or at a  
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reasonable cost. Quality control in the design of new software and integration of legacy 
and COTS software can provide some assurance that many of the hidden vulnerabilities 
are uncovered and corrected before that part of the network is put into operation.  
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III. RISK MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter defines risk and the terms used in the DoD risk management process. 
The process is shown to result in the benefit of achieving the organization’s objectives 
when used in a meaningful program that iterates the process throughout the lifecycle of 
the program or system under assessment. The next chapter focuses on the customizing the 
risk management process to a computer network, including local networks and a network 
enterprise system. Each  chapter concludes with a summary of the reasons why it is time 
and money well spent to protect and secure the U. S. military’s network assets and the 
information and functionality contained in it by formalizing a continuous network 
enterprise risk management program throughout the network enterprise life cycle. 
B.  RISK CATEGORIES AND DEFINITIONS 
1.  Risk 
“Risk is the measure of the probability and severity of adverse effects” 
(Lowrance, 1976; Chittister & Haimes, 2006, p. 5). This classic statement of risk is 
simple but powerful. It can apply to a wide range of applications including the operation 
of any system and the conduct of any program. However, in applying this definition to 
any project or system, a major challenge is to develop a meaningful and valid 
measurement of risk, and deciding what is done with that measurement once it is 
obtained. There are different types of risk depending on what system or process on which 
the level of risk is being analyzed and at what level of the system or process is being 
analyzed.  
• At the elementary level of a system or subsystem, the major concerns about risks 
to the system are from the standpoint of the system’s safety and the ability to 
prevent harm to people or property. 
• At the programmatic level, there are risks to the successful completion of a 
process, should that be the program’s schedule, costs or level of performance. 
Risk and its measurement are key factors in the ultimate definition of the 
program’s success. 
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• There are risks associated with the success of operations, including meeting the 
objective, having the desired effect, or maintaining an uninterrupted flow of 
accurate and reliable information that is vital to the operation’s success. 
• Risk at the strategic level affects decisions on allocation of resources, campaign 
plan and direction, manning levels, acquisitions to pursue, or policies to enforce. 
a.  Safety Risk 
Looking at the risks to the safety and performance of systems, the U.S. 
Navy’s Systems Commands define risk in NAVSEAINST 5000.8 (DoN, NSRMP, 2008) 
as “Risk is the potential for mishaps or other adverse variation in the cost, schedule or 
performance of a program or its products.” In the operation of a system, the desired 
outcome is for the system to operate as it is designed. The risk comes from the likelihood 
of the system not operating as designed, and if that likelihood is realized, the 
consequences of degraded or failed performance in the safety to personnel and equipment 
including the people and property outside the boundaries of the system. The Navy’s 
Operational Risk Management Instruction OPNAV 3500.39.B is a process for 
discovering and dealing with safety and hazard risks at the unit level (Kujawski, 2009). In 
his explanation of the correct operation of safety-critical computer systems, Neil Storey 
defines risk as “ … a combination of the frequency or probability of a specified 
hazardous event, and its consequence” (Storey, 1996, p. 60). Other definitions, which 
relate to risk when considering system safety, are as follows. 
• A hazard (natural) or threat (human initiated) is an act or occurrence 
posing a potential of harm to a person or thing. 
• An incident is the occurrence of a hazardous event which has the potential 
to cause harm under different circumstances. 
• An accident is the unintended occurrence of an event or sequence of 
events that causes some measurable degradation or complete failure of a 
system or harm to people (Storey, 1996). 
b.  Financial and Program Risk 
The Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition, 6th Edition (DoD 
RMG, 2006) and the Naval Systems Commands Instruction NAVSEAINST 5000.8 
(DoN, NSRMP, 2008) both look at risks to a program; financial, schedule, and personnel 
that would inhibit a program from meeting key objectives in those areas. Program 
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managers are directed in those instructions to determine what might threaten the 
program’s schedule, budget, or personnel from performing as required to meet objectives, 
and to weigh the probability of those inhibitors against the consequences to the program 
should they occur. Armed with that knowledge, a program manager can then develop a 
plan to decrease the probability of the unwanted events causing consequences 
unacceptable to the program. The guide defines risk by the following statement: “Risk is 
a measure of future uncertainties in achieving program performance goals and objectives 
within defined cost, schedule and performance constraints.” Program risks have three 
components. 
• A root cause (yet to manifest itself), which, if eliminated or corrected, 
would prevent a potential consequence from occurring 
• A probability (or likelihood) assessed at the present time of that future root 
cause occurring 
• The consequence (or effect) of that future occurrence. 
A root cause is the most basic reason for the presence of a risk. 
Accordingly, risks should be tied to root causes and their effects (DoD RMG, 2006, p. 1). 
c.  Operational Risk 
Looking at risk from an operational level, Bilal Ayyub, (2003, p. 35) says 
that risk can be framed in the context of a scenario or event as the occurrence likelihood 
and occurrence consequences of an event. It is also the potential for loss or reward 
resulting from exposure to a hazard that if realized would result in an outcome of some 
measurable significance on a defined population of people and machines. Risk is 
measured by defining the components of the risk, measuring the chance or probability 
and measuring the potential negative or positive rewards or benefits (Ayyub, 2003). 
Ayyab is talking about both opportunity and adverse risk. 
In the military setting, operational risk is encountered on a constant basis 
from the theater commander to the unit commander; only the level of the risk to 
operations differs at the echelon of command to which it applies. At the Combatant 
Commander level, risk of mission success or failure is considered when determining 
courses of action. In the doctrine of Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) 
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[Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations], the 
mission objective is to achieve an effect, or a change of system state of the adversary to 
what the Combatant Commander desires. Courses of Action (COA) are considered to 
achieve the effect desired, and each COA carries a probability that the action does not 
achieve the effect desired; an operational risk resulting in a consequence. An additional 
risk to operations from the EBAO approach is the risk that actions result in unintended 
consequences. “One will always encounter unintended effects, both good and bad, and 
those that extend beyond objective accomplishment. Improving awareness can help 
anticipate many outcomes and mitigate the impact of unintended negative effects” 
(Hunerwadel, 2006, p. 1). Conversely, a military adversary is also trying to achieve an 
effect on U.S. forces. The operational risk comes from the threat of enemy action, and the 
consequences if the threat should become reality. The military commander must consider 
what motivates the enemy to act, what the action is, what can be done to decrease or 
mitigate his forces vulnerability, and what the consequences are if the threatened action 
happens. This type of analysis is directly applicable to the way the risks to a computer 
network should be handled as is shown in the subsequent chapters.  
d.  Enterprise Risk 
By the very nature of an enterprise being an integration of several systems 
(system of systems or family of systems) integrated and interoperable to some extent to 
achieve a common objective and produce the desired effects, risk to the enterprise takes 
on a holistic perspective (Haimes, 2007). Risks, or the likelihood of occurrences that 
would hinder desired outcomes that achieve the ultimate strategic goals of the enterprise, 
can come from external or internal sources and can be directed at multiple objectives 
such as finance, people, processes, and operational events. Dealing with enterprise risk 
requires common enterprise understanding, strategic communication planning, cross-
enterprise alignment and sound understanding of the evolving environment (Kujawski, 
2009). 
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2.  Risk Analysis 
Risk analysis is a process and practices to identify and assess risk. Risk analysis is 
designed to answer the questions of what could go wrong, how likely is it that it would, 
and what would be the consequences if it happened (Haimes, 2007; Blanchard & 
Fabrycky, 2006). 
a.  Risk Identification 
The identification of risk is the process of ascertaining what could go 
wrong. Sources of risk can come from natural or man-made hazards, from unintentional 
incidents or accidents, from unreliable hardware components or software programs, from 
software that has been unintentionally or intentionally designed with flaws or faults, and 
from individuals or organizations (cultural or political) who desire to tamper with and 
disturb or destroy system effectiveness. Identifying risks of parties intent on harming a 
system requires matching the threat from these parties with the vulnerable set of system 
states that the threat can exploit. In particular: 
• Threats and threat agents are entities with the motivation and the 
capability to cause system disruption, harm or failure. A threat is an event 
that has not happened but has a chance of happening; thus, a probability of 
occurrence is associated with the threat. 
• Vulnerability is the degree of exposure and number of weaknesses in the 
system a threat could exploit. Yacov Haimes and Clyde Chittister (2006) 
further define vulnerability in software engineering as “…the 
manifestation of inherent states of a system that can be exploited or 
otherwise aversely affected…” The authors also say that to be able to 
control system states implies an ability to control vulnerability. For the 
threat to exploit the vulnerability, the threat needs to discover the 
vulnerability and when the optimum time to exploit the vulnerability 
would be to achieve the effect the threat desires. 
b.  Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is a combination of risk identification, likelihood, and the 
associated consequences (Haimes, 2007). Assessment of risk probably involves the 
application of processes and methodologies, often through the use of process models, 
mathematical formulations or simulation, to quantify risk elements and prioritize them for 
when and how to deal with them. Quantification of the impact relies on the assignment of 
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probability outcomes or values to the effect on the system that a threat capability, 
intention, and the threat’s progress (again a temporal attribute) at completing the intended 
threat objective. The combination of the probability of the likelihood that a threat exploits 
a vulnerable system element and the impact that could happen quantifies the risk to a 
system for a given scenario. A prioritized list can thereby be generated. Risk 
quantification is a difficult concept to grasp let alone quantify into a metric. 
3.  Risk Management 
Risk management involves the determination of what should be done about the 
risks identified. Risk management is the process of making management decisions, 
implementing the decisions (take action) based on risk assessment, controlling the 
identified risks and tracking the results of actions taken. Follow-up is equally important 
and involves taking further action based on the effectiveness of the initial actions, and 
continuing to monitor the environment, looking for changes to the environment that 
would change or change the course of action as the level of risk changes. Once it is 
determined what could go wrong, how likely, and the impact, it is then incumbent on the 
analyst to discern what can be done about it, what trade-offs can be made to decrease 
risk, and what effect the decisions to take actions to improve the measure of risk have on 
the future operation of the system (Haimes, 2007). Depending upon the degree of risk and 
the organization’s tolerance of risks, coupled with the importance of accomplishing a 
given objective, the organization’s action on the risk assessment yields the strategy to 
deal with risk elements by avoiding, accepting, transferring or mitigating the risk. The 
subcategories of managing risk, defined below, are the steps in the process for handling 
identified risks. These categories are mostly aligned with the DoD’s definitions and 
processes for risk management, but some go into greater detail than the DoD Risk 
Management Guide (DoD RMG, 2006). 
a.  Risk Mitigation Planning 
Planning for risk mitigation is the activity of examining courses of action 
that decrease or eliminate a threat posing a risk; patching or eliminating system or 
program vulnerability threat could exploit; or changing the importance of accomplishing 
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desired objectives to decrease impact or change the consequences if a risk becomes a 
reality. Mitigation can be accomplished through technological means or process and 
procedures (e.g., system operating rules, personnel selection and training) (DoD RMG, 
2006). 
b.  Risk Mitigation Implementation and Plan of Action 
Risk management does not end with the collection of ideas of what can be 
done with the risks identified and assessed. The decision makers must decide and act on 
the priorities established and implement their actions. Part of the decision-making process 
must be an evaluation of what effect the decisions have on the future operation of the 
system and what new exposures might be created because of their actions (DoD RMG, 
2006). 
c.  Risk Management Plan Tracking 
The effects of the actions to implement must be monitored to see if the 
goal was achieved, or if modifications need to be made to the implementation plan. In 
addition, any changes to system or program performance must be monitored as the 
environment surrounding the system changes. While monitoring the system response to 
the implemented plan, analysts should determine if the reaction is a positive or negative 
result of actually mitigating the identified risk or other changes (DoD RMG, 2006). 
C.  DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
1. Risk Factors/Influence 
a. Influence 
Understanding how risk affects the operation of an enterprise, which 
definitely encompasses probability and consequences, is fundamental to making good 
decisions in managing the risk. Part of that understanding comes from knowing what 
influences the decisions made and what influence those decisions have on subsequent 
outcomes. In turn, this motivates subsequent actions taken in response to the results of the 
first decisions. The experts in the field of risk analysis (Clemen & Reilly, 2001; Haimes, 
2009) advocate using influence diagrams to aid in the visualization of the consequences 
52 
of making risky decisions. Influence diagrams graphically display the decisions, chance 
events and scenarios, and outcomes with arcs representing the direction of influence and 
sequence. An influence diagram helps the decision maker put decisions and alternatives 
in context and to visualize the factors that affect the desired outcome or effect. Influence 
diagrams can be used for both opportunity and adverse risk scenarios. When used to 
display decisions for risk management, the diagrams are mainly utilized to show the 
relationship between actions and outcomes as a result of adverse chance situations (risk) 
(Clemen and Reilly, 2001; Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006). Figure 10 is an example of a 
simple, one-objective influence diagram on the decision whether to install a firewall in 





Decisions produce outcomes, and knowing the influences 
on the outcomes aids in making better decisions 
Figure 10.   Basic Influence Diagram on Risk to a Network 
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In the diagram, a rectangle represents a decision, a rounded rectangle 
represents an objective, an oval is a chance event, and a diamond is the final outcome, 
final consequence, or “overall satisfaction. The arrows are arcs representing either a 
sequence of events or relevance of an event. In the figure above, both arrows are 
sequential; a decision is made and a chance event may or may not happen. The outcome 
of whether database confidentiality is maintained or not, is determined by a 
decision/action and by the result of a chance event. The idea of actions and chance events 
coupled to yield an outcome is executed further in the next discussion. However, in the 
influence diagram, measures of probability of the chance event and the decision variables 
are not graphically shown. The idea of the diagram is to show the relationship between 
events of chance and actions. In a slightly more complex situation, an influence diagram 
could be used to show multiple chance events impacting on intermediate consequences, 
which arise out of the desire to meet two or more objectives. Figure 11 illustrates the 
decision whether to install an upgraded firewall upstream of the network’s gateway to the 























Knowing the influences causing a mind-set for making a certain decision 
supports better decision making 
Figure 11.   Multiple Objective Influence Diagram on Risk to a Network 
Two intermediate objectives precede the outcome of whether database 
confidentiality would be compromised; stronger firewall protection, and because the 
firewall is on the Internet side, not requiring encryption within the network’s LAN 
architecture to save on the budget and to increase data accessibility by authorized users. 
The figure shows how the chance event of the budget amount has relevance to the 
decision/action to install the upgraded firewall and to the intermediary consequences of 
stronger firewall protection and “no encryption inside gateway”. The chance event of an 
intruder gaining access to the LAN has relevance to both intermediary objectives also. 
The diagrams above are grossly simplified. It would be advantageous to 
carry the analysis one step further to diagram how the outcome of loss of confidentiality 
to the database would influence the desired effect of the network enterprise, e.g., the loss 
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of confidentiality on this network would give an adversary access to vital campaign plans 
and operations plans, which would have to be redone to gain the advantage. A thought to 
consider: the loss of the campaign plans, although highly unlikely because this particular 
network is isolated/disconnected from the Internet, would be catastrophic to an already 
deployed Army Division that is to follow those plans. This fact might increase the weight 
given to the influence of the intruder’s attack and decrease the influence of the budget, 
causing a reallocation of dollars to this network and away from another.  
b. Uncertainty 
In his book on Risk Modeling, Assessment, and Management (3rd ed.), 
Yakov Haimes (2009, p. 158) explains how most decisions that involve a chance 
(probability) of the events or scenarios happening are based on maximizing the expected 
value of the outcomes’ “payoffs.” However, in risk management basing decisions on the 
expected value, or median, a set of outcomes resulting from action taken in the face of the 
probability of a set of scenarios is not necessarily a wise decision. In the section about the 
fallacy of expected value, Haimes makes the point that if decisions were based on the 
expected value of the outcome, systems would be constructed, ignoring the possibility of 
the low probability but highly catastrophic outcomes. His formulation for the way 
decisions should be made is to partition the probability distribution into segments and 
calculate the expected value in each segment. Even though the catastrophic events have a 
very low probability of occurrence, human behavior and preference tends to skew the 
integrated result toward actions, which protects the system against the catastrophic event 
more than if only the expected value of the total distribution were used. This method, 
called the Partitioned Multi-objective Risk Method, more realistically “conditions” the 
expectations of the decision maker, and allows for a practical decision conclusion in the 
face of risks to a system, especially considering the element of safety risk (Haimes, 
2009). 
As is the case in most real world systems, the probability of chance events 
is incomplete but some data is available and can be used to develop a probability 
distribution of the chance events. Two methods to estimate the distribution are the 
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Fractile method by dissecting data into fractiles usually of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% 
and relating the outcomes to a fractile. Probability density and cumulative distribution 
functions can then be developed to give a probability to the chance events. The second 
method is to obtain expert advice on the lowest, most likely, and highest value of 
outcome. From this assessment, a triangle probability function is constructed with the 
base as the lowest and highest outcome values and the apex as the most likely. From the 
probability density and resultant cumulative distribution functions, probabilities of the set 
of outcomes are available to analyze against a decision to be made in light of the outcome 
(Haimes, 2009; Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006). 
To frame what is actually accomplished in a risk management process, the 
steps used by the DoD Risk Management Guide for Acquisition are used to illustrate how 
the process works in an actual very large organization for the management of 
programmatic risk. 
D. THE DOD RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
The sixth edition (2006) of the DoD Risk Management Guide for Acquisition 
describes a generic process model for managing risk in acquisition programs. It is the 
DoD guide and template for other risk management schemes for processes other than 
acquisition and for the individual service components’ plans for risk management within 
their service-related programs. The steps of the risk management guide closely follow the 
steps described above including risk identification, risk analysis, risk mitigation planning, 
implementation, and tracking, and is graphically shown in Figure 12. It also provides a 
planning guide for setting up a system of risk management in an acquisition program. 
The guide states that “DoD risk management is based on the principles that risk 
management must be forward-looking, structured, continuous, and informative. The key 
to successful risk management is early planning, resourcing, and aggressive execution” 
(DoD RMG, 2006, p. 22). The guide exhorts Program Managers to evaluate their 




definition of risk in this guide is: “Risk is a measure of future uncertainties in achieving 
program performance goals and objectives within defined cost, schedule and performance 















The basic process of managing risk is essentially the same for safety, 
finances, or operations. How it is applied depends in large part on the 
application.. 
Figure 12.   DoD Risk Management Process (From: DoD RMG, 2006) 
1.  DoD Risk Identification 
The first step in DoD’s risk management process is risk identification. Risk 
identification is the activity that examines each element of the program to identify 
associated root causes, begin their documentation, and set the stage for their successful 
management. Risk identification begins as early as possible in successful programs and 
continues throughout the program with regular reviews and analyses of Technical 
Performance Measurements (TPMs), schedule, resource data, life-cycle cost 
information,… (DoD RMG, 2006, p. 7). 
. 
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2. DoD Qualitative Risk Analysis 
The next step in the DoD guide is risk analysis, a step performed much like the 
risk management models studied in the next chapter, where each risk element identified 
in step one is analyzed to assign it a likelihood of occurrence and an impact on cost, 
schedule, and/or performance. Figure 13 shows that the analysis is conducted 



















Qualitative risk assessment places the decision making in the 
right context; is it (the risk) something to be concerned about or 
not. 
Figure 13.   DoD Risk Reporting Matrix (From: DoD RMG, 2006) 
The numbers for likelihood are matched to a table of probability of occurrence 
and enumeration of consequence is matched to a table that assigns the numbers 1 through 
5 to schedule slip, cost overrun, or technical performance parameters. Interestingly, the 
technical performance parameters start with just meeting requirements and become 
progressively poorer. Also, included in performance risk is the program’s management. 
While this is an important risk factor for a process such as acquisition, it is sometimes 
overlooked when evaluating risks to a system. 
Likelihood 
increasing 
Undesirable consequence increasing 
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3. DoD Risk Mitigation Planning 
Risk mitigation planning is the process of evaluating the results of the risk 
analysis and deciding on which risks need to be mitigated, how and when mitigation 
should be accomplished, and who is responsible. Risks that fall into the red blocks of the 
risk reporting matrix (in Figure 13) naturally have priority over risks that fall in the 
yellow region. Those risks in the green region most likely are considered to be acceptable 
risks, and no mitigation efforts are required up front. However, just because these risks 
are acceptable now, they still need to be tracked to ensure their likelihood or their impact 
does not change over the course of the program or change due to outside influencers. 
Once the risks have been prioritized, planning turns to ascertaining how to mitigate the 
most risky. The means of mitigation must be balanced against the costs of mitigation, not 
only the cost during acquisition and development, but also what impact a mitigation 
action has over the life cycle costs of the program or system. Mitigation actions might 
have implications on the technology required to mitigate the risk, and of course, the 
mitigation strategy has to examine and balance the opportunity cost that a mitigation 
strategy may have on system functionality (DoD RMG, 2006). 
4. DoD Risk Mitigation Plan Implementation 
Implementation is the process of putting the plan developed above into action. 
Implementation is the management function of communicating the plan to both action 
personnel and to the selected stakeholders who have a vested interest in the resulting new 
system requirements if the plan is implemented. Implementation is also the management 
function of assigning mitigation action responsibilities, and inspecting the progress and 
results of implementation. Finally, the implementation requires some type of reporting 
activity to keep program management aware of changes to a program and the effects 
those changes have on the program’s cost or schedule. Justification for program cost 
increases or schedule changes can best be documented by relating them to the risks being 




identified risk. It also documents any changes to the performance parameters of the 
ultimate program’s product because of changes to the system to mitigate a risk (DoD 
RMG, 2006). 
5. Risk Tracking 
As with any good management plan, after action is decided upon and taken, it is 
good practice to monitor the program or the system to see the result of the mitigation 
efforts. If the results are not what were expected, or conditions in the environment 
affecting program performance change, further actions or a change to current actions may 
be in order to keep the level of risk low, or to meet program objectives. The balance of 
the benefit of mitigating an identified risk must be weighed against the total cost of 
implementation and proper tracking of the results of mitigation actions supports or refutes 
the decisions made so that any non-working decisions can be changed. As the graphic of 
the process clearly indicates, risk management is not a once-through process. Tracking 
inevitably leads to the identification of other risks not uncovered in the first iteration of 
the process. Based on good systems engineering principles, the process is repeatable, in 
the case of this directive, throughout the acquisition cycle (DoD RMG, 2006). 
E.  SUMMARY 
1.  Benefits of the Risk Management Process 
The rigorous application of a risk management process is an important weapon in 
the program manager’s arsenal supporting activities and decisions leading to a successful 
program and a capable product. For instance, had the Future Combat Systems (FCS) 
program been able to quantify the risk that the integration of new networking 
technologies across such a wide array of hardware systems would have posed, the 
program directors might have been able to mitigate that risk by partitioning the disparate 
systems networks into manageable pieces. The consequences of that risk unmitigated are 
apparent in the fragmented status of the program today. As is evident in the FCS 
program, one of a program manager’s important risk factors is the political environment 
surrounding a program, and equally important is the necessity to examine the level of risk 
contributed by that factor continually as the political environment changes.  
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2.  Relating the Process to the Network Enterprise 
The general methodology described above translates well to the analysis of risk 
and the implementation of mitigation strategies for information systems and computer 
networks. The risk process described above is related to programmatic risk in the Defense 
acquisition community, but as is shown in the next chapter, the basic steps for applying 
the process to programmatic risk are equally applicable to operational and enterprise risk 
encountered in local and enterprise networked systems. The basics of risk determination, 
probability of an event times the impact of that event, still hold true for the assessment of 
risk to a network.  
3.  Relating Benefits to Costs 
To be able to mitigate risk to the operations of a local network or an enterprise 
system of systems and achieve operational or strategic goals, identified risks are assessed 
to make the decision whether it is worth the cost in funding or opportunity to plan and 
implement a mitigation strategy for that risk. The answer to the question “What is this 
mitigation strategy protecting?” directly affects the mitigation strategy employed. For 
risks of little or no impact, no matter the likelihood of occurrence, the mitigation strategy 
may be one of accepting the risk as is. Implementation of security requirements that 
restrict functionality of a network incur monetary as well as opportunity costs, life cycle 
costs, and some hidden or latent costs (such as stakeholder costs in the future). If the 
protected system and its information have little impact on the success of achieving the 
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IV. ENTERPRISE NETWORK RISK MANAGEMENT  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Risk and the process of risk management as it applies to computer information 
systems and network enterprises is examined in detail in this section. While the basic 
definition of risk applies to networked systems and the management process framework 
is similar, information systems have unique attributes requiring a slightly different 
perspective on how to determine the level of risk to those systems. By connecting 
information systems into a network capable of sharing and collaboration, the number of 
possible failure paths and initiation points for intrusion to cause harm increases rapidly. 
An analysis of the reliability of a network is important to the designers and 
architects of the system and is worthy of further study. To be thorough, the assessment of 
risk must integrate the risks and hazards associated with unreliability of equipment, 
accidental failures caused by equipment or people, and sabotage or attacks to obtain a 
true picture of the system’s capability to support operational and strategic objectives. As 
reliability and human factors engineering generate key design criteria for a system 
designer, and since the contention is that risk covers all the categories above, the risk 
management process should include all those areas above and should be integrated with 
the determination of key performance parameters at the beginning of a system’s life 
cycle, during concept definition and possibly before. 
Information systems and network enterprises are at risk due to the following. 
• Failure of hardware components, software faults and bugs, and network 
communication and signal failures 
• Incorrect design, installation, arrangement of the interconnections between 
nodes on a network 
• Human error by accident or faulty procedures 
• Intentional invasion and destruction of hardware, software program logic 
and functionality, and network connectivity by entities intent on inhibiting 
correct network operation looking to steal or corrupt information  
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This thesis concentrates on examining risks to a network from the fourth source of 
risks listed above, intentional intrusion into a network with the purpose of causing harm. 
Recognizing and dealing with intentional acts designed to disable a network enterprise is 
challenging to understand fully. These challenges continue to grow as technology 
improves and gives the adversary more tools with which to intrude on network 
operations. However, the challenge must be confronted because the threat of network 
intrusions and disruptions continues to increase as the military relies more on networked 
systems to provide the edge in operations and strategy. The allocation of scarce monetary 
and human resources without a management plan is misdirected and may impede the 
purpose of the network in the first place. Installing technical network countermeasures or 
writing and enforcing procedures that affect the information flows and availability on the 
network supporting operations and strategy are without clear benefit and without robust 
risk management planning and implementation. Equally disastrous is when the risks are 
ignored or overlooked, allowing the adversary freedom to intrude and disrupt vital 
network functionality just at the time when it is most needed. 
B. RISKS IN THE NETWORK ENVIRONMENT 
The definition of the level of risk to computers and information systems from 
intentional intrusion can be defined in general terms as a function of the level of threat, 
the vulnerability of the information system and network, and the value of the system and 
information assets (Jones & Ashenden, 2005). Or put another way, risk is the result of a 
threat with adverse effects on a vulnerable system (Chittister & Haimes, 2006, p. 5). 
When no vulnerability exists to exploit, there is no probability that a threat damages 
network assets, and when a network’s assets are not worth protecting, the measure of risk 
is low no matter what the probability is of a threat exploiting network vulnerabilities. 
More succinctly, risk from a threat to a computer network can be defined in the following 





Risk = Probability of Attack x Impact of Attack (1) 
Probability of Attack = Probability that Threat will Exploit Vulnerability (2) 
Threat Probability = Threat Motivation and Threat Technical Capability (3) 
Threat Motivation = Enough Resources, Likelihood of Attack Success (4) 
Likelihood of Attack Success = Likelihood of Avoiding Detection and Impact (5) 
(Ingoldby, 2009). 
1. Safety Risk 
Safety risk to a network is most often identified with networks that provide 
supervisory control and data acquisition, commonly called SCADA systems. SCADA 
systems are usually critical industrial, mechanical or electrical equipment operational 
control networks to monitor hardware system parameters and provide control signals to 
adjust inputs to get desired outputs. SCADA systems are networked to provide system 
managers information to change mechanical or electrical parameters and change system 
outputs. These networks are usually isolated and bounded by the industrial system they 
are controlling. However, if the network extends to a multipurpose computer that has 
access to the Internet, exploitation of these critical systems is possible from threats 
outside the system’s boundary. For instance, if a control system on a ship supplies 
information to a system manager’s computer also used for unclassified networking to 
other information systems off the ship, the control system may be vulnerable to attack 
from outside the ship. Since exploitation of a computer network vulnerability can come 
from a variety of sources, it is important to know if that adversity is from an intended act, 
an accident, or from a near miss (incident), as this information supports the decison-
making process as it is applied to the management of risk. 
2. Operational Risk 
Operational risk is the threat to networked systems that provide information and 
functionality to accomplish a mission. Many activities on a network can be included in 
this definition. Civilian and military organizations want to achieve certain effects by the 
actions they perform, and the organization has short-term goals, which measure the 
effects achieved. Any network system contributing to the accomplishment of those goals 
66 
is at operational risk of failing to support the achievement of said goals. For instance, the 
network of UAV sensors to ground control stations that may be directly connected 
through a network to war fighters in the field that depends on the UAV intelligence and 
surveillance for targeting is at risk operationally as long as a way exists to exploit a 
vulnerability in the “sensor to shooter” network. Operational risk includes threats to a 
network that inhibit the network from achieving the desired effects supporting the goals 
of a unit or organization to which it belongs. Operational risk is a broader view of risk to 
a network than safety and program risk and must consider the integration of the people, 
processes and systems used in the attainment of those enterprise objectives and the 
external forces that would prohibit obtainment of those objectives (Kujawski, 2009).  
3. Enterprise Risk 
The aggregation of operational risks to a system or family of network systems can 
result in enterprise risk, which is the threat to the infrastructure or the long-term goals of 
an organization. It is important to understand that risk to an enterprise network is 
wrapped up in the nature of the integration and interoperability of the network’s 
components and sub-networks connected together. Enterprise risk is different than 
operational risk by the organizations’ assets and ideals that are possibly threatened and by 
the fact that the networks threatened by enterprise risk are most likely virtually 
unbounded much like the Internet. Unbounded networks were defined in Chapter I as a 
network where no one entity can know who is connected to the network at any one time 
or what connections are active in the vast array of paths between nodes that exist in the 
system. The action of exploitation in network enterprises usually takes place at the 
interfaces, and the network response to deterring or responding to an attack can depend 
on whether the systems at the interface are loosely or tightly coupled. Tight coupling 
offers a greater amount of control over the entire system, whereas loose coupling offers 
system resilience by containing the “infection” of an attack to one of the coupled systems 
and limiting the spread of the attack. 
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In a network enterprise, the ultimate goal is to achieve strategic information 
superiority. Enterprise risk is the probability that some threat agent has the desire and the 
capability to exploit the network enterprise, reducing or eliminating the information 
superiority of the enterprise, resulting in a consequence of varying severity to the 
enterprise’s ability to achieve its strategic goal. As enterprise risk takes on a holistic 
perspective, so must the element of threat to the enterprise. The environment surrounding 
the network enterprise contains threats from other national interests, rogue players, 
evolving technologies, and internal people processes and policies (Kujawski, 2009). 
C. RISK CONTROL IN A NETWORK 
1. Balancing Security with Functionality is a Team Effort 
Management of risk requires the application of risk controls on a system. Controls 
of risk to a program or system usually fall under the name of security. The method of 
controlling risk in any information system, and especially in the U.S. military’s large 
inventory of information systems as they are networked together, is a balancing act 
between security technology and procedural implementation by system administrators 
and the desire for functionality by the users. The system administrators are charged with 
the security of the system, while providing usability that meets the needs of the mission. 
To accomplish this effectively, a dialogue between users and system administrators must 
be established so that security scheme and strategies can be aligned with the needs of the 
users, and the users must be trained in the network system vulnerabilities and how the 
vulnerabilities are being mitigated to lower the level of risk to the network. Without this 
dialogue, dealing with risk includes risk transfer or avoidance, which may unnecessarily 
limit the network functionality.  
2. Controlling Risk is an Evolutionary Process Requiring Several 
Iterations 
The controls put in place today do not necessarily guarantee effectiveness 
tomorrow. As the threat changes in capability and motivation, and as the network grows 
in size and changes in technical design, a robust risk management plan requires the 
constant evaluation of the risk controls in place and the requirement to change or improve 
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on their capability to lower the level of risk. Table 2 (Mulokey, 2009, p. 27) outlines 
some of the effects evolutionary change has on the security design and procedural 
implementation on network systems. 
 
Evolutionary Changes Effects on System Security 
The user’s tolerance for risk may change in 
response to changing world conditions, political 
considerations, or business priorities. 
Stakeholders may require increased levels of 
assurance requiring tighter controls. Conversely, the 
greater need for the system’s outputs may justify 
higher risk. 
System components become obsolete. 
 
Commercial off-the-shelf products no longer 
supported by vendors become vulnerable to attack 
External sources can change the characteristics of 
their inputs to the system. 
 
Anomalous responses to the changed inputs can 
degrade the system’s availability or become an 
attack vector for sophisticated hackers. 
Advances in technology instigate system 
modifications to improve efficiency. 
 
Design changes may increase security or provide 
new vulnerabilities. Security analysis, design 
recommendations, and testing are key to assure 
security performance. 
Workforce characteristics can change due to the 
retirement of experienced personnel. 
 
Undocumented procedures can be lost when 
experienced personnel are replaced. Improved 
process documentation is needed to support training 
new personnel. 
 
Risks to a network are always changing and must be reassessed frequently.  
Table 2.   Effects on Network Security due to Evolutionary Change (From: Mulokey, 
2009) 
D. RISK MANAGEMENT OF A GLOBAL NETWORK ENTERPRISE 
1. Complexity of Network Risk Management for an Enterprise System 
For an enterprise as complex and with such a breadth of coverage as the current 
and the target GIG, a process of risk management is a huge undertaking. The individual 
services’ system of systems as exemplified in the Navy’s FORCENet, Air Force’s 
Challenger, and the Army’s Future Combat Systems are in and of themselves expansive 
networks involving multiple physical infrastructures of connectivity and computational 
power, a vast array of software programs designed to control, operate and manage 
complex weapons platforms and inform, train, and command many thousands of 
specialized soldiers and sailors. Developing a system for risk management for the service 
components’ information systems individually is problematic as the eclectic mix of 
current systems and their connectivity through thousands of different networks makes the 
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assessment of risk especially difficult. As is explored later, several studies on risk 
assessment have been or are being conducted on assessing risk within individual network 
operations. However, in the future, these individual networks are tied together so that war 
fighters can integrate intelligence and targeting data from selected sources to the weapons 
systems they are operating along with the decision support systems that need to be 
available to achieve success in the mission. It is the contention of this paper that the U.S. 
military needs a workable and understandable risk management system with the rigor to 
be comprehensive, the structure to be consistent, and the flexibility to adapt to a changing 
environment. The process must be able to identify and assess as many risks as possible 
across the enterprise of the service components and across the DoD infrastructure of the 
target GIG, and it must be a continuous process, which monitors the state of the GIG 
network and feeds back information to improve the process with every iteration. A 
comprehensive risk management system is designed to handle an eclectic mix of 
numerous network components and their interconnection and interfaces, and it is 
designed to handle large amounts of data required to make a trustworthy assessment of 
the systems risks so that decisions made to counter the threats are well informed and 
effective, contributing to the success of net-centric operations. The process is able to keep 
the management plan current with changing technologies, new threats, and up-dated 
military, political, economic and diplomatic strategies of the government. It is shown that 
this enterprise management system must take a top-down view as well as a bottom-up 
view, decomposing the risks across the myriad of networks, each of which requires 
special sets of values; then integrating the risk process across the many networks to 
establish a truly enterprise risk management system. This is especially important because 
DoD and the individual services have chosen to architect their networks in accordance 
with Service Oriented Architecture as discussed in Chapter II.  
2. Beginning the Process Early in a Network System’s Lifecycle 
Viewing the networked system of systems from the top-level down, which 
comprise the infrastructure of the GIG, risk management of the network enterprise must 
be an overarching process, which includes and encompasses the risk management of the 
infrastructure’s individual network systems. The challenge in a network of this size and 
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complexity is to mesh the overall risk management plan with the individual system’s risk 
management plans, so that there is a unity of effort and a common set of objectives; and 
the most advantageous time in the system’s lifecycle to start this is from the beginning 
during concept definition, which draws on the network system’s concept of operations. If 
the risks to the network enterprise are not identified and assessed with the start of a 
management plan in place before the requirements and specifications are defined and 
allocated to system components, the architecting of the system during preliminary design 
does not consider how to architect the system to reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities that 
could be exploited, threatening critical data and system operation. In essence, the need for 
operational capability competes with the need for security; the resultant architecture 
being reactive to the threats as they are encountered during the later stages of the 
network’s lifecycle. 
E. PROPOSED NETWORK ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 
PROCESS (NERMP)  
1.  Review of Available Software Risk Management Processes  
The Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and the CERT Coordination 
Center of the Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie-Mellon University has been 
supporting network security for DoD for several years. Their model (Carelli & Young, 
2008) for analyzing risk is a multi-dimensional model, which encompasses the following. 
• Incident response risk model and assessment 
• Software process risk model and assessment 
• Operational security risk model and assessment 
• Other risk models 
CERT’s classic model OCTAVE for operational security of computers and 








• Repeat  
This process is similar to the program risk management of the DoD acquisition 
program, and many of the activities of OCTAVE, surveys, workshops, questionnaires, 
and auditing mirror those of the program risk management requirements and activities of 
the DoD risk management guide for acquisition. 
2. NERMP Details 
Drawing on the process model from CERT, DoD Risk Management Guide for 
Acquisition, lectures and articles by Yacov Haimes, and course materials for enterprise 
risk management (Kujawski, 2009), Figure 14 graphically displays a process for risk 
management, which is discussed in detail below the graphic. 
 
 
NERMP is similar to the process of the last chapter but is designed for network 
enterprises. 
Figure 14.   Network Enterprise Risk Management Process (NERMP) 
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The Risk Analysis Process is a method to identify the components of risk as stated 
above systematically and assess the risks identified to determine what could go wrong 
and assess the probability so that risks can be prioritized. The Risk Management Process 
continues the process once risks have been analyzed. It is then necessary to manage the 
risks by determining what can be done about matching available resources against risk 
implementation plans, and controlling and monitoring the network for the effectiveness 
of the risk management decisions as well as determining the effectiveness of survivability 
and resiliency measures for system recovery. Each of the components of risk, assets, 
threats, vulnerabilities (Figure 14, column 1), recovery and resiliency (Figure 14 column 
4), are examined briefly in more detail below for their contribution to the risk analysis 
process as it applies to a network enterprise. 
• Asset valuation is an important and complex part of the process. The value 
of network assets is more than just the cost of hardware, software and 
operational costs of the network. A thorough valuation must take into 
account the assets of information and functionality provided by the 
network and the value of these assets to achieving the organization’s 
goals. This is a moving target, though. Information in the military is often 
transitory, valuable for the moment or the situation at hand. The effects 
that the organization is trying to achieve to meet goals is usually longer 
term, but even those change with changes in the environment surrounding 
the network enterprise. However, an honest valuation of assets in the 
identify phase supports the assessment of the impact of an attack on the 
network and where to place priority on the choices to handle and monitor 
the identified risks.  
• Threat identification, assessment and management (such as it can be done) 
is equally as complex since the probability of an attack from a given threat 
agent is difficult to quantify statistically. Unlike reliability, a threat makes 
an attack based on the threat’s subjective analysis of its likelihood of 
success in not being detected while doing the maximum amount of 
damage. 
• Vulnerability of the network is the one risk component over which there is 
some control. However, in the age of COTS and SOA, identifying, let 
alone assessing and managing, the vast amount of ways to exploit a 
network enterprise as expansive and technologically complex as the GIG, 
can be overwhelming in itself. Several sources (Clark, Sollins, 
Wroclawski, & Faber, 2003; Chittister & Haimes, 2006: Haimes, 2009; 
Jones & Ashenden, 2005; McCabe, 2009; Storey, 1996) have 
approximated that in an individual computer operating system, there are  
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over 200 million lines of code, and out of those, two million have “bugs” 
(defects). The challenge is to determine what bugs are exploitable and 
what to do about them.  Other vulnerabilities are explored in depth below. 
• System recovery and resiliency are increasingly important to a 
comprehensive risk analysis. For the attacks that do get through, it is 
important to know how the network recovers, what information needs to 
be sustained during an attack and how quickly the network can get back to 
full capability after an attack. This analysis has to be conducted before an 
attack to make tradeoffs and decisions about what recoverability features 
need to be part of the network, such as redundancy, replication, diversity, 
and distribution. Survivability characteristics of recognize, resist and 
recover, are part of the requirements that comprise the other functionality 
performance parameters of a network. 
The process, if done correctly, establishes priorities and allows for the selection of 
alternatives on which to make decisions on how and where to protect the system. Many 
of these decisions are made in uncertain circumstances, and the decisions made rely on 
some prediction of probabilities and of consequences. Since an effective risk 
management program must start in the first phase of a system’s/network’s lifecycle and 
continued throughout, an effective risk management plan guides decisions on how to 
architect a protected yet functional network that optimizes the competing objectives of 
system capability and system protection. As Yacov Haimes says of risk assessment and 
management, “The risk assessment and management process is aimed at answering 
specific questions in order to make better decisions under uncertain conditions” (Haimes, 
2009, p. 22). 
At the conclusion of the process, it should answer some of the following 
questions. 
• What needs to be protected and why 
• What is being protecting against 
• How much protection is required 
• How does the protection inhibit operation of the system and affect the 
desired outcome or ability to achieve the system’s objectives 
• What protection is it possible to do without to make the system more 
functional 
• What system functionality can be forfeited because of the unknown threat 
or vulnerability  
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• How is  the protection to be implemented 
• How much does the protection cost (to implement, in opportunity cost, in 
training and monitoring) 
F. IDENTIFYING, EVALUATING AND MEASURING THE ELEMENTS OF 
RISK ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT 
1. Asset Valuation 
Appraisal of an asset is important in that its value depends on the end product or 
mission that asset is designed to achieve. For instance, given a similar information system 
in two organizations with similar vulnerabilities in that 
system, an adversary who successfully exploits that 
vulnerability causes greater damage to the organization with 
the more critical mission. As with any system design, 
development or operation, the engineer needs to know the 
systems requirements, how those requirements are going to be or are being met by the 
system architecture, and if the functionality of the system is designed to achieve the 
objectives of all the stakeholders. An assessment of risk must also start from the vantage 
point of a thorough knowledge of the system under assessment. A detailed system 
definition comprising the system’s requirements, specifications, and objectives is 
required before an assessment of the system’s vulnerability’s is determined. In several 
studies on risk assessment of networked computer systems, and especially in Storey’s 
analysis of safety-critical computer systems, the first step in the study of system risk is to 
discover asset value (Jones & Ashenden, 2005). 
Placing value on network assets is not just about the dollar value of the 
information asset exploited, but also about the consequences that exploitation has on the 
organization in terms of missed opportunity or damage to critical data, people or 
infrastructure. Not only is the consequence of any given exploitation important, but so is 
the interrelationship of the value of that system to the value of a connected system and 
the cascading effects that an intrusion and attack on one system may have on another. In 
the DoD enterprise, this process is problematic because of the large inventory and wide 




required to meet 
goals 
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throughout the services. Add onto this, the direction of the new architectural framework 
in the form of service oriented architecture, and the effect that one system’s degraded 
condition can have on the condition and capability of another is endless. There are so 
many systems and so many people and organizations at stake with opinions as to whose 
system is more important. Additionally, a networked system takes on different values 
depending on the operation for which it is used, the environment in which it is operated, 
and as envisioned by FORCENet and the GIG in general, to be able to set up ad hoc 
networks, and what the value is of a network as the composition of that network changes 
to achieve a temporal objective. The military has employed a similar system of 
information valuation since the beginnings of safeguarding classified information; that 
level of classification has been determined by the severity of its loss to the conduct of 
U.S. operations. For instance, the loss of top secret information would cause grave 
consequences to U.S. operations and to U.S. forces should it fall into unauthorized hands. 
This same idea, but on a far larger and more rigorous and robust level, is needed to place 
a value on the multitude of networked systems in the service today and planned for the 
future in the GIG. The Navy has taken the initial steps in this type of classification by the 
development of Cross Domain Solutions and Multi-level Security (CDS/MLS) processes 
within U.S. information systems. However, with the fluid nature of these systems’ 
capabilities as they relate to the environment and the national security situation, and as 
they transform with the addition of changing technologies, it is necessary to conduct a 
top-down analysis of system value both as a stand-alone system and in the context of 
interoperability (and with SOA) and collaboration with other systems. With the desired 
capability of creating ad hoc networked systems to meet a tailored mission, the valuation 
of individual systems changes and must be addressed each time one of these ad hoc 
networks is created. 
Taking a mission-oriented perspective, Donald Buckshaw et al.(Date?), take a 
back door approach to asset valuation by modeling a value hierarchy on the adversary, 
the user, and the service provider. Instead of trying to optimize the system under a model 
of multiple competing objectives, they use Value-Focused Thinking methodology 
introduced by Keeney and Raiffa. Their main focus on assigning value was to an 
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adversary model, but they also applied this methodology to a valuation of assets in their 
user and service provider models to help quantify the importance of assets from a 
mission-oriented perspective, which then leads to an assessment as to the severity of the 
consequences due to an attack on a networked system. Appendix B examines this model. 
2. Vulnerability Determinations 
Hand in hand with the threat assessment piece of risk assessment is a 
determination of a system’s vulnerability. Without a vulnerability element, the threat 
agent cannot harm the system, and without a threat, the 
vulnerable part of the system is not a risk (other than normal 
reliability considerations). The interrelationship of threat to 
vulnerability is captured in the attack tree analysis mentioned 
in the next section. The path an attacker might take to reach an 
objective of doing harm to the system leads into an analysis of the scenario that points to 
the vulnerable elements of the system and what components of hardware or routines in 
the software might be vulnerable and require attention. This is done routinely in the 
commercial world with the identification of a path or scenario an attacker might take and 
identification of what components are exploitable. For instance, in 2007, it was found that 
no matter how carefully a network topology is guarded within the network, it is possible 
for an intruder to gain network knowledge while packets are transiting the Internet 
through a process called reverse Domain Name Server (DNS) look-up. Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP) packets were captured on the Internet, which gave internal IP 
address information to an unauthorized source (Faber, 2009). There are ways to prevent 
this with the configuration of the network’s DNS servers to keep reverse look-ups 
internal to the network, but this vulnerability is illustrative of the breadth of system 
vulnerabilities and the huge task at finding and fixing them.  
Determining the vulnerability of a system is a very complex problem. In 
networked information systems, vulnerabilities can be extant in system software (most 
visibility these days), hardware, firmware, user or service provider personnel, policies 




sector alone, vast libraries have been compiled to document and catalogue the myriad of 
vulnerable components, programs and paths in the vast array of computer systems and 
networks. Vulnerability can show up at any level of the system from the physical layer to 
the most advanced application. In addition, because of the complexity and diversity of the 
technology, the path to a vulnerable component can take many different routes depending 
on the instrument or method used to penetrate a system. 
Vulnerabilities are a natural byproduct of the quantity of systems which have been 
developed with quality that is less than perfect, incomplete reqirements, and limited 
testing. The higher the quality, the fewer vulnerable components, but it is now more 
difficult to detect the remaining software flaws. Quality of software was discussed in 
Chapter II, with the discussion of CMMI; a process for quality control on software 
development, which is a process to improve the level of software quality to diminish the 
suspected software faults that open up vulnerabilities in the software architecture. 
Software and systems engineering need to grow in scope and capability because even as 
the quality of software products improves, other additions to the software inventory open 
up new paths to exploit an upgraded system, making it difficult to catch up. On the 
software side, patches have been used in commercial and military enterprises to fix or 
lessen vulnerability when it is discovered. It is by far easier to find and fix vulnerability 
during the development stage of a system’s life cycle than when the system has already 
been deployed. However, the use of COTS components and programs makes this 
problematic. In fact, one of the down sides to open architectural development and reuse 
in a SOA is that the developer may have little if any insight into the contents of a 
software program or a component with imbedded software and its vulnerabilities. This is 
especially true of purchased material (programs and components) design architectures, 
which are proprietary. Some of this risk can be mitigated by disabling portions of COTS 
programs not being used, layering additional security programs on top of the proprietary 
program (but this may itself create more vulnerabilities), conduct research and 
development into technological tools to analyze the COTS coding (this is an expensive 
alternative that must be weighed in the risk assessment), or plan on a response 
mechanism or procedure for fixing flaws (more expensive but probably necessary is the 
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capability of fixing flaws “on the fly” to improve recoverability) (Anderson & Hundley, 
1998).  COTS use in building systems has gained wide acceptance within the military’s 
acquisition community because it saves on system development costs, on personnel 
training costs (many users have used like systems in the commercial world), and on the 
costs of inventory stocking and supply chain management (although some control is lost 
when relying upon a vendor for spares, and when dealing with multiple vendors, the 
problem can multiply rapidly). While the cost advantages of using an open architecture 
approach to design of networked systems looks appealing, the remedies cited above can 
come with their own enormous price. Neil Storey (1996) notes in his book, Safety-
Critical Computer Systems, that exhaustively testing a piece of software can be time 
consuming and costly to find all the vulnerabilities (what he calls exhaustive testing) in 
just one piece of a program. The procedure must test for all possible binary inputs to a 
system against their output (black box testing when the code is unknown as in proprietary 
software) .He points out that” With a small program of 40 inputs, the test involves the 
input and measurement of output of 1012 combinations. When the subsystem components 
are known, a check of each component as its state changes (binary patterns) can be 
conducted, but in a simple 8 byte microprocessor, exhaustive tests of all combinations of 
states will be 10160,000, and to only look at the combination of failures due to a bridging 
fault on just three nodes, would require 1018 combinations.” 
Obviously, to test a component of COTS software for vulnerabilities, sampling 
techniques must be used (what Storey calls coverage-based testing) to develop statistical 
measurements, which gains a confidence level that a system’s vulnerabilities are limited. 
Still, many vulnerabilities may and probably do exist. 
One of the difficulties in looking for vulnerability when conducting the risk 
assessment process is that as technology improves at a rapid pace, the risk management 
methodologies are slow to react to incorporate the new technology and to identify the 
new vulnerabilities created by the new technology. The challenge is to maintain a 
vulnerability that is accessible and current with the range of vulnerabilities to the 
system’s network, the various operating systems on that network, and the ever expanding 
quantity of applications in each information system, and the connectivity protocols used 
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for interoperability. The vulnerability library provides the latest known or experienced 
paths that lead through the system’s vulnerabilities and the ways to block these paths. In 
addition, the vulnerability library needs to remain current with the technology of 
vulnerability detection devices and intrusion alert mechanisms. All of these factors are 
important to the analysis of the risks the network faces and to the assessment with which 
hey are dealt. 
When considering the system’s vulnerability, the security specialist must look at 
detecting intrusions into the system’s vulnerabilities, identifying the vulnerability to be 
exploited, and the proper countermeasure to prevent the intrusion from proceeding. In 
addition, consideration must be made as to how the system maintains its minimum or 
critical functionality if the intrusion is successful, and how the system limits the extent of 
the intrusion and stops any progressive or cascading effects to the system due to the 
intrusion. Many methods exists for intrusion and vulnerability detection including Rule-
based pattern recognition, forced intrusions to make the system react before an attacker 
penetrates the system, and inference-based testing to recognize the interrelationships 
between components in the threat environment. Identification of the intrusion once 
detected is important to know how to stop it. Access to a database that catalogues known 
malicious agents is important to identification and resolution of an intrusion on a system. 
It is also a key element in the identification of countermeasures, which can be applied in 
the planning and design of a system or during operation and recovery of the system once 
an intrusion has been detected.  
Taking the analysis or the threat agent and the system vulnerability that the threat 
agent might exploit is one of the key elements in the calculation and assessment of risk, 
and is crucial in managing that risk. 
3. Threat Assessment 
A threat to a distributed networked information system is comprised of an 
adversary (an entity with intent to cause harm or disruption) who uses tools (viruses, 
worms, information overload, software altering devices) to produce an undesirable effect 
(information denial, corruption, theft, fabrication), which reduces capabilities or causes 
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harm in safety-critical applications. The military make its business out of knowing who 
the threat is today, but it is quite uncertain who the adversary is going to be in the future. 
Also, in today’s environment with an asymmetric enemy, it is the opinion of this paper 
that the identification of the threat can get muddled in the identification of the loyalties of 
the threat and ideals that motivate them. By not knowing whom the adversaries are, one 
is less certain of the tools they might use, what their motivation is, and what effect they 
want to inflict on the distributed network system. 
Much work has been done both in the public sector by the major producers of 
software and computer and network systems, and in a less visible manner, in the military 
to categorize and recognize the vast array of methods and 
tools available to an adversary. The major effort has been in 
building libraries of threat data and techniques with 
appropriate remedies. In the simplest terms, companies such 
as Symantec and McAfee who sell remedies to private 
consumers through distributed software and routine programs maintain the libraries in the 
public sector. 
To be classified as a threat, a threat agent needs to have opportunity, motivation, 
resources, inside knowledge, and a finite amount of time to accomplish an objective. If it 
is too hard to penetrate a system, or once penetrated, too difficult to achieve the desired 
effect (such as denial of service), or it takes too many resources or time, or the desired 
effect does not have the impact that would make it worth the expenditure of those 
resources, then the likelihood of the adversary actually attempting to breach a system 
becomes less. It is also possible that other inhibiting or amplifying factors may come into 
play to make an entity a threat. Deception can act as an inhibitor and perceived lack of 
retribution can be an amplifier. 
The assessment of the threats that are a potential risk to a networked system is an 
integral part of the overall risk assessment and management of those risks. Most 
methodology for determining the source and the qualities of a threat (Jones & Ashenden, 
2005; Buckshaw Parnell, Unkenholz, Parks, Wallner, & Saydjari 2008; Hamdi & 
Boudriga, 2005) rely on finding a logical grouping of agents to decompose further into 
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their motivation, capabilities, and resources as well as the triggering factors, or catalysts, 
and the timing that would cause a threat agent to exploit a system‘s vulnerability. Each of 
these categories can be further decomposed and weighted on a constructed scale (when 
no natural scale is available). In their Mission Oriented Risk and Design Analysis 
(MORDA) model of risk assessment, Donald Buckshaw et al. (2008, p. 24) use what they 
call swing weight matrix in their determination of value for the level of threat to a system 
as well as the other components they consider in their assessment of risk. The swing 
weight matrix consider the change in relative importance between different 
measurements of value when the value measurements go from worst to best possible 
level. An overview of their methodology is contained in Appendix B, examples of risk 
models. It is important in any assessment system to weight the factors properly relative to 
one another, to know why the weighting is being distributed a certain way over an 
alternative. Since much of the input data used in a given methodology is subjective in 
nature, it is important to process that data in a logical sequence so that the process is 
repeatable (especially if the model is used in a continuous analysis) and the results 
obtained are consistent and justifiable within the constructive scale chosen. Finally, the 
results have to be useful for decision making, which requires an understanding by the 
decision maker of the basis on which the decision is being made. 
When looking at threat amplifiers (events or motivating factors that encourage 
attack) and inhibitors (change in cultural attitudes or political roadblocks) in regard to a 
specific threat agent, the effect the amplifier or inhibitor has on the agent must be 
considered, on the environment in which the agent and the protected system exist and on 
the system being protected. Consider an amplifier of a search for recognition by a threat. 
It has an effect on the threat and the system, but the environment may not come into play; 
whereas, the speed in which technology changes and improves affects the system and the 
environment, but any adjustment to the magnitude of change probably does not affect the 
threat agent. 
As one piece of the puzzle of gaining an understanding of the risks to distributed 
networked systems, a knowledgeable threat assessment provides an overall risk 
assessment with valuable information. Without a threat, the fact that vulnerabilities exist 
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in the information systems becomes academic; an exercise in technological expertise to 
plug the holes and reach a certain level of perfection. However, this is certainly not the 
case. Numerous threats are present and are waiting for the right time to exploit networks 
to achieve the goal of degrading or incapacitating information capability. The threat is not 
just from the outside (although outsiders may already have achieved a position inside 
U.S. systems, either with “time bombs” in the software or by compromising users). The 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) at the Software Engineering Institute has 
examined case studies of insider malicious activity to include sabotage, espionage, fraud, 
theft, and manipulation. They have developed a simulation to help uncover potential 
cases of insider malicious activity through the use of behavior modeling and the 
consequences of improper applications of new technology as well as practices for 
personnel screening and authorization to systems. This study has focused lately on the 
potential for insider activity during the system’s development lifecycle, where virulent 
code has been inserted during development among other deleterious actions that may take 
years to uncover (CERT, 2008). Knowing the threats and planning for their reduction is 
an important step in any risk management process both before a system degrades or fails 
and equally important when planning the operation of a system at reduced capability and 
how to recover as quickly as possible.  
4. System Recovery 
A subsequent chapter explores what makes a system survive in a hostile 
environment, particularly a distributed network of information systems relying on one 
another for complete functionality and the ability to meet 
objectives, and how network survivability is inherent in the 
network enterprise risk management approach. This section 
examines an overview of what element recoverability plays in 
a risk assessment process and what is meant by reactive risk 
analysis. Most methodologies and risk assessment models focus on a risk management 
scheme to prevent the undesirable outcome. This is why recovery or reaction is routinely 
left as an afterthought in most risk assessment models. Once a threat has exploited a 
system’s vulnerability and achieved its objective (disruption, theft, or denial of service), 
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the risk has manifested itself. Therefore, what does reactive risk and system recovery 
have to do with risk assessment, and why should it not be subordinated but treated as an 
equal step in the risk assessment process? Principally because it cannot be avoided or all 
risks mitigated to zero, and with a system as complex, and with such determined and 
ingenious adversaries, it is not a question of if but of when; and it is absolutely necessary 
to be ready for this eventuality. 
The major measurement of reactive risk assessment is time and the major tool in 
the risk assessment arsenal to handle this ability to react is the intrusion detection device. 
The element of uncertainty in this case, which makes this applicable to the risk 
management process, is how much time is available for a given attack, how much time 
before losing the minimum amount of capability needed to accomplish the mission, and 
does the intrusion detection give the system time to react, or more simply, does it detect it 
at all or does it detect too much (false alarm). In the survivability chapter, quantification 
of these survivability characteristics are examined by exploring some system models 
using optimization and simulation to characterize the survivability of a network. The 
critical element in these models is what value these characteristics provide the 
survivability of the network for it to meet requirements. The other critical element 
cursively mentioned in the model is how the requirements for survivability are 
determined and at what point in the system life cycle should the survivability 
requirements be decided. The contention of this thesis is that protection, risk mitigation 
and survivability system/network requirements must be integrated into the general 
requirements definition phase, and they ought not to be dealt with apart from the rest of 
the systems engineering process. 
G. ATTACK TREES: A USEFUL TOOL IN RISK IDENTIFICATION AND 
ASSESSMENT 
Drawing at once on the concepts of game theory and fault trees used in reliability 
analysis, attack trees can be useful in identifying and analyzing network vulnerabilities 
and the paths that can be exploited to gain access to the assets of the network. At the 
same time, they are useful in gaming the attributes of a threat that would make the threat 
more or less likely to make an attack on the network. As discussed above under threat 
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assessment, a threat agent has multiple motivations on whether to execute an attack or not 
to attack a network with multiple constraints. Several of the risk management process 
models discussed in Appendix B use attack trees in their identification and assessment of 
network vulnerabilities and the motivating factors of threat agents (Buckshaw et al., 
2005; Hamdi, 2005; Hernandez, 2001; Jones, 2005).  
1. Identifying and Correcting Vulnerabilities 
Attack trees use the same methodology as fault trees in analyzing the paths to 
system faults when determining overall system reliability. The attack tree, shown in 
Figure 15, takes the ultimate objective of the attacker as the root of the tree, then expands 
the tree through the different logical steps an attacker would be required to take to reach 
the ultimate objective. Developing the attack tree leads network developers to discover 
where the networks vulnerabilities are and the paths to get to a vulnerable network 
attribute. Analysis of the attack tree paths also reveals methods to eliminate or reduce the 
vulnerabilities, while in turn informing them of what the effect on system functionality 




Attack tree analysis of the route an attacker takes helps to organize the 
evaluation of network vulnerabilities and identify those needing to be 
fixed. 
Figure 15.   Sample Attack Tree Analysis of a Threat 
In Figure 15, the logic operators, AND & OR gates, identify either alternative 
paths to the ultimate objective (OR) or the combination of steps required to reach the nest 
level (AND). For instance, the OR gate (red arrow in Figure 15) affects database 
confidentiality since it is vulnerable from either access to the database proper or from an 
unauthorized download of information to a network enclave of lesser classification and 




the unauthorized cross-domain transfer by requiring the use of a packet sniffer and 
translation of XML security addressing to get to the information unintentionally moved to 
a less secure location on the network. 
2. Minimal Cut Sets  
Minimal cut sets (Haimes, 2009) in the attack tree can point the analyst to the 
likely scenario of attack and where to look within the individual components of the 
system for the vulnerabilities requiring the most attention. The minimal cut set is the 
minimum set of attack nodes an attacker needs to take to reach the top goal of the attack. 
Additionally, the analysis of possible scenarios following certain paths through the attack 
tree can lead an analyst to discover patterns in the way attackers reach their objectives 
and may be supportive in developing strategies to counter similar scenarios in multiple 
network systems. Attack patterns can be built into scenarios, which take into account the 
following. 
• Attack objective (base data) 
• Preconditions set to motivate the attacker to achieve the objective 
• Attack mechanisms, tools, paths chosen, etc. 
• Changes to system state as an attacker proceeds down the scenario path to 
achieve the objective 
This analysis leads into the second part of the game theory of the attack tree 
analysis; identifying and analyzing the threat attributes leading an attacker to chose a 
certain vulnerability path. This analysis supports the decision of where to allocate 
resources to mitigate the risk from a given vulnerability. 
3. Identifying and Analyzing Threat Motivations and Constraints 
Similar to the quantitative analysis of the fault tree, the probability of a threat 
choosing a primary entry point on the attack tree coupled with the likelihood of being 
able to proceed to the next step yields a value of risk with each step. For a given path up 
the tree to the ultimate objective, the probability that a threat would reach the ultimate 
objective is calculated similar to the composite failure rate calculated from a fault tree. 
However, as shown in Figure 16, the quantitative values at each node of the fault tree 
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consist of a n-tuplet of subjective values, the cost to the attacker, the level of technical 
capability of the attacker to reach that step, the attacker’s perception of the likelihood of 
being detected before or during an attack, the attacker’s perception of the value of 
reaching the ultimate goal, and other motivating factors. If a reasonable quantification of 
the values associated with the attacker’s several motivating factors can be agreed upon, 
and a reasonable limitation to the number of values can be reached, it might be possible 
to achieve a quantitative value for the probability of each attack path for comparison and 
determination of where countermeasure resources should be allocated. This calculated 






Attack trees can be used in a game theory approach to evaluate an attacker’s 
motivation. Enumeration allows comparison of the different paths to 
determine the most likely route an attacker might take to get to the objective. 
Figure 16.   The Attack Tree from the Attacker’s Perspective 
Carrying this methodology a step further, a network of arcs (paths) to get to 
successive nodes (components in the system and similar to the nodes on the attack tree) 
can be formulated and analyzed using various network analysis tools to determine the 
shortest path to reach an objective and changes in node states that would indicate the 
presence of an intruder (Hamdi & Boudriga, 2005). In attack tree analysis, the 
preconditions, post conditions, and the steps are combined into each node on the attack 
tree. In network methodology, conditions are separated from the steps between arcs and 
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nodes. Both analyses give more rigor to the threat assessment of the risk analysis process 
and lend themselves to the development of better intrusion detection devices, and other 
network vulnerability containment features. It also allows the analyst to consider 
scenarios involving multiple attackers on one system that may desire to conduct a 
coordinated attack. Computer models have been developed that consider the coordinated 
attack as the union of more than one individual attack scenario and seek to model the 
system’s states as a coordinated attack occurs. 
H. SUMMARY 
Network enterprise risk analysis is an important part of an IA program and it 
should be implemented at the beginning of a network system’s lifecycle. The risk 
analysis and management process follows the steps of general risk management processes 
for safety, program, operational, and enterprise risks in organizations. Unique to network 
risk management is the concentration on an unpredictable threat who is motivated to 
exploit network vulnerabilities that the threat discovers for an ultimate goal of gaining 
something of value. 
The network risk management process identifies, assesses and manages risks to 
the network by implementing mitigation strategies to reduce vulnerabilities and improve 
network resiliency through recovery and survivability techniques. With mitigation 
strategies in place, the process then requires that the network be monitored for the results 
of the mitigating actions to observe effects on network functionality and the network’s 
ability to resist or handle threats. Based on the effectiveness of the mitigating actions as 
observed by monitoring or by changes to network requirements or the environment 
surrounding the network, the risk management process is taken through another iteration 
to support improvements to the networks adaptability based on experience. 
Attack trees are a useful tool in analyzing network vulnerabilities and assessing 
the motivating factors of threats to attack a network. 
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V. NETWORK SURVIVABILITY AND RESILIENCY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines what survivability and resiliency mean and why the 
concept is important as part of a robust network enterprise risk management process. It 
explores some of the ways to make a network more survivable and resilient. It also 
discusses the basic framework of select system models developed by academicians for 
quantifying network survivability, what the quantification of survivability can do to 
support improving the risk management process, and the limitations of the models in 
providing concrete evidence for quality decision making in global networked system of 
systems built on the scale of the GIG and systems based on Service Oriented 
Architecture.  
While risk analysis and management are designed to find and fix vulnerabilities 
that put the network at risk by the threat that exploits them with the intent to gain access 
to valuable information system assets, survivability is the attribute of a system that 
defines how it deals with an actual exploitation of network vulnerabilities that have 
remained after mitigation implementation. The architecting of a system before attack to 
respond to attack after other risk mitigation implemented plans have been activated to 
resist attack by mitigation plans has reduced network vulnerability. In other words, 
survivability and resiliency are defense in depth for a network by designing the capability 
to continue action to resist and recover after an attack scenario, not just the mitigation 
strategies put in place before attack. While it is vitally important to manage the risk to a 
network before attack and to make every effort to keep it from happening, a further 
defense mechanism and process needs to be in place in the event of an attack. 
For many of the critical networks upon which military forces rely to obtain the 
information needed, it is essential that their critical networked communications and 
applications be designed to survive, because by nature, they are exposed to a hostile 
environment. It is highly probable that an adversary is attempting to disrupt the military’s 
computer networks and their networked operations to gain the edge in any level of 
90 
operation, from high intensity conflict to stabilization and peace-keeping operations. If a 
network can be designed or modified to be more survivable, it can strengthen its defenses 
against those risks for which it was unable to mitigate or remove fully prior to attack. 
This adds flexibility to the management of risk up front, allowing for greater options 
when deciding how to deal with the risks identified at the beginning of the risk 
management process. This is especially important when managing the risk on critical 
network systems since any intrusion, no matter how small the probability, could put 
important operations in severe jeopardy. Not only is it desirable to architect a network 
less vulnerable to failure (failure being deliberate or accidental intrusion or because of 
hardware/software malfunction), but also design the network to be resilient and adaptable 
under attack and failure, and to be able to recover in time to minimize the disruption to 
the completion of critical tasks. The ultimate goal in architecting a network for 
survivability and resiliency is to improve its operational effectiveness, safety, and 
affordability through the refinement of technical effectiveness, system effectiveness, 
system availability, and cost controls (Ellison Fisher, Linger, Lipson, Longstaff, & Mead, 
1999). 
B. DEFINING SURVIVABILITY AND RESILIENCE 
1. Network Survivability Characteristics 
a. Susceptibility 
Susceptibility is the capability (or lack thereof) to avoid an attack. It is 
essentially the converse of looking at the threat agent. Chapter IV discussed using a game 
theory approach with the attack tree method for analyzing a threat’s motivation and 
capability to exploit a vulnerability and conversely determining which paths through the 
tree are most vulnerable so the vulnerability can be mitigated. Susceptibility approaches 
the game theory from the standpoint of analyzing for the network’s strengths and tactics; 
particularly the network’s ability to recognize an attack and avoid it. In any system, 
susceptibility can be reduced by using decoys/deception, removing the system from the 
adversary’s theater (or not letting network boundaries interact with the adversary’s 
system boundary), and by the capability to recognize an attack on the system (intrusion 
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detection) in time to take evasive or defensive action. In a computer network, this can be 
accomplished by the correct design and operation of intrusion detection devices, policies 
as to when and where networks are accessed, and tactics as innocuous as the “honey pot;” 
drawing an adversary to a place on the network that looks appealing, but is a trap to keep 
the threat from reaching valuable data, applications or network functionality (Ellison & 
Moore, 2001). 
b. Vulnerability 
In survivability and resiliency analysis, susceptibility is vulnerability go 
hand in hand. When looking at a network’s vulnerability from the survivability 
perspective, the system weaknesses and the paths adversary might take to exploit the 
system to achieve an objective are not the only factor. Also, an analysis of the 
interrelationships between known areas of exploitation for the effects of that exploitation 
must be done; what the immediate damage to the system would be and if the effects cause 
a progression of damage to the network in a linear or cascading (arithmetic, 
multiplicative, or exponential) manner. Survivability analysis seeks to define where 
damage could occur on the network, what the extent of the damage is and how that 
changes over time, and what methods or technology might be employed to limit of stop 
damage to the network once an adversary has discovered and begun to exploit that 
vulnerability (Ellison & Moore, 2001). 
c. Recoverability 
Analysis and design for recoverability of the networked system parallels 
reactive risk management processes and methods described in Appendix C.  
Recoverability is the quality of robustness displayed by a system that can return to 
normal operation after an attack by a threat agent.  Recoverability is the robustness of a 
system to return to normal operation after an attack by a threat agent. It is defined by how 
the system and the operators respond to an attack. However, the recoverability of a 
network must be designed into the system both technologically and procedurally. In 
critical networked computer systems, continued operation in the face of an attack may 
require instant response and can only be controlled by an automatic response mechanism 
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such as a switchover or an auctioneered system that can assume the critical capability. If 
time is critical but not immediate, system design should consider the intermediate stages 
that can be recovered in the face of an attack and still maintain critical functionality. 
Also, consideration must be given to the network’s capability to provide critical services 
at a reduced capability for an extended period of time and how much and how long 
degradation to the operational objective is permissible until full system recovery or until 
the objective is not attainable even with later recovery. An important aspect of 
recoverability is the ability of a network to adapt in the face of an attack and to learn from 
that adaptation to make the network more resistant to future attacks. However, as the 
system becomes more resilient to attacks through experience, the threat agent can, and 
does change tactics. The ultimate capability of a recoverable, adaptable system is to learn 
from the present attack and be able to predict how the next attack morphs so that the 
system is less susceptible to the next attack. How to design perspicacity into a global 
networked information system can be somewhat problematic (Ellison & Moore, 2001).  
In networked system, it is important to design in redundancy and dispersion/distribution 
(through enclaves or other separation schemes).  When the attack has started, the system 
must be able to redirect the energy of the attack (denial of service redirected to an 
inactive server), systems designed for optimum fault isolation and load shedding, ability 
to compensate for services or capabilities that are damaged or stolen, and the adaptability 
to recombine system components automatically to reconstitute critical services.  On top 
of the automatic adaptations, procedures and operator instructions that are pre-planned 
and practiced to reconfigure network connections and even architecture are necessary for 
continued uninterrupted operation and continuation of critical operations 
2. Designing a Network for Survivability 
a. Designing Survivable Networks at the System Boundaries 
Designing a network for survivability is scenario-driven by the scenario of 
an attack by a given threat to the network. The architectural decisions are dependent on 
what the attack might be and the probability of the attack. However, the architecture is 
also guided by the requirements definitions. The challenge in designing survivable 
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systems is to determine how to define the requirements of a survivable and resilient 
system since survivability depends on the type, timing, and depth of attack. During the 
requirements definition phase of a system’s lifecycle, requirements are defined and given 
specifications based on the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), which is used to 
determine the system’s capabilities. The CONOPS is also scenario driven, but with the 
scenario desired to meet the organization’s goals derived by effects-based thinking (the 
effects the organization desires to achieve from the operation of the system, among other 
actions). However, the CONOPS scenario is somewhat deterministic whereas the threat 
scenarios are stochastic. 
One location in a network (or any system for that matter) where the 
probability of attacks from threats can be somewhat constrained is at the system 
boundaries. Much the same as in movement warfare, designing a network for 
survivability and resiliency depends on where the line is held against attack, or what 
system boundary is the last strong-hold to ensure the network delivers required critical 
services in the face of attack. As seen in the attack tree analysis, the attacker enters into 
the network by exercising sequences of interdependent decisions to produce (the attacker 
hopes) undetected and disastrous consequences to the functionality and information of 
the network. McCabe Software® uses a software validation approach to check for 
trustworthiness of software paths and to uncover security flaws in software code by 
analyzing the control flow paths and verifying control flow integrity. This method is a 
way of drawing the line (at the network boundary as defined in the requirements) on an 
adversary’s attack (McCabe, 2009). 
b. Designing Survivable Systems with COTS Software 
Designing networks for survivability and resiliency with COTS software 
as prescribed by open architecture requirements can be problematic because of the lack of 
access to the COTS software artifacts or the COTS engineering process when COTS are 
used in network system development. Controlling system states is important throughout 
the development cycle of software development, and access to the artifact and 
engineering process of COTS is important in providing the assurance evidence for the 
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trustworthiness of the developed software. As the realization that software is becoming 
the overall cross-functional systems integration agent, one way to provide this assurance 
is through the methodology of the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) levels 
of software development (Chittister & Haimes, 2006). Another way is through the 
methodology of a Vendor Risk Assessment and Threat Evaluation Project® offered by the 
Carnegie-Mellon Software Engineering Institute CERT. This methodology examines the 
COTS product used in software development from the vendor’s inherent risk elements 
(visibility of artifact attributes, vendor performance history, trustworthiness, vendor 
technical competence and compliance to standards) and the vendor’s risk associated with 
the developer’s risk management skills in dealing with vendors (technical and non-
technical risk mitigating factors, exposure, vendor compatibility, independence and 
interdependencies) (Ellison, Linger, Lipson, Mead, & Moore, 2009). The human 
knowledge role in software development should not be overlooked when designing for 
resiliency.  
The focal point of systems integration is the realization that all hardware-
software systems are made of multiple interdependent sub-systems. Each 
sub-system, in turn, is a system that is driven by its own state variables, 
inputs, outputs, and control and random variables, among others, where 
the output of one system constitutes the input to others. Understanding this 
interconnectedness and the interdependencies among these many sub-
systems is imperative for an effective software architectural design and for 
ultimate systems integration and control. (Chittister & Haimes, 2006, p. 9) 
c. An Example of Survivability and Resiliency Scenario-Driven 
Requirements 
If survivability and resiliency requirements can be defined at the 
network’s boundaries, and an analysis of the important (most probable or most 
devastating) threat scenarios can be analyzed for flow control paths using attack tree 
analysis, then this data can be used in a survivability/resiliency analysis to study the 
effectiveness of the network Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), and reaction/recovery 
mechanisms to meet minimum standards for connectivity, time and amount of lost data 
(as in packet loss in an IP network), and mechanisms and software processes to establish 
and safeguard data in priority order. The survivability/resiliency studies support the 
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determination of which survivability primitives of redundancy, replication, distribution, 
separation, access control, diversity, or adaptive reconfiguration contribute most to 
making a survivable, resilient network. Consider the following example of possible 
survivability requirements driven by the following threat scenario. 
It is desired to interconnect in an information systems network a sensor 
system, an intelligence analysis system and a weapons control system to 
detect, track and engage a theater ballistic missile attack. To accomplish 
the objective, the weapons control system must receive information from 
the sensor network, validation of the target from the intelligence analysis 
network, and verification of weapons parameters from the weapons 
control network to engage and destroy the target. Risk analysis determines 
that the highest probability threat and the weakest vulnerability to the 
networked system of systems is the alteration of missile identification 
parameters in the intelligence network. Without valid missile 
identification, the weapons control system does not allow engagement of 
the target missile. From the attack tree analysis, a path of a threat agent 
leading to missile identification data is mapped. Survivability analysis 
looks at the probability that the intrusion can be detected as the threat 
nears the goal of altering the intelligence network, how the damage to the 
system progresses over time, what level of damage can be tolerated before 
the correct information has to reach to the weapons control network to 
achieve successful target engagement. Resiliency analysis examines how 
quickly the intelligence network can stop the intrusion, determine what 
data was corrupted, what data is trustworthy, and how soon the network 
can return to normal or how quickly it can switch to an alternate network 
path unaffected by the intrusion. 
While the quantification (such as it is) of the impact of a network 
compromise during the survivability/resiliency analysis is similar to the impact variable 
in preventative risk analysis, the probability has shifted to the network’s ability to 
recognize, react, recover and adapt as opposed to the probability that the intrusion 
happens in the first place. As part of the design of the survivable system, the goal is to 
determine the probabilities attached to recognition, reaction, and recovery for a given 
intrusion and to build a system that recovers or adapts in enough time to meet the 
system’s mission. When the important threat agents are considered, their interactions at 
the boundaries of the network have been studied, and the possible ways they could 
penetrate the network and cause damage from attack tree analysis using a type of game 
theory, the aggregation, even from a holistic perspective, of the scenarios that a threat 
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might come from is no small matter. Moreover, with the changing dynamic of a 
network’s objectives (especially an ad hoc network in a wireless or satellite 
communications mode), designing resiliency into the network to secure its assets and 
functionality requires the design to be adaptable to accommodate the changing objectives.  
d. Challenges in Quantifying Survivable Network and Software 
Attributes 
Quantifying survivable network attributes requires the determination of 
what attributes of a network make it more survivable and how they are quantified; 
attributes such as connectivity ratio, quantity and quality of information transmitted and 
received, service request distortion percentage, maximum service disruption time, and 
node (server) state. To improve the survivability of a network, design trade-offs need to 
be considered between network functionality under normal conditions and system 
requirements to meet mission objectives under selected attack scenarios and which of the 
network’s attributes cited above are most important. Survivability analysis of computer 
networks and the network software controlling operations has peculiarities that differ 
from survivability analysis of traditional hardware systems. Software, the largest 
component of networks and arguably the most vulnerable, can be attacked by almost 
anyone with some knowledge of computer systems and programming to varying degrees. 
It is not susceptible to obsolescence, and it is particularly difficult to uncover all its faults 
(especially in COTS as noted above) and to intrusions that might introduce additional 
faults. The faults are not randomly distributed between a class of software as with 
component reliability and survivability of hardware components of the same type or 
makeup, so software faults can defy accurate prediction. While some of the same tenets 
of design primitives, which make a physical system more survivable, hold true for 
software systems and computer networks such as geographical separation, redundancy of 
units, deception techniques, and human access control; software and network systems 
offer unique characteristics, which make some design primitives indispensible when 
dealing with information generation and information flow. Duplication and rapid 
replication of data and recovery of connections in networks is usually not possible in 
physical systems, but with the careful design of network control and management 
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software, these primitives can be designed in to improve network resiliency. Also, 
especially important is the ability of a network to reconfigure adaptively in fractions of a 
second if necessary. 
C. ARCHITECTING SURVIVABLE NETWORKS 
1. Network Attribute Considerations 
Architecting survivability into large, distributed computer networks draws on the 
disciplines common to the protection of critical systems such as security, safety, 
reliability, and fault tolerance (Ellison et al., 1999). The goal of designing survivability 
into networks is to preserve essential services that allow mission completion during 
network intrusion and compromise. Architecting the system to be survivable is a 
balancing act between the network’s design to support the maximum functional 
capability under normal operations and the ability to defend against and recover from any 
compromise to the system while maintaining critical functions during attack and 
recovery. The success of system recovery is measured by the system’s ability to minimize 
the consequences of degradation to system functionality and to the network’s critical 
attributes by preserving data, and allowing the continued execution of essential services 
during an attack of the system. Critical attributes of a distributed network are the 
capability to access data and services and to share between network nodes, and to 
conduct the necessary computations and data manipulations to achieve the system’s 
objectives. The challenge in architecting a survivable network is that during normal 
operation, it is desired to minimize the constraints placed on system operation and 
availability in the form of system defenses, but also desirable is the ability to have the 
necessary protections in place (procedures and countermeasures) to resist, recognize and 
to be able to recover from system degradation or failure, whether the compromise is due 
to system fault, unintentional accidents, or intentional attacks by intruders. The more 




In architecting a network for survivability, the consequences to system 
operation and mission fulfillment that various threats have the potential to cause should 
vulnerabilities be exploited must be considered. This approach is slightly different that 
the classic models for risk analysis and assessment. While it is necessary to seek 
information about all known possible threats, where they might originate, the threat’s 
capabilities, motivations, and timing to cause the network harm; keeping up with the 
multitude of constantly evolving threats, known and unknown, in the environment around 
the boundaries to a system can be an insurmountable task. New threats and threat 
tactics/methods emerge every day from global sources of unknown entities who would 
like to intrude on U.S. systems for various reasons. Since the universal set of threat 
agents potentially staged to cause system harm cannot be fully known, what is known and 
understood is used to examine it from the survivability (or consequences) angle. To do 
this requires looking at the network from an intruder’s standpoint and examining how the 
network developer needs to architect the network to reduce susceptibility. In the areas 
where it is susceptible, an examination of ways to mitigate system vulnerability, and 
subsequently, the mechanisms and system characteristics is conducted to handle the 
consequences of a given attack and preserve critical attributes in the face of an attack. 
b. Connectivity 
Analysis of architecting for survivability is complicated by today’s 
network systems, which because of their size, are unbounded (or an unbounded, 
networked system of systems of individual bounded systems). This is especially true of 
DoD’s GIG form a top-level view. By its nature and global size, it is an unbounded 
system, much like the Internet (to which it connects). A network is unbounded in the 
sense that no single or group of participants are certain of who is part of the entire 
network. In an unbounded network, no centralized control exists, and participants have to 
trust the other members on the network to comply with agreed upon standards. Both 
legitimate users and threat agents act as peers on the net (Maier & Rechtin, 2002; Ellison 
et al., 1999). Obviously, without boundaries, a network’s environment is now part of the 
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system. Threat agents come from the environment. Thus, they are intrinsically part of an 
unbounded system and can be thought of as latent participants (until they attack of 
course). 
c. Control 
Another complication to large, highly distributed networks is the 
constraint on network control and governance. When networks were small and bounded, 
their architectures were built around centralized governance that had a manageable span 
of control. One controlling entity had the power to enforce policy and enact sanctions for 
inappropriate network conduct. Network protection was implemented with static 
countermeasures, the most ubiquitous being firewall installations; first, at individual 
workstations, then in front of local area networks, and later enterprise firewalls were 
incorporated in the network architecture and integrated with the desktop firewalls. 
Changes and updates to firewall configurations were pushed to users by local system 
administrators or by a centralized network administrator (NSA/SNAC/IAD, 2006). 
However, this architectural arrangement is insufficient to protect systems as networks 
take on global proportions, with governance decentralized or non-existent, and the 
network characterized by interoperable and collaborative system of systems. Since 
control of distributed networks is so tenuous, there is good reason to consider network 
risk management from a survivability viewpoint. With an inability to impose controls 
throughout the entirety of the network, survivability architecture looks at consequence 
management, focusing on the mission accomplishment of network segments and on the 
creation of the ad hoc networks envisioned for the target GIG.  
d. Governance 
As the size and complexity of the network grows, operating standards and 
protection methods become schemas agreed upon by the membership of the network. 
When an organization makes the decision to move to service oriented architecture, the 
system takes on more characteristics of an unbounded network. A sophisticated 
architecture of countermeasures, authentication devices and procedures, and network 
behavior recognition and intrusion systems must be introduced, tested and monitored by 
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someone who has the responsibility for accomplishing the mission and ensuring the 
availability of services. Partitioned segments of the network can be loosely controlled (as 
is done with the Internet in countries desiring some political control), but even that 
governance and control is limited, and attempts to subvert it constantly occurs. The U.S. 
military’s GIG has a better chance of providing some governance over its participants 
and its operations because, on a high order scale, the objectives of the participants on the 
grid are the focused around a common cause, and a form of constructive governance 
might be achieved. However, as the network users’ objectives become more refined into 
distributed and parochial operational plans and tactics, this form of network control 
becomes more diluted, and governance of the net tends toward the problematic and 
control is less centralized. This fact soon becomes more apparent as the DoD lashes the 
individual services’ network architectures together to create the global target GIG. The 
overall joint governance of the net most likely is be based more on a set of collaborative 
standards rather than a defined rule set controlled by a central authority such as DISA. 
e. Communication 
In a distributed network architecture with services spread across many 
domains and an environment of diminished trust with no unified system administrative 
control, survivable network design relies on a common communications and routing 
systems to tie distributed services, diversity in coding and protocol mark-up, and node 
logic systems together in a survivable package. Since it is impossible to know everything 
about a threat agent, the survivable network requires an architecture built on the 
interactions between nodes such that protection is protocol-based instead of architected 
for a given network topology. The network must have some system of trust maintenance, 
and must have system-wide properties that do not reside strictly within nodes and is 
emergent and stochastic (Ellison et al., 1999). A functional decomposition of the 
networks attributes set the priority for where resources are allocated to protect and to 
recover those network attributes that must be maintained in the face of an attack, or must 
be instantly recovered because their function is time-critical, and any interruption would 
cause a failure of the mission. 
101 
The capability to maintain essential services (and maintain the associated 
essential properties) must be sustained even if a significant portion of the 
system is incapacitated. Furthermore, this capability should not be 
dependent on the survival of a specific information resource, computation, 
or communications link. (Ellison et al., 1999, p. 9) 
2. Elements in the Architecture of a Survivable Network 
a. Usage Models 
To determine the make-up of a survivable network, the developer 
constructs a system usage model for the network, both from the standpoint of a legitimate 
user and also an intruder (since it was stated that they act as peers on the net). The usage 
model shows what services are essential and non-essential; the timing, load, and all 
possible uses of a network service (Ellison & Moore, 2001).  For survivability, the 
architect must determine what survivability services are employed and their allocation. 
Survivability services and their components consider a threat agent’s capability to access 
the network, to penetrate nodes of the network and systems on nodes, its ability to 
navigate within nodes to discover information, and the ability to exploit, or corrupt 
services in the node. Survivability services are as follows. 
• Resistance to intrusion through the use of firewalls, diversity of programs, 
and encryption and authentication 
• Recognition through intrusion detection devices, anomaly and behavior 
patter recognition, trust maintenance, and self awareness methods 
• Adaptability through backup programs, alternate connections, scalable 
bandwidths, learning from attacks, nodes share fixes with each other 
• Recovery through redundancy and data/program replication, fault tolerant 
mechanisms, diversity in data storage 
Since it is nearly impossible to tell the difference between users on a 
network, the only way to determine if the user is legitimate or hostile is to observe the 
user’s behavior with respect to the system. Work on determining how to tell what 
differences in client behavior on a server can provide clues to illegitimate use of a 
network has been conducted by the Computer Science Department at Cornell University, 
among others. They have adapted the timeout feature of computer network fault detection 
to the process of transactions between objects and the timing of those transactions to 
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determine if a fault is real or just a transitory state of one of the clients on the network 
(e.g., entering or exiting the process during a transaction) (Birman, 2009). By virtue of its 
reliance on the service oriented architecture, the military’s GIG network is unbounded. If 
a network partition is to be shutdown due to detection of a fault, the consequences of the 
shutdown need to be identified, the critical time of shutdown determined, how the data in 
a transactional state to be preserved, and what obligations are forfeited to the user or to 
the mission objective by network shutdown. It is most critical to recover the system 
before determining the cause because it often becomes apparent only during recovery, 
and not while in a shutdown state. 
Architecting for a survivable network requires an architecture that allows 
no single point of failure, a system of continuous trust verification between nodes of the 
network, protocols that define knowledge between nodes, and specific services 
accomplished in a single node does not significantly detract from the network’s overall 
mission should that node fail (Ellison et al., 1999). Work continues on determining where 
in the network layer the encoded trust information resident in the network’s 
communication protocol can be interpreted, on what are the cost differentials with 
packaging server state information into protocols to verify trust and the availability of 
critical processes. Much research has been done at Cornell University, as shown in the 
description below, about work completed on recognizing errant network behavior, on the 
study of how network processes are ordered and how the network reacts when one 
process fails. 
b. Fault Tolerance 
One of the important aspects of recoverability in a survivable network is 
fault tolerance. This is the ability of the system to withstand failure and keep critical 
elements functioning mainly through the mechanism of redundancy. If it is desired to 
lower the risk of losing a critical capability, designing in a fault tolerant capability 
supports the systems capability to withstand attack and damage to the network and allows 
the continued access to critical services. Fault tolerance improves system reliability, 
availability, dependability, and safety. Redundancy in network components not only 
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protects the system from intentional attacks, it also improves reliability in the face of 
unintentional accidents and equipment failure. The key to fault tolerance is the ability to 
architect in reliability because “ … in all practical systems, reliability is of great 
importance, and any system that is unreliable is likely to be unsuccessful even if it is 
safe” (Storey, 1996, p. 114). Here again, the emphasis on architecting a system for use 
and availability by increasing reliability is seen; one of the main drivers in availability, 
and balancing system and personnel protection with system utilization. 
Architecting fault tolerance requires understanding the nature, duration, 
and extent of the expected fault. The nature of a fault can be random or systemic. 
Random failures generally are generally associated with hardware. Software most often 
exhibits a systemic failure because the software cannot become obsolete or degrade like a 
physical component, and software failures are evident in their specification, coding, 
logic, or variables. The fault duration can be permanent, intermittent, or transient. Many 
software faults exhibit an intermittent failure and it can be difficult to find the cause. The 
extent of a fault can be localized or system-wide. 
To deal with faults and design fault tolerance, system models can be 
constructed to analyze failure modes and make an assessment of the effect of faults on 
the system given the nature, duration and extent. Hardware (especially computer memory 
and processing ships) is usually modeled with the “single stuck at,” “bridging,” or “stuck 
open” model of system operation, and analyzed with the Failure Mode Effect and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) method. These methods and models are important to 
analyze during the architecting of a networked system at the physical layer. As discussed 
in the section on risk methodologies, computer systems and network software faults are 
analyzed using fault tree analysis and its transposition, attack tree analysis. System 
software faults are difficult to detect as the test vectors for the software process can be 
overwhelming. Often software is assumed to have some faults, which are never detected 
and are tolerated. With this assumption, it is important that the system be architected for 
fault tolerance during design. It is far easier to discover and remove software faults 
during the development stage of the system life cycle then during operation. However, 
this method of fault coverage can become problematic under the open architecture 
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scheme that uses COTS components. The purpose of using COTS in system development 
is to take advantage of the testing already conducted by the commercial vendor, and to 
use their usage data during system operation for reliability determinations. Often, 
however, COTS software contains either proprietary programs or lines of code so large 
that it is prohibitive to double check the reliability of the program, or to ascertain if the 
software’s coding is embedded with any malicious operators (Storey, 1996; Anderson & 
Hundley, 1998). 
Open architecture is one good reason to build in fault tolerance. The other 
is to mitigate the effects of an attack on the network, and to support system recovery by 
architecting the system to be survivable. To build in fault tolerance, the system is 
designed with redundancy. However, the redundant design has to be smart. Limited by 
resources, bandwidth, power, space, or the environment in which the system operates, a 
system presumably cannot be made with an infinite amount of redundancies such that it 
contains an infinite set of duplicate components with which to switch over. Additionally, 
for systemic failures, a redundant component of a component with a systemic failure also 
fails the same way and is redundant in the true sense of the word; not necessary. For 
systemic failures, the redundancy needs to be diverse so as not to duplicate the systemic 
error in the primary component. The architecture of the redundancy is also determined by 
whether the system is composed of hardware, software, information, or time. 
• Hardware is classically made fault tolerant by triple modular redundancy; 
three components that perform the same function and are switched on or 
off by a fault sensor, or have their outputs auctioneered to select the 
component with the valid output. 
• Software programs can be duplicated to produce the same output but by a 
different process to eliminate system errors in the program. For an attack 
on the network, it is necessary to ensure the backup program is in a 
different location and cannot be corrupted by the same threat agent that 
corrupts the primary program.  
• Information is made fault tolerant by duplicate repositories of data, 
stacking information on top of the data to ensure its validity such as check 
sums or indexing schemes such as hash functions and tables. 
• Timing functions for program execution can be used to ensure a fault 
tolerance from intermittent failures such that the program or service is 
timed to execute when the process fault is recovered. There are many 
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timing schemes for program execution operating or underdevelopment 
such as cloud computing and multicasting programs (Birman, 2009). 
Once the architecture of the redundancy has been determined, it is 
necessary to architect the system for fault detection. For network hardware, the simplest 
arrangement is called masking, which does not actually detect a fault, and basically 
allows a redundant system to pick up the load. Dynamic systems sense faults by 
examining output and comparing it to a desired output. Upon fault detection, the system 
switches to a redundant component to contain the existing fault and reconfigure the 
system for continued fault-free operation. There are many arrangements to architect the 
system for fault detection and tolerance, but a detection system inserts another 
component into the system that must be analyzed for its reliability to not let a system 
fault go undetected. Obviously, redundancy in detection components should reduce the 
risk that a valid fault may be missed or a false detection of a non-existent fault induces 
unnecessary action.  
Software fault detection is complicated by the fact that faults in software 
are always systemic. As mentioned above, architecture for fault tolerance in software is 
achieved by diversity, or what is called N-version programming. Several versions of the 
software run concurrently on one or more processors, and their outputs are compared for 
similarity. With only two versions, if a difference is detected, it is difficult to tell which 
version is correct, so the system must perform further diagnostics to determine the correct 
version. The other software detection scheme, called the recovery block (Storey, 1996), is 
to run diagnostics continually on all program versions to check for issues such as run-
time errors, math errors or reasonability. However, to make a software system fault 
tolerant, the system needs to recognize and fix a system state condition. To detect a fault, 
a fault must occur. In software, the faulty execution changes the system state before the 
redundant program assumes control. To fix this situation, the state of the system before a 
failure needs to be known and saved somewhere so the system can recover. Much 
research is being conducted on ways to save and reset system states without having to 
make a copy of system states continuously. One example is the new multicasting 
technique over a layered network. Markov non-time dependent models of the system 
state can be used to determine the risk due to a software fault (intentional intrusion), and 
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can be used to inform the architecture of the system to control the component and sub-
system state changes and recovery to the operating state. Software reliability predictions 
can be difficult to assess since some parts of the software are used infrequently, and a 
fault to an intermittently used portion of the program may not show a fault for quite a 
while into system operation. For this reason, testing of all possible program execution 
cases is important, and if too many cases exist to make it economically feasible, a test and 
verification of those executable programs, which impinge on critical operations, must be 
tested. 
D. SURVIVABILITY MODELING 
1. Reactive Risk Analysis  
Reactive risk analysis (Hamdi and Bordiga, 2005, pp. 783-785) examines the 
resilience of a network once an attack is underway by analyzing the network’s reaction to 
the attack given a set of attack detection devices and countermeasure mechanisms to 
resist attack and recover the network. The reaction to the attack depends on the following. 
• The type of attack (from attack tree analysis) 
• The number and type of intrusion detection devices and their efficiency at 
detecting true intrusions and ignoring false alarms 
• The number and type of countermeasures installed and their capability at 
resistance and system recovery 
A consideration in deciding how resilient to make the network is the cost of 
detecting and reacting to an attack weighed against the benefit of detection and reaction. 
The benefit is highly dependent on the capability retained and the functionality or data 
saved or recovered, and the effect of the loss before recovery on the ultimate objective of 
the network at the time of attack.  
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is most often composed of a sensor and an 
analyzer. The sensor uses either pattern or behavior recognition to tell that an 
unauthorized node has penetrated the network and alerts the analyzer to attempt to 




inspection, the analyzer makes the determination from the captured data whether or not 
this is an intruder so that the other countermeasures can take appropriate action to resist 
the penetration, and recognize and recover any lost data or functionality.  
The authors developed a cost/benefit model that could be used to conduct an 
analysis of different types and levels of IDS and countermeasures to support the decision 
of how resilient a network should be given the level of funding and other resources 
available. The model formulation is expanded in Appendix C. One unique factor claimed 
by these authors is the use of an attack progression factor in the analysis. Depending on 
the type of attack, the impact of an intrusion can be constant or can grow linearly or 
exponentially over time as the intrusion progresses. How the attack is countered and the 
resource costs to deal with the intrusion depend on the characterization of the initial 
impact as well as what effect the attack has over the time the attack is active until it is 
stopped and system recovery has been initiated. 
The four elements of the reactive model are as follows. 
• Cost of detecting the attack 
• Cost of reaction 
• Impact of the attack (when the progression factor applies) 
• IDS efficiency 
The utility of this model is helpful in an analysis of the costs of IDS and 
countermeasures from a comparative standpoint if it is possible to come up with plausible 
values to insert into the model’s variables.  While the progression factor is an interesting 
and expanding concept for the model, determining an expression or function that captures 
all the dynamics of the progression of an attack is probably not realistic. 
2. Modeling the Recovery Phase of a Survivable Network 
Heegaard and Trivedi (2009) develop a model to quantify the survivability of a 
telecommunications network by examining the virtual connections state and capacity 
between peering nodes to maximize throughput and minimize delays when the network is 
under failure from intentional intrusion, natural disasters or failed states. Their approach 
to the steady state model is similar to a model done by Chen/Garg/Trevidi. that looked at 
108 
rate of frame drop in steady state and transient losses due to faults in a wireless ad-hoc 
network (Chen, Garg, & Trivedi, 2002). They combine a continuous time Markov chain 
(CTMC) model with traffic queuing models for the steady state network availability. 
Then, they use several different models for propagation of failures due to undesirable 
events and quantify the network’s recovery cycles. 
The authors contend that making a network more survivable is accomplished by 
three actions; i) preventative measures (stop the attack before it starts), ii) designing in 
enough spare capacity and sufficient diversity to make the network fault tolerant, and iii) 
developing and configuring proactive and reactive traffic management techniques and 
protocols (equally applicable to data networks and wireless networks as traffic 
management is a vital attribute of any efficient network).  These models’ utility is best 
captured in the risk and survivability analyst by informing the analyst possible network 
attributes and software functions that pose a major impact on survivability and where to 
place an emphasis on designing in a more robust survivability capability such as 
improved data replication or diversity of components.  
The Heegaard and Trivedi model quantifies the virtual management of network 
traffic for survivability and discusses how it is accomplished with changes to traffic 
routing requirements, traffic loads, and capacity changes due to random, non-
synchronous service requests. The undesired events cause failures to nodes and their 
communication links (arcs between nodes), which reduce network resources of 
bandwidth, memory, and processing speed and capacity. Recovery is accomplished 
through rerouting and restoration of the failed nodes and links.  That these models are 
being considered by design engineers supports evidence that efforts to design traffic 
management techniques to improve survivability in networks are plentiful.  Work 
continues to improve on the techniques of traffic and process flows through different 
layers of a network as is being done in work at Cornell University on a “Virtual 
Synchrony”process.  This technology uses the multiple processes handling of the Client-
Server Object Request Broker (CORBA) middleware in a fault tolerant architecture on 
top of multicasting techniques of network traffic management (Birman, 2009). 
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3. Characteristics of Dynamic Mobile Networks 
In their work on describing and simulating dynamic mobility networks, Scherrer 
Borgnat, Fleury, Guillaume, & Robardet, (2008) look at how networks change over time 
with new nodes attaching and failed nodes being removed from a network. Through 
analytical models and simulation of a mobile communications network attached by 
Bluetooth®, they concluded that link creation and deletion is independent of one another 
and can be modeled by a Markov process, but the interaction within the network is 
random and characterized by the creation of communities that intensify the data flow 
rates within the communities at statistically insignificant and non-correlated ways, which 
complicates the modeling of the network flow traffic within a large-scale system. Since 
the activity of communities changes randomly over the temporal scale, a true measure of 
information loss probabilities is difficult to simulate, whereas link creation and deletion 
can be formulated and simulated. That communities have unpredictable data flow rates 
and link connection creations between them seems intuitive as human activity that 
requires a network to control an event or meet a schedule most times relies on external 
events independent of the network’s activity level or its steady state processing of 
information. 
E. SUMMARY 
A network designed for survivability and resiliency is one that can continue to 
provide critical services while under attack and has enough resistance and adaptable 
recovery to return to its normal state. Survivable networks are architected to recognize an 
attack, resist the attack to the greatest extent possible and recover quickly after the attack 
has been stopped or thwarted. Networks designed for resiliency are capable of immediate 
adaptation, shifting the workload in the network from the failed modes to the operable 
nodes with little or no effect on the end-to-end capability of the network. An example of 
resiliency in a network is the adaptation of Unmanned Ariel Systems (UAS) to pass 




middleware communications package, allowing uninterrupted intelligence to flow to the 
field unit depending on it (deJong, 2009). A survivable and resilient network provides 
defense in depth for the operation of critical network systems. 
Survivability is scenario-driven, and defining survivability requirements with 
which to build a survivable network system is challenging. For this reason, the architect 
must look at the network’s boundaries, the interface to other networks, and define where 
the line is drawn to resist attacks from threats that come in various ways with an array of 
capabilities. Once an attacker has penetrated a network, the architect must look at the 
capability of the system to adapt and recover while stopping the attacker’s progression. 
Adaptability has to be built into a system on initial design. Unlike manned systems that 
can adapt with human intervention, network systems require adaptation in fractions of 
seconds, through complex software logic and must be able to do this automatically. 
Quantitative models of network operational characteristics and attributes are 
informative for measuring a network’s capability to adjust one parameter under failure 
from a single attack scenario. When designing a system for survivability, these 
measurements may be useful in the evaluation of tradeoffs between different system 
architectures as long as the parameter under study is reflective of a quality required to be 
maintained in the network during attack to ensure mission objectives continue to be met. 
Some conclusions follow that can be made with respect to survivability modeling. 
• The ability to quantify the survivability of a network is an important step 
in determining the reliability and availability of a network under attack. As 
the network grows in size and complexity, quantifying survivability 
becomes quite complicated as the conditions and constraints on the model 
become more detailed and interdependent. 
• The models above are not process models per se but are system models 
that formulate the problem of survivability mathematically or 
systematically and can be used to solve for a quantitative number 
representing survivability by optimization techniques, probability 
calculations, or simulation. 
• The first step in quantifying survivability of a network is to determine the 
characteristics of the network under normal steady state operation. The 
classic model for steady state network node characteristics is a continuous 
time Markov chain, with information arriving at a node in a Poisson 
distribution and service through the node processing in an exponential 
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distribution. There are many situations where the assumption of these 
distributions is not accurate enough to provide a reliable representation of 
the network’s operation, and care must be taken to understand the 
information flow characteristics within the network, how they are 
changing over time, and the most accurate depiction of the network’s 
handling of information from sender to receiver. 
• Survivability does not consider the probability that an attack is made on 
the network; the attack has already commenced, and the analysis of 
survivability deals with how the network handles the attack once it has 
begun. 
• Survivability analysis must balance the costs of designing the system for 
survivability with the cost in functionality reduction to implement 
survivable features. Some survivability features have direct costs of 
technology development and installation, monitoring, and maintenance, 
but does not have an opportunity cost in lost functionality as the 
countermeasure does not inhibit normal operation, such as an intrusion 
detection system (IDS) or device, although one opportunity cost that might 
arise from an IDS is the reliability of the IDS to minimize false alarms. 
Other survivability features may involve an opportunity cost as in traffic 
management schemes, which lower throughput below that which is 
capable without this feature. A direct cost may be incurred if throughput 
functionality is important and traffic management restrictions are 
mitigated by larger bandwidth. Paramount should be the cost of losing 
capability in an attack scenario if survivability is not designed into the 
network, and the risk of losing the network’s capability for an 
unacceptable period of time because recovery and rerouting were not 
designed into the network in the first place.  
• Quantification of survivability requires the measurement of some network 
value of interest (packet loss rate, delay in packet arrival). The formulation 
of the model must have a basis in truth or in experimental data to back up 
the assumptions as to how the changes in these key parameters are 
affected by a network failure from attack. 
• Network configuration and network operating characteristics change 
depending on the applications being used, the number and connectivity of 
network members accessing services or communicating with other 
members. While node behavior can be predicted on knowledge of the 
node’s make-up and what the node is designed to process or pass, the 
behavior of the members can be random and unpredictable. Survivability 
must take into account the user population and the typical behavior 
patterns of the typical user and how that behavior might change based on 
the external environment to which the user is exposed. 
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Obviously, models that assist in quantifying a network’s survivability support 
management of risk to a network. However, what models like these do not provide is the 
answer to the question of what value of survivability is required to meet the mission. 
Proceeding to the next step, a detailed mission description must be articulated that 
specifies the parameters a network must meet during network failure recognition and 
recovery. Without a clear-cut mission effectiveness requirements and specification, the 
capability of the network to survive a given attack is meaningless. For instance, in the 
Chen & Trivedi wireless network model, survivability is the capability of the network not 
to lose too much information from the sender to the receiver and to have them 
communicating once again as quickly as possible. However, it has not been determined 
what the minimum values of packet loss or of packet delays required to accomplish a 
given task, or what the task profile for the network is. Survivability analysis must include 
a definitive description of system’s goals. For instance, in a commercial wireless 
telecommunications network, it would be helpful to know the necessary recovery time 
needed to keep from losing too many customers due to dropped calls and the probability 
that the network is able to meet that minimum network service quality under attack from 
the most likely threat or the most likely failure. Also not specified in the model is what 
information is lost; or is there a priority in information content that dictates what can be 
dropped and what must make it through the network? If the network drops a connection 
for only a minute, the information lost may or may not be important, but it is not possible 
to tell from these models or to quantify that attribute. While the models represent the 
system well under a given attack, most network models use the dropped link or failed 
node as the basis for model development. Other problems could be inflicted on the 
network such as the rerouting of sensitive information, or the distortion of information 
without sensing a connectivity problem, which would prompt a node switch. It is unclear 
how this situation would be handled by these models. As the number of types of threats 




The Department of Defense and the military services are well on their way in 
establishing information dominance enabled by network connectivity as the centerpiece 
and dominant factor in the defense and warfare strategy of the present and future. The 
edge over the enemy is the ability to control events through knowledge of the situation, 
eliminating as much as possible the “fog of war.” It is essential that this information be 
shared with the war fighter in as clear and unambiguous way as possible; certifying that 
the information shared gets to the war fighter, is the correct information, and that it is 
unavailable to the adversary. It is equally important that the opposition be hampered as 
much as possible in its ability to reach this goal with their war fighters. The desired effect 
is to increase the density of the enemy’s “fog of war.” 
The DoD CIO says: The Department of Defense is transforming to 
become a net-centric force. This transformation is based upon the 
recognition that information is a critical strategic component that enables 
decision makers at all levels to make better decisions faster and to act 
sooner. Ensuring timely and trusted information is available where it is 
needed, when it is needed, and to those who need it is at the heart of net-
centricity. (DoD GIG, 2007, Preface) 
The U.S. military’s information systems and the network enterprise are threatened 
on several fronts; equipment malfunction, unintentional mistakes and accidents causing 
system and network inoperability, hazards from natural causes and the exposure of 
systems to hostile environments, and intentional disruption and destruction of data and 
functionality by many adversaries, each with their own motivation for opposing the 
military’s objectives and disrupting the flow of information. 
The GAO warns: In addition, DOD faces risks inherent with the nature 
and scope of the effort it is undertaking, for example, risks related to 
protecting data within the thousands of systems that will be integrated into 
the network. Furthermore, the technical challenges to develop new 
networking and network management capabilities to support mobile, 
integrated communications are considerable. (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2004, p. 4) 
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Much effort since the start of the information age has gone into research, 
development, and testing of technologies and practices that increase the security of 
computers and networks. The need for an ability to recognize the threats to information 
systems and networks and to determine what to do about the threats is paramount. This is 
best accomplished through a robust program of network and information system risk 
analysis and management.  That it is important to take the holistic view of network risk 
assessment rather than focusing on short term fixes is clearly articulated by Chittister & 
Haimes in their article on Cyber security and the software lifecycle. 
The balance for achieving secure information systems is tilted more 
toward short term tactical measures, focusing on fire walls, patching, and 
response to cyber attacks, and less toward long-term, strategic approaches 
that address the entire software lifecycle development. (Chittister & 
Haimes, 2006, p. 2) 
1.  Network Architecture 
This thesis examined a network’s architecture from the hardware aspect 
(topology) and software (layers and SOA) and how certain architectures create or 
mitigate vulnerabilities that could be exploited by threats. 
Conclusion 1: A study of network topology from the standpoint of vulnerabilities 
should be part of the decision in the evaluation of alternatives along with performance 
and cost. Networks architected from concept definition to resist attack are more capable 
of evolving with the growth of the network into a more secure posture. 
Conclusion 2: The decision to use open architecture and to take advantage of the 
attributes of a SOA carries with it several implications that can introduce vulnerabilities. 
One of the principle sources of introducing vulnerabilities through software architecture 
is the open architecture and SOA reliance on COTS. COTS software may be questionable 
as to the testing conducted before use in the military’s network systems in addition to the 
possibility that there may be hidden software programs or logic that can introduce 
unknown vulnerabilities that can appear during network operation. 
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2.  Network Risk Management 
The thesis researched the elements of risk, especially as they apply to networks; 
the composition of a risk management process, with a detailed look at DoD’s risk 
management for acquisition programs, and what attributes of commercial risk 
management processes might support the continuing improvement of a network 
enterprise risk management approach for DoD Net-centric operations and the GIG 
architectural framework. 
Conclusion 3: Identified risks need to be fully assessed for the potential not only 
to disrupt the network, but also the consequences on the operations they are designed to 
support. A rigorous and enlightened assessment of network risk should support network 
designers and operators in making a decision as to whether it is worth the cost in funding 
or opportunity to plan and implement a mitigation strategy for a given risk. The answer to 
the question “What is this mitigation strategy protecting?” has a direct effect on the 
mitigation strategy employed. 
Conclusion 4: Attack trees are a useful tool in analyzing network vulnerabilities 
and assessing the motivating factors of threats to attack a network. When analyzed from 
the standpoint of game theory, attack tress (based on the reliability analysis done through 
fault trees) contribute to the insight of network vulnerabilities as viewed by the network 
versus by the threat. 
3.  Network Survivability and Resilience 
This thesis examined resilience and survivability of networks and strategies for 
architecting networks for those qualities. Survivability means a reduction in susceptibility 
and vulnerability, and the ability to recover. Resilience in a network is an abstract quality 
that metaphorically means the ability to resume the previous shape. Architecting a 
network for resilience is challenging in that the requirements for survivability are 




Conclusion 5: To architect resilience into a network, a network architect must 
look at the network’s boundaries, the interface to other networks, and define where the 
line is to be drawn to resist attacks from threats that come in various ways with an array  
of capabilities. Once an attacker has penetrated a network, the architect must look at the 
capability of the system to adapt and recover while stopping the attacker’s progression. 
Adaptability has to be built into a system on initial design.  
4.  Network Entreprise Risk Management  
This thesis compared some of the popular risk management processes in the 
public domain. It examined how their methodology might support DoD’s network 
enterprise risk management process to achieve a survivable and resilient enterprise 
network and support DoD in making risk assessments and decisions on the cost/benefit or 
value of the choices in alternative architecture and countermeasure use for risk mitigation 
implementation. 
Conclusion 6: This thesis contrasted some of the popular risk management 
processes in the public domain. A common thread in all the commercial process models 
is the necessary involvement of the entire organization in the process, from top level 
management to the network administrators and functional managers. Leaders and the 
people in command positions need to take an on-going role in the security and risk 
management of their most valuable assets, the networks and the information and 
functionality contained therein. Risk management is a continuous process.  
Conclusion 7: In the end analysis, managing risk is a balancing act. However, it 
is a process that is necessary; it is a process that needs to evolve; and it is a process that 
needs to be continuous. Risk could be eliminated by erecting barriers to impenetrable 
potential threats, or by just shutting everything down. The consequence of this action is 
that network users would be unable to use the network to achieve their objectives. The 
converse is to ignore the level of risk or setting the criteria of an acceptable level of risk 
too low to avoid mitigating it; allowing uninhibited access and mobility to data and 
functionality contained in the network. This method is just as untenable as shutting down 
the network completely every time the network is attacked. Without mitigation, the 
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network would be inundated with illegitimate members intent on causing harm to satisfy 
many motives (data destruction, fabrication, and interruption of critical services). The 
process of managing risk gets more complicated as systems grow in size and complexity, 
and as the systems become distributed both in functionally and geographically. The 
answer is to conduct a continuous assessment of the risks to a network, to balance 
network capability prudently with network security, and applying the available resources 
with which to do that wisely. 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS OF AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
It is the contention of this thesis that to continue to provide the network capability 
desired in the GIG enterprise to support the strategy of information dominance even 
when the network is under attack, the network must be designed with the quality 
attributes of survivability and resilience. Service Oriented Architecture, with its loose 
coupling at the boundaries and its objective of software reuse by making the service 
independent of the client through the use of description language and callable interfaces, 
offers an opportunity to examine this process for ways to make the underlying network 
resilient and adaptable to realigning the service when the network is under attack. Further 
research and analysis should concentrate on how this would be done.  
Service Oriented Architecture offers significant advantages in an enterprise as 
large as the GIG is envisioned to become. However, one of the biggest sources of 
vulnerability that increase the level of risk to the enterprise is the use of COTS software 
in designing the network with open architecture. Considering the cost savings and time to 
provide capability to the war fighter through the use of COTS, research and analysis on 
how to close the vulnerability gaps created by using COTS should be conducted. The use 
of quality control measures such as Capability Maturity Model Integration and others is 
vital to closing that gap. Determining sufficient software testing requirements that do not 
take an inordinate amount of time or resources but still provide the assurance of quality 
would be a step ahead in the military’s ability to enhance the one factor that is under their 
control in the risk equation; i.e., reducing network vulnerability in a network that 
provides invaluable resources to the war fighters in their efforts to reach their objectives.  
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APPENDIX A. VULNERABILITY AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES 
BY NETWORK LAYER 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter II, a network is a complex organization of physical 
components and connecting devices arranged in a certain topology, signal paths, software 
logic controlling the signals, protocols which define how information is packaged, logic 
programs controlling the routing of the packets of information, packet addressing 
schemes to obtain the information from source to destination, software programs for 
determining who receives what information, mechanisms to keep packets from 
interfering with one another, the data and functionality contained in packets sent through 
the network, and a variety of other schemes for making the network operate correctly and 
perform the functions desired. The International Standardization Organization ISO has 
decomposed the operation of networks into seven layers in its Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) model, and by in large, a plan to evaluate and mitigate risks to 
network enterprises must consider the layer abstractions to define the mitigating strategy 
properly that is to be used for the security software logic and mechanisms to operate 
correctly. The boundaries between some of the layers can overlap, and indeed network 
abstractions by other organizations may combine ISO layers in their definitions. For 
instance, Figure 17 shows how the Navy has combined layers of the ISO model into three 
layers in its model of FORCENet; the communications and network layer, enterprise 
services layer, and the applications services layer. In this discussion, a comparison is 
made between the different layers of the ISO Open System Interconnection (OSI) model 
layers for vulnerabilities and the Quality of Service attributes that need protection. 
This figure is a comparison of the network information abstract as depicted in the 
ISO seven layers with the layers defined by the U.S. Navy’s FORCENet model of 
information extraction. A mapping of the vulnerabilities and mitigating strategies can be 




model. While the mapping is not necessarily direct, as these abstraction models overlap 
in their actual functionality in an operable network, a comparison can be made and 
translated between the two models closely enough to have some utility.  
 
 
The risks inherent in the ISO layers translate into the FORCENet model 
to inform the Navy’s network development team the types of risk to look 
for in each of the three layers of the FORCENet model. 
Figure 17.   ISO Network Layers Mapped to FORCENet Network Model (From: 
Stewart, 2006) 
B. NETWORK ISO LAYERS AND THE RISKS TO NETWORK QOS 
ATTRIBUTES 
1. Physical Layer 
Description: This layer is defined by the hardware of the network, the devices that 
constitute a computer workstation or central processing unit of a controller, memory units 
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(hard drive, compact disc driver), network interface cards (Ethernet, modem, SONET 
token), electronic switching devices (hub, switch, router), connection hardware (Fire 
Wire, Universal Serial Bus, Bluetooth,), connection media (optical fiber, twisted pair 
cable, wireless radio signals), and power supplies. The hardware devices of the network 
are constructed to prevent collision of data, to provide multiplexing, and to form the 
electronic signals in the shape required for the communications medium (packets for 
wired systems and frames for wireless signals) (Smith, 2003). 
Vulnerability: Primarily, the threat is to the network’s availability by physical 
damage to components as well as the reliability and availability of hardware components. 
The threat at the physical layer is probably as likely to come from an unintended accident 
(component assembly or proximity to a hazard) as from a malicious attack. Interruption 
to power sources can cause damage to sensitive electro-magnetic components through 
electro-magnetic interference or power surges. 
Mitigation Strategies: As in other hardware systems, availability can be enhanced 
by fault tolerant strategies of redundancy and diversification. Physical separation of 
components at this layer is advantageous as well as power isolation techniques such as 
surge suppression. The selection of hardware components and their location in the path of 
the network also affects the ability of the hardware to resist attacks. Speed of 
transmission and bandwidth of the communications medium affects the ability to get 
volumes of information to the right place within a time specification. The physical layer 
is the first step in the architecture choices of a system since the components chosen to do 
certain tasks, the quality of the hardware, and arrangement of where they are connected, 
what physical connectors are used, what shielding of cabling is employed; and many 
more architectural choices drives the cost of the network. It also determines the nature of 
the subsequent layers and what software can reside on the system components to perform 
the services architected in the upper network layers. 
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2. Data Link Layer 
Description: In this layer of a network, electronic signals are passed 
indiscriminately node to node by frame delivery. These are the signals and packets that 
are transmitted through the physical lines (or through the air in wireless networks) by 
data link protocols such as ANSI standards of connectivity 802.2 and 801.11. ( 
NSA/IAD, 2005). This is the layer in which the Media Access Control (MAC address) 
number is assigned to a particular piece of hardware, the internal addressing of a local 
area network. Basic protocols (rules) for sending signals from a node or workstation like 
the multi protocol label switching (MPLS), Ethernet protocols, token ring, and point to 
point protocol. In this layer, the network conducts logical link control (flow control) with 
flat addressing of information packets (Smith, 2003). 
Vulnerability: Since this layer is merely the flow of information packets before 
they are guided by source and destination programming, the availability of data and 
services is the QoS most threatened at this layer. However, data signals that flow through 
the Internet can be intercepted because of the availability of access for anyone that can 
connect to the internet. Thus, packets (or wireless data streams of frames) could be 
intercepted, and if not encrypted, could lead to loss of confidentiality. 
Mitigation Strategies: Since encryption of data is not done on this layer, the 
technology of service-transparent transport or “tunneling” is normally employed to 
protect the data streams using Ethernet technology. It can be implemented in this layer or 
in the physical or network layer to shield the data stream from recognition upon 
interception. Figure 18 shows a typical tunneling architecture using Ethernet technology 
and control and management functions (May, 2004). In addition to tunneling, data 






Tunneling is a method to keep data safe while in transit outside the 
security protections of the Local Area Network when it is between source 
and destination gateways. 
Figure 18.   An Example of Tunneling at the Data Link Layer with Ethernet (From: 
May, 2004) 
3. Network Layer 
Description: The network layer in a network is the abstraction that implements 
end-to-end packet delivery and routing through a network with addressing via Internet 
Protocol (IP). It is also the location where network management services are conducted 
such as how the packets are handled at each intermediary node (usually a router). Packets 
are sent from the source without establishing a connection with the destination, and 
routing is done through subnet routers for message forwarding and data flow control. 
However, the source can receive acknowledgement, and some error checking and control 
of the packets is done at this layer. With hierarchical addressing being done in the 
network layer, this abstraction defines the path which the packets take to reach their 
destination. The network layer can make service requests to the data link layer (Smith, 
2003). 
Vulnerability: Since this layer is where the network management takes place, the 
configuration, and performance of network traffic flow is monitored and managed from 
this layer. This is also a layer where access control is maintained to network system 
components; those components that manage network characteristics. At this layer, 
intrusion into the network affects network performance characteristics such as 
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connectivity between critical nodes, how traffic is routed node to node and number of 
hops from end-to-end. This also affects the latency of data travel, and on software control 
of bandwidth allocation to certain users, subnets or LANs. Availability of data due to 
connectivity issues or routing issues on the network layer is the major threat. Integrity of 
data can also be affected, as intrusion into network management can cause excessive 
information packet loss and distortion of data received by the end user. 
Mitigation Strategies: Maintaining minimum configuration standards for the 
network and components, especially routers, on the network is important for maintaining 
security to ensure availability of network paths for legitimate information flow. To assist 
in security management, it is in this layer that intrusion detection device characteristics 
are abstracted to measure their performance in detecting unauthorized access to the 
network. With basic packet addressing at this layer, name conventions and protection of 
network addressing is important and confidentiality network component locations are 
maintained by hiding Domain Name Servers (DNS) behind an encryption and 
authentication device and preventing DNS reverse look-up that gives a domain name 
away. When the packets with an IP address leave the LAN, the IP address can be 
repackaged to prevent IP spoofing. Spoofing is a way for malicious actors to use 
someone else’s IP address notation to gain access to an unauthorized location.  
4. Transport Layer 
Description: The transport layer abstraction is where the information and control 
packets have been fully addressed with transmission control protocol (TCP) or the 
universal datagram protocol (UDP) and prepared for transmission from one user to 
another. TCP is a connection-oriented protocol. Port numbers are added to the IP address 
to allow access to ports called network sockets. The TCP addition to the packet address 
establishes the communication between sender and destination (or host and application). 
Additionally, packets are assigned ordering numbers to allow sequential reception and 
reordering at the destination, and it allows the ability to resend packets lost in congested 
nodes. At the transport layer, the network seeks to provide congestion avoidance. 
Between TCP and UDP, UDP has a higher throughput, which means a shorter latency 
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and is often used for video and Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) where data drop is 
acceptable, but reduced latency is desired. The Hyper Text Transmission Protocol 
(HTTP) uses TCP for web browsing (Smith, 2003). 
Vulnerability It is in this layer and the network layer below that the distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attack is launched. With the ability to address IP packets fully 
with TCP addresses and port numbers, the attacker can target a network component for 
flooding with traffic from commandeered workstations called “robots,” and the attacker 
sets up a network of these robots to establish a “Botnet” that then causes an overflow of 
requests for service through a legitimate network node. 
Mitigation Strategies: This layer protects information mainly through the 
establishment of virtual private networks, an arrangement of nodes in a physical network 
authorized to communicate and pass information end-to-end. The VPN is established by 
node authentication through security procedures such as password recognition and 
firewall installations. Another technique to controlling the direction and path of 
information through a multi-node network is to establish network overlays where only 
certain nodes accept signals and packets of a certain type (for instance differentiating 
light wavelengths in optical fiber). In addition to the software tools that provide a secure 
socket layer or SSL (a program to control a user’s ability to “plug in” to a network) for 
guarding port numbers so that an engineered TCP address cannot be constructed, an 
effective mitigation to the DDoS is the adaptable router reconfiguration, aided by 
behavior and pattern recognition software in an intrusion detection device to sense when 
unauthorized service requests are in-coming and block them. Another tool that can be 
used to control network participation is addressing packets with secure IP (IPsec). 
5. Session Layer 
Description: The session layer handles requests and response between 
applications or hosts. The software controlling actions in the session layer handles the 
setup and management of sessions. In this layer, authentication and permission is 
controlled. Sessions management software tries to reconnect the original connection path 
through the network when a connection is dropped (Smith, 2003). 
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Vulnerability: If the sessions management program does not verify the 
authorization of a user to set up a connection with an application, database, or other user 
(say for collaboration), information could be stolen or altered, affecting information 
integrity and confidentiality. In addition, an unauthorized member in a network could 
repudiate the information sent by a broadcasted, thus causing delays in successive 
information being sent by the need to resend information continually that was received 
the first time.  
Mitigation Strategies: It is critical in this layer to gain authentication of those 
users accessing a session with an application or service so that information remains 
confidential. Security software programs that provide authentication and access control 
are important to keep the session from being disconnected or from information being 
hijacked by an unauthorized member of the session. The session and transport layers are 
where software called middleware resides in a network system. Programs have been built 
to control who is in a session, who can send and receive information, and how 
information is broadcast through the virtual network created by the session. Transport 
and session are the ISO layers that are aggregated in the FORCENet model above as the 
enterprise services layer. Network management programs designed in the Common 
Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) are resident in the session layer and 
determine who is able to retrieve what objects (complete programs or sets of data). 
Middleboxes are the components that comprise the middleware in the sessions layer. 
They use programs such as the Network Address Translator (NAT), load balancers 
(rewrites packet headers), (Joseph & Stoica, 2008) and intrusion-prevention devices as a 
type of firewall at the interface between applications and the network. (DISA, 2009; 
NSA/CSS, 2009).  Service Oriented Architecture often uses a Distributed Data Services 
architecture in developing programs which are based on a data-centric model to establish 
a loose coupling at the middlebox interface with the network versus an object model that 
tightly couples the source node with the network management structure and the network 
operating system (Joseph & Stoica, 2008).  
127 
6. Presentation Layer 
Description: In this layer, data packets are assembled into language recognized by 
the program using the data it has retrieved from the network and it is where data sent 
from a program is packaged into packets for delivery through the network. Encryption of 
data is usually performed in this layer, but can wait until subsequent layers before 
transmitting the transparency of the network (Internet). EXtensible Markup Language 
(XML) is a method for packaging data sent from one program to another with a different 
language (NSA/CSS, 2005; NSA/CSS, 2008).  Extensibility is the quality that allows 
add-ons to permit the evolution of the packaging to grow with changes to network 
configurations, network control procedures and development of new applications. (Smith, 
2003) 
Vulnerability: Data integrity and confidentiality is at risk in the presentation layer 
since access into this layer puts a malicious actor in contact with data or programs before 
encryption. On the other side of the interface to the sessions layer, if data has not been 
encrypted and marked up in accordance with an organization’s security policy (security 
tokens, digital certificate, and userID/password pair), the data is available for pilfering 
and/or corrupting.  
Mitigation Strategies: To provide security to the markup, XML has variants that 
attach onto the XML standard data representation. Used for web services security, Simple 
Object Access Protocol (SOAP) supports digital signatures and encryption and forms the 
shell to carry security tokens, Security Assertions Markup Language (SAML) and other 
security headers attached to the data. Extensible access control markup language 
(XACML) allows the inclusion and encapsulation of security measures on data packets 
within the construct of a security management and services architecture. XAMCL 
executes organizational policy models on information packets from the Attribute-based 
Access Control model (ABAC) and Role-based Access Control model (RBAC) to the 
Identification–based Access Control model (IBAC), Authentication-based Access 
Control model (NBAC), and Authorization-based Access Control model (ZBAC) 
(NSA/IAD SOAP, 2008). The last of these is compatible with a data-centric security 
model where the data and the network owner are kept separate, making this type of XML 
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packaging security system compatible with the goals of Service Oriented Architecture 
and the capability to share information securely across very divergent platforms. Further 
protection of data can be done in this layer (before markup in XML for transmission over 
the network) using “hash tables” (Walker, 2008). 
7. Applications Layer 
Description: The top layer of the ISO model of abstraction is the applications 
layer. This is where the services are performed. Many standard protocols are used in the 
applications layer to allow access to various services. The more common protocol which 
allows applications to access specific services is HTTP (NSA/SNAC, 2001).  In the 
applications layer, the network has finally reached the point where processing power is 
accessed, data is stored, and real-world input from things like sensors or the human 
interface are translated into digital format in the language used by that processor (Smith, 
2003). 
Vulnerability: The applications layer is where received data is processed to be 
delivered to the physical interface (e.g., display) and control of outgoing data from 
storage or a physical interface (e.g., keyboard) is manipulated for subsequent 
transmission through the network. Since data and programs have been unencrypted for 
use by the end-user at this point, data and programs are highly susceptible to interception, 
and theft or fabrication. If a malicious actor can reach this point, integrity and 
confidentiality of information is easily manipulated for retrieval by the attacker or by the 
attacker modifying incoming or outgoing information.  
Mitigation Strategies: If, in a collaborative session, loss of confidentiality to 
information might be mitigated if the end user has a way to know who is attending the 
session, and even though each attendee may be authorized, a count of access points might 
give the end user an indication that the session should be terminated or the connection to 
the network severed. Software programs are also available to monitor at the applications 
level for members on a network who might be masquerading as an authorized user. For 
survivability, data at the applications layer should be easily replicated in a secure location 
and program functionality distributed among several authorized nodes of a network to 
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minimize the possibility of one failed node stopping the operation in progress. Equally 
important to survivability is the diversity in processing such that if one program is 
compromised, the end user could switch to a different mode of an application which may 
not be compromised, and continue operations while simultaneously discovering the 
intrusion point and blocking it. 
C. SUMMARY 
Risk analysis and management of risks identified requires a good understanding 
of the location of vulnerabilities in the network.  To locate possible intruder entrances 
and paths through the network precisely, a thorough understanding of the layer 
abstractions assists in defining the vulnerabilities and in mapping out a mitigation 
strategy that can place the right resources in the right layer abstraction for maximum 
effectiveness.  When considering the vulnerability in a network, it is useful to know 
which architectural abstraction layer or layers must be penetrated to compromise the 
networks availability or the data integrity of confidentiality, and to know what the 
characterization of the penetration might be depending on where the attack is made, and 
finally what resources are available to protect the Quality of Service in each layer. 
Knowing where in the layer abstraction the network is most vulnerable, given the value 
of the data asset remains constant, can support the decision of where to concentrate 
resources to counter an attack. Equally important in computer network warfare, it 
determines the ideal location to enter the enemy’s network to disrupt their operations if 
that is a campaign objective and a desired effect. 
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APPENDIX B. OVERVIEW OF SOME CURRENT RISK 
MANAGEMENT PROCESS MODELS AND THEIR 
APPLICABILITY TO NETWORKS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This appendix explores the methods of risk management processes for network 
systems used to varying degrees in the commercial and defense market. As DoD 
continues to formalize their process of managing the risk to the global network system in 
the GIG and the individual networks now resident in all military organizations, 
incorporating applicable processes that have made these models successful for other 
organizations could support DoD’s efforts to make their process robust and timely. 
A majority of the models explored below are process models and vary between 
the qualitative and quantitative realms. Qualitative models take a large amount of time 
and resources, especially human resources to collect and analyze all the data.  They can 
lack specificity and contain much subjective information and opinions. However, when 
empirical data is unavailable or too difficult to obtain, as in the destructive testing of rare 
and limited components, a subjective model may be the only path to obtain information 
about a system and its risk factors. Quantitative models appear on the surface to be more 
logical and fit into the engineer’s idea of accurate information and outcomes. Moreover, 
they too can produce misleading results if the input data into the model is ambiguous, 
approximate or inconsistent. Ambiguous data can come from the misidentification of 
possible outcomes or not fully recognizing all possible outcomes from the 
implementation of a process model. Approximations are introduced into models by over-
simplification of data or model parameters, assumptions introduced, or idealized 
representations (Ayyab, 2003). In a system as broad in scope and complex as the global 
connectivity of the GIG (let alone the individual services’ networked systems), no one 
risk assessment process model provides the military a complete representation of the 
steps to go through to quantify system risk. Nor is it possible for one model provide the 
information necessary to implement procedures or protection systems and schemes to 
protect the entire network. That does not mean that the use of risk assessment models in 
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determining how to protect the GIG and all the systems in a global network can be 
abandoned. Each model allows some insight into how to structure a risk management 
system, be it for the enterprise, for a specific theater of operation, a component’s 
partitioned operation in that theater, a weapons platform subsystem, or for a specific 
application on that platform. 
B. DESCRIPTIONS OF CURRENT MODELS AND THEIR 
APPLICABILITY 
1. Information Assurance Risk Management (IARM) (Safety Risk) 
The IARM methodology was developed in 2001 by LCDR E. D. Hernandez, a 
Naval Postgraduate School student, for his thesis work (Hernandez, 2001).  The 
methodology draws on the steps used by the Navy for Operational Risk Management 
(ORM) as defined in OPNAV 3500.39.B; a framework for evaluating the risks involved 
in critical operations that pose a safety hazard (e.g., replenishment operations in heavy 
seas). ORM is a systematic way of discovering and ranking risks of an operation and 
deciding how to minimize the risk by altering the way the operation is conducted, by 
taking other safety measures, avoiding risk by not performing the operation, or accepting 
the risk because the benefits outweigh the risk. IARM is also patterned after Navy-
Marine Corps Internet (NMCI) computer network defense model of protect, detect, react, 
recover and revise and the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) five category risk 
evaluation matrix card. 
The five steps in IARM are the following. 
1. Identify vulnerabilities: vulnerabilities are classified according to asset 
relationship (hardware, software, data, services) and information attributes 
that could be compromised (confidentiality, availability, integrity). 
2. Assess vulnerabilities: a process similar to the DAU risk card is used to 
rank each vulnerability identified in step 1 as to its likelihood and its 
severity. Depending on where the vulnerability falls within the matrix, a 






3. Make risk decisions: based on the risk level in the second step, risk 
assessments are made to determine what would be an acceptable risk 
based on the benefit, and what risks need to be mitigated or avoided. This 
is the planning stage for determining the controls necessary to manage the 
risks identified in step 2. 
4. Implement Controls: Installing the controls, either technological or 
procedural, assigning responsibility, and providing support. 
5. Supervise: This stage is the feedback loop of monitoring the results of 
control implementation. It is also the time to observe if the implementation 
of controls has had any adverse effect on the assumptions made in 
previous steps. 
The author cites as advantages of IARM over traditional approaches the 
systematic nature of the method, proactive nature of attempting to discover all threats and 
vulnerabilities (such as social engineering threats), and increased communication 
between network users, information systems technicians, and decision makers through a 
common language of the ranking of risks (Hernandez, 2001). While the claim of a 
systematic approach is justified, the advantage of capturing all threats and vulnerabilities 
may be inflated. The process does look at more than just technological controls and 
digital network threats. However, it is impossible to capture all threats and vulnerabilities 
in one or even many iterations of a standard process. The system requirements and 
system capabilities change too quickly as well as the source and nature of threats is 
continuously evolving with the developing technologies. 
2. Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency (CCTA) Risk 
Analysis and Management Method (CRAMM) 
CRAMM is a process model owned by the Government of the United Kingdom 
that follows a three step process. It relies heavily on qualitative data gathering and 
analysis from subject matter experts and interviews with computer system operators. The 
steps in the process are the following. 
1. Building an asset model and defining system boundaries 
2. Asset dependencies are established and a threat and vulnerability 
assessment is made by circulating questionnaires. With the software tool, 
measures of risk are calculated. 
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3. With a comprehensive countermeasure database, the tool recommends the 
countermeasures (policies and technical tools) that should be implemented 
to mitigate the risk. 
Data gathered is placed into a software program that can produce reports to 
management on asset classes, threats and vulnerabilities, and countermeasures to deploy. 
The model has been around since 1985 and is difficult to use unless the organization has 
someone who has used the model in the past. CRAMM does allow the organization to 
systematically think about what the value of their information is and what steps need to 
be taken to address vulnerabilities against known threats. Not much information exists on 
what to do about unknown threats and how to address them as they are identified through 
threat libraries or if one penetrates the organization‘s system (Jones & Ashenden, 2005). 
3. Fundamental Information Risk Management (FIRM) 
FIRM is a two-phase, ten-stage process that looks at the information systems and 
networks of an organization from a very high level. It is a quantitative data gathering and 
scoring process with some software tools for organizing data gained through 
“scorecards,” which are filled out by resource owners. The idea is to take the scorecards 
and balance out the system functionality with system protections and produce a senior 
management report as to the state of vulnerability and protection of the organization’s 
system enterprise. The two phases are designed to get senior-level buy-in by showing 
ways to plug obvious but overlooked vulnerability holes. The second phase collects 
information about the enterprise a second time with a more detailed look at the score, or 
assets versus threats and vulnerabilities. By virtue of distributing quantitative data 
gathering among all the organization’s resource managers, this process appears to work 
better in larger organizations. It does not take the next step of identifying and 
recommending countermeasure implementation (Jones & Ashenden, 2005). 
4. Simple to Apply Risk Analysis (SARA) and Simplified Process for 
Risk Identification (SPRINT) 
The SARA and SPRINT tools are complementary and the process is similar to the 
processes above in that they rely on collecting data through interviews with management, 
system operators and subject matter experts. SPRINT is a fast track tool that assesses the 
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business risk, the threats, and system vulnerabilities and controls through mediated 
interviews. The goal after assessment is to produce a plan to implement system controls 
that more effectively reduce the assessed risk. SARA is designed for business-critical 
systems and uses a more in depth approach than SPRINT. SARA uses interviews and 
workshops to 1) define the system and its boundaries, 2) identifying business 
requirements for security, 3) assessing threats and vulnerabilities in a workshop format, 
and 4) production of an action plan. These tools are labor intensive and require the time 
and manpower of a significant part of the organization (Jones & Ashenden, 2005). 
5. Cobra 
Cobra is a process similar to CRAMM and is owned by a security service in the 
United Kingdom as well. While the process is similar to CRAMM, it makes extensive use 
of questionnaires to gather data and the software tool is modularized to conduct 
assessments on certain aspects of security in isolation. For a full assessment, the modules 
are combined for a full report on the risk condition of the enterprise and countermeasure 
to implement (Jones & Ashenden, 2005). 
6. The CORAS Method 
Another United Kingdom funded project, CORAS (an undefined acronym) is a 
risk management method that uses a Unified Modeling Language (UML) in its automated 
tool, which supports a methodology similar to the process models above. The method 
follows the process of 1) identifying security-critical assets through a questionnaire and 
accurately representing the current system’s security state and the interaction between 
system components, 2) risk identification by determining threats (though fault trees and 
Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis {FMECA}), 3) risk analysis through 
identification of outcomes and consequences and the likelihood of the outcomes, 4) risk 
evaluation by ranking the risks according to likelihood and evaluating the impact of the 
consequences determined in step 3, and 5) risk treatment in the form of mitigation or 
avoidance/transference strategies by employing countermeasures to reduce the likelihood 
or reduce the consequences. Throughout the process steps, the model specifies strong  
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communication between teams conducting the analysis and constant monitoring and 
review of results so that the model can be adjusted in an iterative fashion (Hamdi & 
Boudriga, 2005). 
The next three process models were developed by the CERT® Coordination 
Center, which is part of the Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University; 
a federally funded research and development center sponsored by U.S. DoD. The primary 
objective of CERT is to develop technology and systems management practices to resist 
attack to computer network systems and to limit damage and ensure continuity of critical 
services when an attack on a network occurs. 
7. Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation 
(OCTAVE) 
This process model and its associated software were developed by the Carnegie 
Mellon University and Software Engineering Institute and use the workshop format to 
define the assessment and gather data. The process is designed to bring all facets of a 
business together through interdisciplinary teams that look at risks from threats and 
vulnerabilities to the organization not only in information systems, but in all facets of a 
business. The process model is run in three phases; 1) asset prioritization through data 
gathering, 2) assessment of threats and vulnerabilities and where these impact 
information flow and veracity through workshops, and 3) Risk identification and 
development of mitigation strategies. One of the terminal objectives of the OCTAVE 
process is to develop threat profiles for individual assets. This takes into account both 
threat access ability (through vulnerabilities and other means) and a threat motivation 
profile. This method is unique to OCTAVE over the other previous models, but is a 




The CERT Coordination Center’s OCTAVE 
model follows many of the characteristics of 
the DoD Risk Management Process for 
Acquisition Programs 
Figure 19.   The OCTAVE Risk Management Cycle (From: Caralli & Young, 2008) 
New versions of the OCTAVE method and tool have been developed since 
OCTAVE was created in 1999 including a small business version and a “continuous 
improvement” version. The same methodology of inter-active team workshops is 
employed by the newest version, but concentrates on information asset storage, 
transmission, and use to allow assessments to be conducted without professional 
knowledge of assessment processes. The aim is to broaden the landscape assessed by 
opening up the assessment process to operational security, not just information security. 
The shift from periodic risk assessment to a continuous action was prompted by the 
dramatic changes in information ownership and use through networked systems just in 
the last decade. New terms have been developed including Continuous Risk Management 
(CRM) and Operational Risk Management (ORM), although this is not a new term to 
Naval safety programs (Caralli & Young, 2008).  The OCTAVE developers have 
expressed the need for a continuous program in the following statement. 
Operational resiliency in an organization is dependent on many types of 
organizational assets performing together to achieve a mission. (Caralli & 
Young, 2008, p. 78) 
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8. Architecture Refinement Process 
This model, created by Robert Ellison and Andrew Moore (Ellison & Moore, 
2001) from the Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie-Mellon University 
(SEI/CMU) CERT Coordination Center, is tailored more toward the concept definition, 
design, and development stage of a system lifecycle and concentrates on architecting a 
system for survivability. Consistent with other models in the architecting of software-
based systems, they employ the spiral model from a systems engineering standpoint. In 
fact, the process is the successive use of four models/processes, which comprise the four 
quadrants of a spiral graph. Counter to some developers concentrating their architecture 
on the arrangement of technological security components, this model seeks to address 
how the system architecture counters attacks that degrade the system’s mission; in other 
words, how to architect for survivability. The authors define survivability similar to the 
definitions of Chapter V in that survivability is the characteristic of a system to perform 
its designated mission even when penetrated and compromised by a hostile force. The 
survivability of a system is impacted by the system’s reliability, performance, safety, 
security and fault tolerance.  
Similar to the military’s Observer, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA Loop) the Plan 
Decide, Execute (PDE Cycle), the spiral process of this model leads the developer 
through architecting the defense of a system in a Resist, Recognize, Recover continuum, 
which employs reusable survivability design primitives. Examples of these design 
primitives are replication, redundancy, distribution, separation access control, intrusion 
detection, diversity, and adaptive reconfiguration. The reuse of these primitives comes in 
an iterative fashion as the architect works through each cycle of the spiral. The four 
quadrants of the spiral are the following. 
1. Survivability Planning; including mechanism-based risk remediation 
2. Usage Modeling; essential work-flow analysis 
3. Intrusion Modeling; using attack trees and intrusion work-flow models. 
(An intrusion work-flow model is simply a path through an attack tree 
diagram to show what path an intruder might take to exploit vulnerabilities 
in the networked system.) 
4. Survivability Risk Analysis; vulnerability and impact assessment 
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The process starts with designing the system architecture around survivability 
design primitives based on the current knowledge of the system requirements and the 
adversarial environment. The usage modeling refines the architecture around essential 
work flows. A model of intrusion to the architected network is built with an attack tree 
analysis of possible intrusions and their cascading effect on the architected network, and 
finally, a survivability risk analysis is conducted based on the intrusion model to 
determine where the architecture needs to be refined for survivability; allowing essential 
services to recover or continue operating to meet the system’s mission. The process of 
this model is shown in three iterations: firstly, considering network-based attacks, 
secondly, application-based attacks are contemplated, and finally, data-centered attacks 
are analyzed. Each iteration considers the correct architecting of the system for 
survivability using the survivability design primitives that preserves the quality attributes 
of the system of performance and reliability (Ellison & Moore, 2001). 
The penultimate survivability primitive above is a topic of some controversy. In 
their article about the unwarranted concern of not diversifying, Fred Schneider and Ken 
Birman from Cornell University postulate that diversity, especially in software, can be 
too expensive and makes a system too complex for the advantage gained by a network 
attacker who gains only slightly by the similarity in software systems in a monoculture 
environment (Schneider & Birman, 2009). 
9.  Mission Assurance Analysis Protocol (MAAP) 
Another process model developed by SEI/CMU is the Mission Assurance 
Analysis Protocol or MAAP, a process contained in the SEI Mission-Oriented Success 
Analysis and Improvement Criteria (MOSAIC) management approach. MAAP is more of 
a general method of looking at distributed, complex systems within an organization to 
discover the elements which make it successful and mitigating the factors that deter 
success. The process is comprised of building a model (representation) of the current 
state of a system in terms of its ability to achieve mission success. The uncertainty 
(probability) of achieving objectives due to inside or outside influences is analyzed along 
with the categorization of the threats (reliability issues, unintended mistakes, intrusions) 
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that would hinder success. The MAAP protocol is a roadmap for conducting the analysis 
by assigning activities, goals, and expected outcomes. Risk plays into this model in the 
consideration of the uncertainty of factors that would inhibit success. As with process 
models explained above, this process is time and manpower intensive, with the formation 
and training of teams from within and organizations to conduct the process. The 
requirements for being on a team are an in-depth knowledge of the system being 
considered and an understanding of risk assessment, process modeling, and statistics. The 
qualifications seem to indicate that a team with all members of this caliber would be 
difficult to assemble for just one part of a distributed system, let alone the entire network.  
The end product of a MAAP assessment yields a success profile for every key 
objective determined during the operational model development. Each key objective 
success profile informs the organization of their probability of mission success in that key 
objective, and for key objectives not acceptable to the organization; a plan can be 
developed to remediate the influences causing a less than desired success rate. 
Interestingly, the operational model development is different than the asset valuation of 
models above because it focuses not so much on value but more on the contribution each 
element in the distributed system makes to overall mission success. The decomposition of 
each key objective into influences and their uncertainties requires a disciplined approach 
to determining threats and vulnerabilities (Alberts et al., 2008). 
MAAP is primarily a management process, designed to take a holistic view of a 
complex and distributed system. While the description of the MAAP process does not 
explicitly state that it is a risk management model for computer networks, the fact that it 
was developed by SEI/CMU seems to indicate that the motivation was to use this process 
in a software-driven computer network environment. In fact, SEI/CMU has piloted the 
protocol in a cyber-security incident response system and in elements of software 
development and deployment. 
10. Network Risk Analysis Method (NetRAM) 
This framework for risk management was developed by M. Hamdi and N. 
Boudriga of the University of Tunis (Hamdi & Bordiga, 2005).  Their motivation in 
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developing this method was to develop a structured framework that captures risk 
management approaches, techniques, and software tools that can be used by an 
organization to run an effective risk management program. Their methodology centers on 
risk management analysis, decision, and response. The model consists of a ten-step 
recursive process that includes pathways to return and adjust previous steps based on 
information revealed during a later step. Included in one of their model steps are a robust 
process for incident impact and response, particularly framing the response to maximize 
recovery and minimize reduction in critical services and safety issues. The model is 
scalable to different types and sizes of network architectures and topologies, and is 
designed to remain current with changing technologies with a learning process that 
updates quantitative parameters and semantic links. A set of modules in the software tool 
also monitors the system’s states to detect deviations from normal and differences in 
values of key parameters. One of the unique features claimed by the authors is that their 
methodology restricts the propagation of errors or poor decisions made in previous steps 





The NetRAM model includes a process for evaluating risk based on the networks ability to react to attacks that are 
experienced; a measure of resiliency. 
Figure 20.   The 10 Modules of the NetRAM Framework (From: Hamdi & Bordiga, 2005) 
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Aside from the fact that this model looks quite similar to the ones above and uses 
some of the same methodologies for determining threats and assessing vulnerabilities (a 
combination of questionnaires and automated vulnerability scanners), the separation 
between preventative and reactive risk analysis is one area that stands out. While 
preventative analysis studies the likelihood of threats exploiting vulnerabilities with a 
resultant undesired effect, reactive analysis considers the probability of the detection 
system alerting on a network intrusion, following the amount of penetration, and the 
effects on system operation, particularly critical operations. This is the idea behind a 
consequences-based risk management approach. While full efforts should still be directed 
at prevention, it is inadvisable to give short shrift to planning the reaction and recovery 
from an unknown threat, left to exploit the vulnerability that remained undetected and 
unprotected. In addition, an important element in reactive risk management is the real-
time element of recovery and an analysis on the system of the time requirements for 
recovery to limit system functionality or to meet critical mission objectives. 
11. Mission Oriented Risk and Design Analysis (MORDA) 
The MORDA methodology was developed to address the risk involved in the 
operation of DoD’s Global Command and Control System (GCCS) from the war fighter’s 
perspective. The methodology employs a model called Security Optimization 
Countermeasure Risk and Threat Evaluation System (SOCRATES). The MORDA 
methodology and the SOCRATES model ride on the foundation of the following. 
• Attack tree models 
• Qualitative information assurance models 
• Quantitative information assurance models 
• Multiple objective decision analysis models for information assurance; 
using values rather than alternatives to measure parameters 
It is built within the DoD’s Information Assurance Technical Framework (IATF), 
which is what the DoD has developed as the architecture for information assurance 




model’s name was prompted by the developers’ opinion that a system of risk assessment 
and management of risk needed to start in the design phase of a system, not when the 
system reached the operational phase of the system lifecycle.  
SOCRATES is a quantitative design optimization model that uses multiple 
objective decision analysis as a mathematical technique for optimizing the 
countermeasure design of a system. Input into the model is data about the adversary 
provided by threat experts, the attack profile provided by security experts using attack 
tree analysis, and the countermeasure characteristics and design options provided by 
systems engineers. Input data is entered into three value models; adversary model, user 
model, and service provider model. Using multiple objective decision analysis, value 
goals are matched to value measures (constructive units are developed if no natural units 
exist), and the value measures are weighted. The competing objectives, now value 
measured and weighted, are compared by a weighted sum such that:  
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( )v x  value of alternative 
i = 1 to n numbered value measures 
ix  score of the alternative on the i
th value measure 
( )i iv x  a single-dimensional value of a score of ix  
iw  weight of the i
th value measure (all weights sum to 1) (Buckshaw 
et al., 2005, p. 23). 
 
This yields the optimum alternate within a set of competing objectives. To explain 
the value system, an adversary value model would use attack data based on the 
adversary’s motivation for the attack, the adversary’s assumption as to how likely the 
attack would succeed, how likely the adversary or the attack would be detected, the 
adversary’s resource consumption in executing the attack, and the impact on the system 
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should the attack succeed. Different techniques are employed to produce the initial value 
goals and measures including affinity diagrams. Some assumptions of the models are that 
it is better to measure attack preferences instead of probabilities, that the adversary is a 
rational thinker, and that an adversary is going to try to maximize their benefit and 
maximize the impact of their attack while minimizing resource expenditure. 
The user value model is structured similarly, and the value measure is defined by 
the values of achieving an objective of the war fighter. The competing objectives are the 
limitations on the system using alternative countermeasures and the effect on mission 
accomplishment. 
The value models’ results are input into an Integration and Analysis model, which 
determines the value of an operable system to the war fighter considering the cost/benefit 
and constraints on the use of the best value countermeasure alternatives determined in the 
value models. The integration takes the countermeasure alternative that best counters the 
adversary and compares it to the degradation in value (mission accomplishment) to the 
user community. This, along with the service provider value model (which is important to 
the service providers), yields ( )v xΔ ; a comparison of alternatives that match adversary, 
user and service provider values to determine the best alternative. When processed 
through a cost benefit model, and evaluated as to the resources required to implement, an 
architectural framework of countermeasures can be developed in the design of a new 
system or as a modification to an existing system (for instance GCCS). The final step in 
the methodology is to optimize the system value as constrained by system cost and 
countermeasure compatibility. 
The authors believe there are advantages to their model and methodology over 
other models in that it explicitly describes the sequence of attacks and compares the 
motivation behind certain attack strategies. It also takes into consideration the conflicting 
objectives and the interdependencies of all the variables, and sets a framework for 
allocating resources best aligned for mission accomplishment. 
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C. SUMMARY 
A common thread in all the process models discussed above is the necessary 
involvement of the entire organization in the process, from top level management to the 
network administrators and functional managers. Executives need to take an on-going 
role in the security and risk management process of one of their most valuable assets. “It 
is now recognized that network security is a mainstream business process, which can only 
be mandated and directed by senior management” (Adler & Lepofsky, 2000, p. 38).  
All of the models either allude to or directly state that risk management is an 
iterative and continuous process. A static plan, just like the technology of today, is out-
dated in short order. Unless the value of the information in the system, the changes in 
system vulnerabilities, and the threat to information system assets and the operations they 
support is not continually reviewed for necessary changes to network technology and 
personnel polices and procedures, the value of the network rapidly declines as the system 
becomes increasingly susceptible to attack from competitors and adversaries. 
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APPENDIX C. FORMULATION OF THE COST/BENEFIT MODEL 
FOR REACTIVE RISK ANALYSIS 
A. MODEL DERIVATION 
Hamdi and Bordiga developed a cost/benefit model that can be used to analyze a 
set of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and reactive countermeasures to support 
decisions on the type and quality of IDS and countermeasure required to counter a given 
set of attacks on a network. In this model (Hamdi & Bordiga, 2005), the probability of 
attack is not considered, since it is an analysis of effects on the network when attacks of a 
given set are conducted against the network. The analysis provides a cost/benefit analysis 
of the set of IDS and countermeasures given the set of attacks and the 
effects/consequences of the impact on the network from the attacks. The analysis gives a 
relative measurement of the cost and benefit to network survivability and resiliency for a 
set of IDS and countermeasures installed on the network. The network architects can 
compare different sets of IDS and countermeasures that fit within the budget to maximize 
the survivability benefit to the network. The model uses four factors to analyze for the 
cost and benefit of a given set of IDS and countermeasures. They are as follows. 
Detection cost is the set of costs for every IDS/analyzer installed on the network, 
whether a particular IDS is used against an attack or not (an IDS is composed of a 
network traffic sensor and an analyzer to interpret data from the sensor. In this analysis, 
the authors use the term “analyzer” to denote the entire IDS). The cost is a given and is 
scaled appropriately for the units of the whole model. Detection cost is depicted as Aiγ , i 
contained in { }1,... An  for An  analyzers. 
Reaction cost is also given and scaled the units of the analysis for each 
countermeasure that provides a reaction to an attack and is depicted as rkγ , for each 
reaction kr  for all k contained in { }1,..., rn  for rn  countermeasures. 
Impact of a given attack aji  causes various effects on the network from attack ja . 
The effects of the attack, which represent multiple attributes, are represented by the term 
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aji  and a unique term ajλ  is developed called the progression factor. A progression factor 
is included to incorporate the cost or benefits realized by the type of progression that 
attack is characterized by, for instance, if the attack is stopped before complete execution 
and the entirety of the attack impact effects are felt on the system, or if the attack is 
allowed to complete execution, the ability of the countermeasures to recover the network 
in time to continue required operation. The progression factor is determined by the 
effectiveness of the countermeasures to stop the attack and recover the network. Impact is 
modeled as a function of the progression factor where ( ) ( )1aj aj aji i λ−  is the benefit to the 
network from the progression factor and ( )1aji  is the maximum damage from attack ja . 
Thus, ( )aj aji λ  is the cumulative sum of elementary impacts of attack ja  in the interval 
0, ajλ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  such that:  
 
 ( ) ( )0 over 0,aj aj aji I t dλ λ λ λ⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦∫  (1) 
 
“I” is defined as the impact function over time as the attack progresses. ( )I t  can 
be any function given the type of attack; constant ( ) 0I t I=  if 00 t t≤ ≤ , or linear, or any 
function that defines the progression of the impact over time. In addition, 0t  is the 
maximum tolerated time the network is allowed to be down and still be considered 
survivable. 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) efficiency is formulated as follows. The 
authors define ‘D’ contained in the binary set {0, 1}, as the probability of detecting an 
attack; 0 if no attack is detected and 1 if an attack is detected. They define ‘A’ contained 
in the binary set {0, 1} as the probability of an attack; 0 if no attack takes place and 1 if 





• P(D|A) represents a true positive, estimated by sending contaminated 
packets past IDS 
• P(D| A) represents a false positive 
• P( D|A) represents a false negative 
• P( D| A) represents a true negative; no detection, no attack (Hamdi & 
Bordiga, 2005) 
B. MODEL FORMULATION 
When considering costs, the authors do not specify the units, but mention that the 
costs could be monetary or a measurement of resource consumption. The cost to the 
system of a reaction to a given attack is the probability of detecting a true attack times the 
cost of the IDS analyzer, the cost of the reaction and the cost of the impact as modified 
by the benefits of the reaction. It also includes the cost of the IDS analyzer, the cost of the 
reaction times and the probability that the system makes a false positive detection. 
Considering an analyzer, iA , that alerted on attack ja , the cost of performing response kr  
to stop the attack is ( ),k ajrγ λ  such that: 
  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),k aj Ai rk aj aj Ai rkr i P D A P D Aγ λ γ γ λ γ γ= + + + + . (2) 
 
The benefit, ( ),k ajrβ λ , to the system of a given reaction to a given attack, is the 
probability that the analyzer detects the attack times the benefit defined above (impact 
without progression factor minus impact with progression factor) such that: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ), 1k aj aj aj ajr i i P D Aβ λ λ= − . (3) 
 
In other words, the reaction to the attack modifies the total attack impact from the 
start of the impact until the reaction has stopped the attack (Hamdi & Bordiga, 2005). 
This model takes into account some important elements of gauging the survivability of a 
networked system; however, it can be challenging to produce empirical quantities for the 
costs of IDS systems, the costs of reaction countermeasures, and a quantitative value for 
each element of an attack, aji  and the progression factor, ajλ , which mitigates the effect 
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of the attack. The value that is most likely the easiest to obtain is a value for IDS 
efficiency as defined above. This value can probably be obtained through extensive 
testing against known attacks. However, even this value may not be independent of other 
components and their use in a network system. 
Even more challenging for the network developer, or the engineer who is 
designing network connectivity between existing information systems, is the balancing 
act between network costs and network capability to meet requirements. As mentioned in 
the main body of the thesis, it is difficult to define a set of survivability requirements as 
they are driven by the scenario (or attack-specific). 
Perhaps the value in a network cost/benefit model such as this one is that it 
supports the development of survivability requirements. They can then be added to the 
capability requirement’s definition as determined by the systems engineering process 
used, and they can shape the architecture that defines the network composition, both from 
a hardware standpoint and from the software components developed or applied for reuse.  
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